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ABSTRACT 
In an attempt to review the existing management of institutional architecture in the petroleum 
industry in South Africa, this research measures the effectiveness of three main issues: policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability with respect to transformation targeted at 
Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA). Despite extensive research on institutional 
architecture, little is known about the extent of effectiveness of policy implementation, oversight 
and accountability in the petroleum downstream industry, towards the attainment of HDSA 
transformation.  
 
In the evaluation of the three main issues, the study took cognisance of the history and socio-
political context upon which the policy objective to ensure HDSA transformation is built. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance 
Commission (DAC) evaluation criteria, embodying relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact 
and sustainability, are used to authenticate findings related to the effectiveness of policy 
implementation. Emerging data trends were developed and analysed wherein it was found that, 
even though the sub-programmes implemented towards ensuring HDSA transformation shows 
relevance for the specific sector they, in actual fact do not translate into HDSA transformation. 
When it comes to effectiveness, the researcher validated the effectiveness of sub-programme for 
policy implementation, through a comparison of expected versus achieved results. The finding 
was that at this stage policy implementation is not effective, because many sub-programmes only 
partially met their intended purposes. Efficiency was also assessed according to the relationship 
between resources and results. In this regard, lack of critical resources such as funding, 
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infrastructure and critical skills, impeded efficiency in the petroleum industry. With respect to 
impact, the researcher concluded that at this stage, the impact of policy implementation is 
minimal. Regarding sustainability, the researcher concludes that the sub-programmes are only 
sustainable if input challenges are addressed. The facilitation model: Communication, 
Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation, (C04); Community (C01) Driven Development 
(D2) minus Historical Institutionalisation (HI) is equal to Policy Implementation Effectiveness 
(PIE), is recommended by the researcher to improve results. 
 
Trends in compiled data were analysed with regards to legislative oversight and accountability in 
the petroleum industry, using the OECD/ DAC evaluation criteria. In terms of relevance, 
effectiveness, and efficiency, the researcher discovered a partial link between the activities 
performed by parliamentarians representing the petroleum industry where HDSA transformation 
is concerned. It was concluded that electrical energy generation and distribution throughout the 
five-year period drew more focus in terms of oversight than on other sectors. It was further noted 
that oversight and accountability could have been applied more efficiently if input were linked to 
policy objectives and activities. This resulted in only partial or limited HDSA transformation in 
the petroleum industry. When it comes to sustainability the researcher argued that despite the 
apparent long-term stability of parliamentary activities, such stability may not translate to 
sufficient oversight and accountability to ensure sustainable transformation in the petroleum 
industry. It was concluded that while oversight and accountability was being applied to one 
specific arena, other areas in need of transformation did not receive sufficient, or indeed any, 
legislative oversight. The facilitation model: Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and 
Cooperation, (C04); and Community (C01) Driven Oversight and Accountability (D1OA) is 
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recommended by the researcher to improve effective oversight and accountability. Thus, 
Effective (A + O) = C04 + C01 /D1OA equals to (A + O)
e
 = C
2
0
5
 / D1OA. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LANDSCAPE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Transformation targeted at Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA) has been a 
government mandate since the dawn of democracy in 1994. In order to ensure cooperation in 
addressing this challenge, all government sectors and relevant stakeholders are compelled to 
demonstrate progress in transformation, in particular the economic empowerment of HDSAs. In 
this study, the researcher conducted an empirical investigation of the petroleum industry of South 
Africa, mainly its downstream sector, to gauge the extent to which this mandate has been 
achieved to date. The study is grounded on the philosophy that policy implementation, oversight 
and accountability, among other things, must be robust in order to ensure full realisation of the 
level of transformation desired. The hypothesis put forward is that in South Africa, 
transformation in the petroleum industry has been approached from an historical perspective, 
whereby the institutional paradigm existing long ago has been used as a foundation on which to 
build policies to address the challenges of the present. In particular, the principles governing 
transformation have not benefited sufficiently from the input of the target of the transformation 
objective, the HDSAs themselves. Consequently, policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability have made only a partial impact towards empowering HDSAs in the petroleum 
industry.  
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1.2 Background to the petroleum industry 
The institutional architecture of the South African petroleum industry is heavily influenced by 
the state of the global industry. The origins of the petroleum industry can be traced back to the 
1928s, in the Scottish highlands, where three forerunners: a Dutchman, Henry Deterding, an 
American, Walter C. Teagle and an Englishman, Sir John Cadman, met at the Achnacarry Castle 
(http://www.aljazeera.com). These three men formed strategic partnerships specialising in oil 
wells exploration, transportation, refinery and distribution. From here onwards the demand for 
oil grew as fast as the demand for petroleum, prompting competition among companies for 
sources of oil. It is believed that the culture of secrecy and mistrust that characterises the 
petroleum industry today originates from the high stakes that existed at the dawn of the industry 
(http://www.ajazeera.com). Inevitably, the main protagonists opted to stop fighting and share 
information, ultimately leading to the rise of a giant cartel whose purpose was to control the 
world’s oil supplies. During this period of agglomeration, four other companies joined the 
original three, and they together came to be known as the ‘Seven Sisters’, the biggest oil 
companies in the world (http://www.aljazeera.com; Oxford-Princeton, 2009: 24).  
 
As the main feature of the Seven Sisters is in controlling the balance of power, they brought into 
being institutions to govern the petroleum industry. These are unveiled through the course of this 
study. A typical case is the pricing of petroleum. Until the end of the 1960s, the Seven Sisters 
controlled 85% of the world’s oil reserves (http://www.aljazeera.com) and were, thus, able to 
dictate the price of oil, by colluding to limit world supply. Since then, their share of global 
supply has dwindled to a mere 10% (http://www.aljazeera.com), due to declining reserves, 
resulting in a freer international market today. The focus of oil is now in Sub-Saharan Africa, a 
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region whose economic growth might well be driven by the petroleum industry, if it were not for 
political instability, corruption and poverty. Generally, the picture painted of the petroleum 
industry is that greed, money and power play a major role in the exploitation and distribution of 
wealth (http://www.eisourcebook.org; Yates, 2009: 11). In essence, this means that transparency, 
robust oversight and accountability should be embraced so that natural resources that come with 
oil exploration activities can have a way of impacting positively in society at large.  
 
The petroleum industry is usually divided into three major components: upstream, which deals 
with exploration, development and production of crude oil or natural gas, midstream, which 
deals with oil tankers, refiners, and downstream, which deals with retailers and consumers 
(Oxford-Princeton, 2009: 24; Competition Tribunal, 2003: 2). This is the structure adopted by 
companies such as Sasol, and is also referred to as a merging of horizontal as well as vertical 
business activity (Competition Tribunal, 2003: 2). For example, Sasol is involved in the refining 
of petroleum products in the upstream market, as well as in the marketing and distribution of 
liquid fuels. However, in some companies, midstream operations are usually included in the 
downstream category. For example, the oil company, Exel, is active in the downstream market, 
in the marketing and distribution of the petroleum products, and does not have any refining 
capacity (Competition Tribunal, 2003: 3) such as has Sasol. The main activities in the petroleum 
industry include exploration, extraction, refining, transporting through oil tankers and pipelines, 
and marketing petroleum products (Competition Tribunal, 2003). The researcher is of the view 
that effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability remain critical for execution 
of these activities in a coordinated manner.  
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In South Africa the petroleum industry has been shaped by different periods. In the apartheid era 
“the petroleum industry was characterised by secrecy, a high degree of state regulation, the 
national imperative that demanded self-sufficiency, as well as various military imperatives” 
(Miller and van Meelis, 2005: 5). Miller and van Meelis (2005) confer that installations such as 
oil refineries were designated National Key Points under the National Key Points Act of 1980 
and access to them, as is still the case now, was strictly controlled. Before 1954, South Africa 
imported all petroleum products from Iran because it had no refining capability. It was only after 
1954 that South Africa developed refining capabilities, surpassed in scale only by Egypt on the 
African continent (Miller and van Meelis, 2005: 5). Sasol was established in 1950 and in 1955 
began producing petrol from coal using the Fischer Tropsch technology that Anglovaal had 
obtained from Germany (Miller and van Meelis, 2005: 5).  
 
Political instability in Iran around the 1970s led to the throttling of South Africa’s main source of 
supply and consequent higher oil prices. According to Miller and van Meelis (2005: 5), “the 
United Nations Security Council’s imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa in 1977, as well as the disinvestments campaigns during the political turmoil of the 1980s, 
fuelled this situation”. These exogenous and endogenous shocks shaped the direction of the 
South African petroleum industry, as well as the development of its downstream chemical 
industry. For example, whereas earlier decisions had derived from self-sufficiency imperatives, 
they were now increasingly dictated by military or strategic needs (Miller and van Meelis, 2005).  
 
While the involvement of the State in the energy sector began around the WWII period, it 
intensified in the 1980s with the creation of institutions such as the Department of Mineral and 
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Energy Affairs (DMEA) to oversee the petroleum industry (http://www.info.gov.za). Other 
institutions were the former Department of Planning, the former Department of Industries, the 
former Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs and several other institutions. In 1987, 
many functions of the DMEA were transferred to the National Energy Council (NEC), a 
statutory institution with an appointed Council and professional civil service 
(http://www.info.gov.za; Energy Policy Discussion Document, 1987: 87). However, the 
allocation of resources such as funding to ensure institutional sustainability derived mainly from 
the levies on liquid fuels, electricity and coal. In 1987, the Energy Policy Discussion Document 
(1987: 66-87) argue that tensions created by commercial sectors represented on the NEC 
crippled the muscle of this organisation to the point of paralysis. In addition, the allocation of 
regulatory functions, particularly governing transport fuels to the NEC, further fuelled identity 
crisis for the Council (Marquard, 2006: 372). Ministerial differences about the NEC’s budget 
funding and non-civil service staffing conditions contributed to the demise of this institution four 
years later, and it was moved back to an Energy Chief Directorate, back within the then 
Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (Abolition of the National Energy Council Act, 
1991). This means that there has been instability in State oversight and uncertainty about whom 
to fund the sector, ever since it took management over the petroleum industry. It is paramount to 
note that the petroleum industry of today is run by two ministries: the upstream petroleum is 
governed by the Department of Mineral Resources, while the midstream and downstream are 
under the Department of Energy management.  
 
In 1987, the Government of South Africa initiated another synthetic fuel scheme, Mossgas (now 
PetroSA), to produce petrol and diesel from offshore natural gas. According to Miller and van 
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Meelis (2005: 5), a steady supply of diesel was needed to fuel the country’s military operations 
outside its borders. Around this time, Sasol’s synfuels process was experiencing problems in 
producing diesel; thus, Mossgas was expected to make up the shortfall. The company was 
formed by consolidating state-owned assets in the oil sector, bringing exploration, extraction and 
processing of gas sources into one company (Miller and van Meelis, 2005: 5-6). However, 
economic power in the oil sector in South Africa remained highly concentrated. Ownership of 
upstream facilities was dominated by multinational companies and the government (Miller and 
van Meelis, 2005), with little or non-existent emphasis on sharing wealth with the locals at large.  
 
On policy development aspect, energy-related policies were conducted separately within four 
main subsectors: electricity, coal, liquid fuels and nuclear. This meant that different 
communities, with vested interests and working in silos spearheaded the policy development 
process (Marquard, 2006: 55-60). Consequently, policies developed in the 1980s were skewed 
towards electricity and nuclear, with very little policy or strategy guiding coal and liquid fuels 
(Marquard, 2006). Transparency and accountability are assumed to be almost absent in this era 
as the country was in a state of siege or undemocratic, while emphasis was placed on 
implementation with no clear strategy around how to go about this. The implication of this is that 
where there is lack of transparency, oversight and accountability hardly exists. It becomes 
impossible as well to track policy implementation progress. This takes us to the problem 
description which prompted the researcher to undertake the current study.  
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1.3 Statement of the Problem 
The South African political landscape changed in 1994 and the energy sector began to slowly 
transform, to be more transparent, inclusive and integrated. The change in political landscape 
came with significant changes in South African legislation, and this affected the petroleum 
industry directly as well. The new era was geared towards sharing the country’s natural resources 
amongst all those who live in South Africa, especially Historically Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA). One driver of this policy was the EPWA, enacted in 1998 to guide the energy 
sector further. Marquard (2006: 61) argues that, “the White Paper itself follows an integrated 
energy planning structure, which recognises that energy is not an end-good in itself, but is rather 
consumed as a means to some end.” As Marquard (2006: 61) says further, much attention was 
then focused on the first target of increasing access to energy, particularly electricity, because 
historically, provision of electricity in South Africa was limited to established towns and areas of 
economic activity, largely excluding the black majority who mainly resided in peripheral 
townships and rural areas. The EPWA of 1998 addresses this marginalisation through five key 
policy objectives. These are inter alia: “increasing access to affordable energy services, 
improving energy governance, stimulating economic development, managing energy related 
environmental and health impacts and securing supply through diversity” (White Paper on 
Energy Policy, 1998: ix). These objectives are also embodied in the National Energy Act, No 34 
of 2008.  
 
In July 2001, the South African government placed more focus on transformation by way of 
maximising black ownership in the petroleum industry, as this group was historically excluded 
from these economic benefits. The LFEC (2000), B-BBEE Act of 2003, and AA Act of 1998 
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were among policy instruments designed to address economic marginalisation. The LFEC, on its 
own, alludes to 25% of ownership by black empowerment companies in the petroleum industry, 
within ten years of Charter enactment. At a snail pace, major companies are placing this policy 
objective into perspective. For example, Thebe Investment Corporation has a 25% share of 
Shell’s South African downstream retail and marketing business (http://www.eri.uct.ac.za; 
Davidson and Winkler, 2003). Shell, with its Sapref refinery (Durban) partner BP, signed an 
agreement with black empowerment firm Southern Tankers to transport oil from the refinery to 
other South African locations (http://www.eri.uct.ac.za). There are several local firms involved 
in the downstream activities, including black-owned firms such as Naledi Petroleum and Afric 
Oil (Davidson and Winkler, 2003: 4-5).  
 
The gradualist approach to transforming the petroleum industry in South Africa also entailed 
changes in certain agreements in order to ensure smooth implementation of government policy 
objective, where HDSA transformation is concerned. Among these was the termination of MSA 
in 2003. Prior to unpacking what the MSA termination means, it is paramount to note the oil 
companies in South Africa that were parties to MSA. These were BP, Shell, Caltex, Engen, 
Total, Exel, Tepco and Afric Oil.  The main features of MSA were that “the oil companies that 
were party to MSA would purchase Sasol’s production of petroleum products up to certain 
maximum volumes from defined sources of supply and that, Sasol may not market petroleum 
products, except for certain exceptions set out in the preamble of the MSA” (Competition 
Tribunal, 2003: 2). These companies were party to what is called ‘Blue Pump Agreements’, 
which were directly linked to the MSA (Competition Tribunal, 2003). Furthermore, in terms of 
these agreements between Sasol and the oil companies, Sasol was allowed to market petrol only 
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through service stations untied to any oil company and through Sasol Blue Pump sales at service 
stations of the other oil companies in the Blue Pump Area (Competition Tribunal, 2003: 2). 
These agreements were, however, terminated in December 31
st
 2003, meaning that the 
commercial restrictions on Sasol marketing its own petroleum products would be relaxed. For 
instance, Sasol as producer of liquid fuels was now required to integrate downstream into the 
retail market in order to compete with its main vertically integrated rivals (Competition Tribunal, 
2003: 2). Consequently, Sasol signed a 25% black ownership deal with the oil company called, 
Exel. This is aligned with its downstream business, so that competition was deemed to be fair.   
 
However, the evolution of the energy sector is said to have brought large challenges (Tyler, 
2009: 7) instead of solutions, particularly hindering speedy implementation of transformation 
agenda. The NDP (2012-2030: 150) echoes this claim, asserting that “the Department of Energy 
finds it difficult to deal with cross-cutting issues including institutional capacity, governance, 
competition, regulation, investments, economic, social and environmental issues”. The 
researcher is of the view that this has a bearing on the process of empowering the HDSAs who 
are required to participate economically in the petroleum industry. In ensuring HDSA 
transformation in the petroleum industry, the Department of Energy (DoE) plays a regulatory 
role by way of awarding and enforcing compliance on wholesale, retail and site licences through 
the Petroleum Controller empowered by Petroleum Products Act of 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977) 
as Amended. The Petroleum Controller is the Minister or any person deployed by the Minister to 
award licences (Petroleum Products Act of 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977). The researcher argues 
that the Minister’s role in this regard is ambiguous because he/she exercises oversight and 
accountability over it. This means that this area lacks independence and, therefore, oversight and 
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accountability is prone to bias. Furthermore, this unclear role does not entail that transformation 
would be achieved once one is awarded a licence to operate, as implementation may require 
other enablers. Furthermore, the mere fact that this role is conducted at the national sphere of 
government poses a situation in which transformation may become uneven provincially. The 
inference is that, aspiring entrepreneurs who reside in Gauteng would more likely have easier 
mode of transportation and access to the national office than those who reside in remote areas. 
Government takes this impediment lightly. Clearly, the petroleum industry is currently doing 
poorly when it comes to HDSA transformation, especially where nodal areas are concerned. 
 
Furthermore, inputs to enable policy implementation are not aligned with policy objectives 
placed upon the petroleum industry. Input that is useful to support policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry ranges from world-class infrastructure, 
financing, skilled personnel and credible information, among other things. Tyler (2009: 7) 
supports this statement, arguing that large-scale investment programmes in the industry require 
financing, management and skills challenges, with governance becoming an increasing concern 
in the industry. The planned Mthombo refinery, for example, has been postponed several times 
due to prohibitive financing challenges. It is in this regard the researcher claims that even though 
the DOE has stringent systems, policies, procedures and regulations in terms of conducting 
compliance and enforcing policy, resources remain insufficient to fully support the industry and 
to achieve the desired policy outcomes. Furthermore, this goes against one of the LFEC objective 
in which “improving access to financing HDSA companies” (Liquid Fuels Empowerment 
Charter, 2000) is espoused. The impact of policy in the petroleum industry of South Africa, thus 
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far, has not fully flowed to the intended beneficiaries. Chapter six of this study highlights major 
disparities in terms of HDSA economic empowerment.  
 
It should be noted that at the apex of oversight and accountability is the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Energy (PPCE) in the petroleum downstream industry of South Africa. 
Parliamentarians monitor the performance of the industry in relation to HDSA transformation, 
among various activities. In so doing, Parliamentarians question, conduct site visits and summon 
the executive branch to account for the performance of the industry. Since the role of the 
executive is to award licences to aspiring entrepreneurs in the petroleum industry, this means that 
legislative oversight would be placed on licensing the HDSA companies and accountability must 
be enforced when this fails to materialise. In this regard, the researcher, firstly, infers that 
legislative oversight pays little attention in tracking this up. Secondly, this oversight plays less 
emphasis in determining whether awarding licences do, in fact, lead to HDSA transformation, by 
way of monitoring licence awardee headway. Lastly, since there is minimum oversight on this, it 
means that there could be no accountability for poor performance. Legislative oversight and 
accountability conducted by the PPCE in the past five years missed linking policy objectives to 
this output. This claim is made clear as the study unfolds.   
 
Furthermore, legislative oversight and accountability can be employed effectively only if 
capacity is strong and credible information is made available timeously. The rationale for this 
argument is that Members of Parliament (MPs) may not know the petroleum industry well due to 
its history of secrecy and technical nature. MPs conducting oversight rely heavily on the 
information they request and receive from the stakeholders, without prior thorough independent 
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or third-party review. This information may lack objectivity, further reducing the effectiveness of 
oversight and accountability towards policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. Lack of 
credible information is among issues that hampered the PPCE’s oversight role and prevented it 
from wielding needed maximum oversight and accountability. Exacerbating this situation is 
prolonging the process of hiring technical and research personnel within Committees, who may 
advise MPs on what to monitor. This, in turn, deprives the industry of deeper knowledge and 
reasonable input on policies and programmes. Furthermore, this has resulted in oversight that is 
reactive, instead of proactive and minimum or almost no accountability for poor performance.  
 
The petroleum industry is complex as its activities involve public-private partnerships. 
Coordinating policy implementation, oversight and accountability in this space is a challenge. 
Among other reasons for this are vested interests, which result in fierce competition among 
incumbent stakeholders. Vested interests emanate from the competitive nature of the industry 
itself as it must answer both private and public sector needs, whilst also answering the common 
policy objective of HDSA transformation. The researcher holds the view that not only is policy 
implementation coordination challenging in such a setting, oversight and accountability could be 
a challenge as well. This is a puzzle that the researcher dubs ‘triangle-conflict’ and is revealed as 
the study progresses. Tyler (2009: 8), for instance, states that “in the energy sector, each 
institution is driven by internal agendas and objectives, with a striking lack of coordination 
amongst them”. This statement is expressed further “a range of institutions and the complexity of 
their inter-relationships makes governance of the energy sector difficult to understand, and even 
harder to oversee” (Energy White Paper, 1998: 15). However, while the sector is slowly 
progressing, the researcher holds the view that there is minimum attention placed on institutional 
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architecture structured to ensure effective policy implementation, accountability and oversight. 
These are weak, especially when they are placed in the same context of ensuring HDSA 
transformation, among other things.  
 
The problematic development in the preceding section highlights the following:  
 Unsustainable funding support; 
 Policy objective not linked to input; 
 Lack of credible information to allow effective oversight and accountability; 
 Weak institutional capacity to drive transformation agenda;  
 Poor capacity to implement policy towards achieving HDSA transformation; 
 Lack of coordination among institutions; 
 Weak oversight and accountability. 
 
The study, therefore, critically evaluates institutional architecture for effective policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability in the energy sector of South Africa, particularly 
the petroleum industry. 
 
1.4 Research objectives  
In an attempt to review the existing management of institutional architecture in the petroleum 
industry in South Africa, this research sought to determine the effectiveness of three main issues: 
policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa. 
This is done in respect to policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation in the petroleum 
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industry. The researcher is of the view that implementation of policy objective to ensure HDSA 
transformation in the petroleum industry remains relevant in South Africa so that the greater 
society benefits from its natural resources. With regard to this, evaluation of the extent to which 
policy implementation is achieved in the petroleum industry, mainly; its downstream part 
requires empirical research. Furthermore, oversight and accountability are critical pillars that 
have a bearing on effective policy implementation and these calls for in-depth enquiry. In the 
light of this, best practices to enhance effective institutional architecture that will achieve the 
petroleum industry vision, will be introduced.  
 
The following are specific objectives of the study:  
1.4.1 To develop a sound theoretical framework; 
1.4.2 To discuss the legislative basis for understanding institutional architecture in the petroleum 
industry; 
1.4.3 To evaluate key entities within the institutional architecture, their roles and challenges in 
the petroleum industry sector, and the implication for effective implementation of policy, 
oversight and accountability;  
1.4.4 To examine and analyse emerging trends from data collected for improved policy 
management. In so doing, DAG/ OECD evaluation criteria is utilised to assess the effectiveness 
of policy implementation, oversight and accountability in relation to HDSA transformation;  
1.4.5 To propose best practice and a conceptual framework for a well-considered institutional 
architectural construct, that will forge and strengthen strong governance of the petroleum sector; 
1.4.6 To make recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of policy in the sector. 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
The significance of this study is grounded on the philosophy that South Africa took a long 
journey in ensuring HDSA transformation in the past two decades since 1994. Intense research 
of the sector is required in order gauge what really is being done to achieve policy objective of 
ensuring HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. This study is 
significant in three aspects. Firstly, the study critically evaluates institutional architecture for 
effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of South 
Africa. The variables: policy implementation, oversight and accountability are investigated 
separately. The aim is to offer empirical enquiry on the status of policy implementation 
effectiveness towards HDSA transformation; and the status of legislative oversight and 
accountability effectiveness over this policy objective in the petroleum industry. Secondly, the 
emerging trends from data collected for this current study might improve policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability management and effectiveness.  
 
Research findings of the study could furthermore offer MPs some advice on strengthening focus 
on policy implementation, oversight and accountability towards the realisation of HDSA 
transformation in the petroleum industry. The DoE could also learn from this research that its 
role should not only entail enforcing compliance and awarding licences, where HDSA 
transformation drive is concerned. Third, the researcher is of the view that institutional 
architecture and its role in effectively assisting policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry has received minimum attention among academics, 
especially in relation to HDSA transformation. Thus, the question is: to what extent has robust 
oversight and accountability resulted in effective policy implementation to ensure transformation 
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impact is felt by the targeted population in the petroleum industry of South Africa? The 
researcher aims to further interrogate this question, and this justifies the study. In addition to this, 
the constitutional mandate of DoE, that of the legislative branch and public administration role 
should be examined in this sector for progressive improvement so that institutions charged with 
the role to render service delivery do so as envisaged. 
 
1.6 Definition of selected terms 
1.6.1 Energy Security 
According to Energy Security Master Plan (2007: 13), “Energy security means ensuring that 
diverse energy resources, in sustainable quantities and at affordable prices, are available to the 
South African economy in support of economic growth and poverty alleviation, taking into 
account environment management requirements and interactions among economic sectors”.  
 
1.6.2 Energy Policy 
Marquard (2006: 323) traces the concept of Energy Policy from the “latter half of 20th century in 
industrialised countries, and was centered on the concept of the energy sector, a new way of 
organising our thinking about these industries, their development, and most importantly, the 
connection between them”. 
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1.6.3 Energy Products 
Energy product are complex, they range from electricity, petrol, diesel, paraffin, wax, kerosene, 
gas, water etc.  Energy services are known as essential services, as problems with them can 
seriously affect everybody such as electricity and fuel. 
 
1.6.4 Institutional Architecture 
A simple definition of institutional architecture relates to formal rules such as policies, 
regulations and procedures, and informal rules such as customs, norms and schemas. Institutional 
architecture also refers to a specific organisation or establishment, like hospitals, jails, nursing 
homes and parliament (Ostrom in Marquard, 2006: 37), among other things.  
 
1.6.5 Oversight  
For the purposes of this study “oversight detects and prevents abuse, arbitrary behaviour or 
illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies” 
(www.gov.za). Embodied in this function is the role to hold the government to account in respect 
of how the taxpayers’ money is used and oversee the achievement of goals set by legislation and 
the government’s own programmes (www.gov.za).  
 
1.6.6 Accountability 
The meaning of accountability, according to Day and Klein (1987: 1), “Is for relevant persons to 
give an explanation of what they do, to those to whom they are responsible and whose authority 
empowers them or gives them the right to demand such an explanation”.  
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1.6.7 Governance  
Ansell and Gash (2007) citing Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2001: 7) define governance broadly as 
“regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, 
and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services”. Ile (2007: 26) citing Kicher, 
Klijn and Koppenjan (1997: 2) see governance as directed influence on social processes. Ile 
(2007) describes this as a workable definition since it could also be argued that its limitations 
concern the fact that indirect influences may not altogether fall outside the scope of governance. 
This means that, the definition of the concept of governance would be slightly adjusted to 
include indirect influences. This suggests that a broader meaning of the concept would include 
deliberate as well as unintended processes that are associated with public policy and public 
interactions (Ile, 2007: 26). The author adds that this has implications since the limits of 
governance are not clear-cut as it includes several actors. In other words, public management is 
governance but not all governance is public management (Ile, 2007: 26) citing (Kicher et al., 
1997: 2). The researcher agrees with this declaration because the concept of governance cannot 
be constrained to one specific sector or process. As such, the study employs Stoker’s (2004: 3) 
expanded definition which sees “governance as referring to the rules and forms that guide 
‘collective decision-making”. This is so because decision-making is done collaboratively and 
agreed upon by actors including both public-private, in specific time and space. To fit in the 
context of this study for instance, public policy must be agreed upon collectively and in 
collaboration by both public and private entities in order to achieve good governance. This is 
what the researcher calls ‘rules of the game’ that must be adhered to collaboratively as 
understood in the petroleum industry of South Africa. 
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1.6.8 Industry and Sector 
The terms industry and sector warrants explanation because they are most times used 
interchangeably “to describe a group of companies that operate in the same segment of the 
economy or share a similar business type” 
(http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/industrysector.asp). These terms are rather 
dissimilar. Thus, the terms ‘sector’ refers to a large segment of the economy, while the term 
‘industry’ describes a much more specific group of companies or businesses, 
(http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/industrysector.asp). The researcher makes 
reference to the petroleum ‘industry’ as focal point. 
 
1.6.9 Policy Implementation 
Hill and Hupe (2002: 231) define policy implementation in terms of a relationship to policy as 
laid down in official documents. According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1984: xxi-xxiii), 
“policy implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals 
and actions geared to achieve them”. The researcher infers that policy implementation is the 
auctioning of agreed upon government’s intention through programmes and projects.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
A brief preview of each chapter is given in order to provide a layout of the organisation of this 
thesis. 
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Chapter One  
This chapter provides the background to the study as it seeks to CRITICALLY EVALUATE 
THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EFFECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF SOUTH AFRICA: 
A PETROLEUM PERSPECTIVE. This section includes the following explained topics: 
 Background of the study; 
 Statement of the problem; 
 Research objectives; 
 Significance of the study; 
 Definition of selected terms; 
 Outline of the study.  
 
 Chapter Two: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework  
This chapter covers the conceptual and theoretical framework upon which the study is based. 
The chapter is broadly organised into five themes. The first part analyses two theoretical ways in 
which institutional architecture is interpreted by institutionalists. Two institutional theories are 
identified: historical and rational choice institutionalists. The central claim made by institutional 
theorists is that institutions are made out of ideas, rules, norms, cultures, procedures and formal 
organisations. These institutions are created by individuals who, in turn, act as catalysts in 
shaping their behaviour. The second part gives a theoretical understanding of accountability in 
which divergent dichotomies are observed in every part of society. Core to this is the principal-
agent nexus. The third part explains the concept of oversight as both ex ante and ex post, which 
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also involves the principal-agent relationship. These are viewed by the researcher to be relevant 
to the context of the study. The fourth part explains an understanding of policy implementation 
as an activity that is carried out by the agent. It further shows what challenges the agent, as an 
implementer of statute, may be faced with during the process of implementation. The last part 
explores the monitoring and evaluation conceptual framework.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 Theoretical approach to the study of relevant institutions to the study; 
 Accountability theory; 
 Oversight theory; 
 Policy implementation theory; 
 Monitoring and evaluation concepts. 
 
Chapter Three: Selected Legislative and Regulative framework 
This part explains selected legislation and regulations that govern the petroleum industry of 
South Africa. An assertion made is that the petroleum industry of today is shaped by history 
legislatively. Furthermore, although these policies are designed to maximise the interests of norm 
entrepreneurs as alluded to by rational choice institutional theorists which, in this instance, is to 
ensure transformation targeted at Historically Disadvantaged South Africans is achieved, among 
selected policy objective, it should be noted that societies are set to heavily benefit as well upon 
adherence to policy objectives.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
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 The evolution of regulatory regime in the petroleum industry of South Africa; 
 Institutional building blocks in the petroleum industry of South Africa. 
 
Chapter Four: Current Institutional Architecture  
This part discusses current institutional architecture and is arranged according to three critical 
variables that are of focus in this study: policy implementation, oversight and accountability in 
the petroleum industry of South Africa. Since there are a range of institutions in the petroleum 
industry, only those relevant to the hypothesis are selected and analysed. The first part of the 
study looks at the international institutional trends and developments in the petroleum industry. 
The second part of the chapter explains regional bodies in the petroleum industry, the rules of the 
game and expected behaviour in operating in the industry on the African continent. The third part 
presents the institutional architecture in South Africa, mainly those institutions whose role it is to 
conduct policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry. The last 
part analyses institutional power relations in the petroleum industry. The study here observed 
dynamics of power asymmetries between the principal and agent. That is, while the principal 
may appear to have all the authority, in fact, the agent may take a lead in influencing government 
policy, especially where the principal has limited technical know-how of the industry.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 International institutional trends and developments to govern the petroleum industry; 
 Selected regional institutions guiding the petroleum industry; 
 South Africa’s institutions with the role for accountability, oversight and policy 
implementation; and 
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 Institutional power relations. 
 
Chapter Five: Research methodology and design 
This chapter presents the process that the researcher took when collecting data for the study. The 
researcher firstly sets out the research design, which is underpinned by a qualitative research 
tool. Secondly, the study discussed the research methodology, wherein a qualitative-triangulation 
research paradigm is employed. Thirdly, the researcher explained the research process and the 
tools used in gathering data. Scheduled interviews, observation and document analysis are 
selected as best suiting the research enquiry for this study. The reliability and validity of the 
study is explained. Since there are various elements of the energy sector, the researcher opts to 
contain the study within the limits of the petroleum industry of South Africa.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 Research design; 
 Qualitative research design; 
 Research methodology; 
 Data collection instruments; 
 Target population and setting; 
 Research sample; 
 Validity and reliability of the study; 
 Ethical consideration of the study; and 
 Delimitation of the study 
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Chapter Six: Findings and Analysis of Selected Issues on Policy implementation effectiveness 
in the Petroleum Industry of South Africa 
In this part of the study the researcher evaluated selected issues with regards to policy 
implementation effectiveness, relating to HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa. Among the many responsibilities of the Department of Energy towards achieving 
this objective is to award wholesale, retail and site licences and enforce compliance. Thus, each 
company awarded a licence to operate is mandated to comply, by including HDSAs in the 
business plans. The chapter focused on the findings, analysis and emerging data trends in this 
regard. The general status of policy implementation in the petroleum industry is analysed. This is 
followed by application of DAC/ OECD Evaluation criteria to assess policy implementation 
effectiveness in relation to HDSA transformation. Best practice and a conceptual framework of a 
well-considered institutional architecture for policy implementation in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa were tabled.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 Analysis of the status of policy implementation in the petroleum industry of South Africa 
and analysis of emerging data trends; 
 DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria of policy implementation effectiveness in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa; 
 Best practice and conceptual framework of a well-considered institutional architecture 
construct: Policy Implementation effectiveness. 
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Chapter Seven:  Findings and Analysis of Selected Issues on Oversight and Accountability 
effectiveness in the Petroleum Industry of South Africa 
Chapter Seven evaluated the effectiveness of oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa with regards to HDSA transformation. The function assessed is that 
played by PPCE, the institution responsible for executing legislative oversight and accountability 
in order to embed a culture of high performance in meeting the envisaged policy objectives. In so 
doing the researcher first unpacked the status of oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa in general. Following this, the researcher unveiled data trends in relation 
to the outcome of activities related to oversight and accountability. The study employed the 
DAC/OECD evaluation criteria in order to assess the effectiveness of oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry, with regards to HDSA transformation.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 Oversight and accountability status quo in the petroleum industry of South Africa; 
 Emerging data trends on oversight and accountability for the period 2009-2014 in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa; 
 OECD/ DAC evaluation criteria of oversight and accountability effectiveness in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa; 
 Best Practice and conceptual framework of a well-considered institutional architecture 
construct: Oversight and Accountability effectiveness. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and future research 
This chapter dovetailed on chapter-by-chapter summary of the study. Recommendations for 
improved petroleum governance were analysed. Future research was furthermore proposed.  
In addition to this summary, the following topics are addressed: 
 Recommendations; 
 Policy implementation improvement; 
 Oversight and accountability improvement in the petroleum industry. 
 Future research. 
 
1.8 Conclusion and Chapter Summary 
This study critically analyses the institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability in the Energy Sector of South Africa, with a particular focus in 
petroleum industry. In so doing the study explained the background of the petroleum industry 
from an international perspective. The study further explained the problem statement, which 
among other aspects points to poor institutional coordination; unsustainable funding support; 
weak institutional capacity to drive transformation agenda; poor capacity to develop and 
undertake programmes and projects that implement the policy; and weak oversight and 
accountability. The development of this study was justified because accountability, oversight and 
policy implementation effectiveness remain critical components that should assist the country to 
move forward towards achieving HDSA transformation, but have thus far not received adequate 
attention in the petroleum downstream of South Africa. The study interrogates this phenomenon 
for further development of concepts and theoretical understanding. Relevant concepts are 
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explained. And lastly a chapter summary is provided. Next, the study discusses and analyse 
Chapter Two. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERTURE REVIEW- CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework upon which this study is based. The chapter is 
broadly organised into five themes. The first part deals with analysing the terrain, in particular 
reviewing theoretical ways in which institutional architecture is interpreted by institutionalists. 
Two institutional theories are identified. These are: historical and rational choice institutionalists. 
The central statement made by institutional theorists is that institutions are made out of ideas, 
rules, norms, cultures, procedures, and formal organisations. These institutions are created by 
individuals who in turn constrain their behaviour. The second part of this chapter sets out the 
theoretical understanding of accountability. This section reveals numerous divergent dichotomies 
of accountability relevant to this current study. Among other things, literature discourse displays 
accountability on vertical, horizontal and diagonal axes. The third part of the study discusses 
literature on oversight, while the fourth outlines the theoretical understanding of policy 
implementation. The last area displays the literature discourse on monitoring and evaluation to 
provide clarity in understanding the phenomenon.   
 
2.2 Theoretical approach to the study of institutions  
Institutional theory finds its roots in the social sciences ranging from studies in ethnography, 
phenomenology, political science, organisational studies, and anthropology (Lowndes in March, 
and Stoker, 2000: 96). Theoretical development in the area of institutionalism grew over the 
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years and was pioneered by academics such as Jordan, 1990; Pedersen, 1991; Sened, 1991; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996 in (Peters, 2012: 25). Former institutional analysis was developed in the Anglo-
American tradition in the late nineteenth century, during the Woodrow Wilson’s era, as espoused 
by (Cole, 2008: 2). During this time, Cole (2008: 2) infers that institutionalism focused on the 
study of public or constitutional law and the formal operation of the key political institutions, 
hence dubbed ‘Old Institutionalists’. According to Cole (2008: 2) this era displayed little interest 
in social behaviour, or the impact of institutions on public policies. Regardless of this claim, old 
institutionalism argues that “modern regimes resemble ancient political systems in terms of their 
main institutions, such as executives, civilian and military bureaucracies, judiciaries, legislative 
assemblies, political factions and parties” (Cole, 2008: 2). However, from 1960 onwards there 
was a move away from the past trajectory in the understanding of institutions. This new epoch 
was spearheaded by the behaviourist revolution in the United States, opposing the old 
institutionalists. This new emergence in institutional theory is defined as “new institutionalism” 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 60). In seeking perceptive and cultural explanations of social and 
organisational phenomena, this new institutionalism considered the properties of supra-
individual units of analysis (Lowndes in March and Stoker, 2000: 97). Hall and Taylor (1996: 
936) portray new institutionalism as focusing mainly on the way in which institutions embody 
values and power relationships. A broader insight is given by Scott (2000: 2) as arguing that new 
institutionalism focuses on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structures made out of 
schemes, rules, norms, and routines, and these become established as authoritative guidelines for 
social behaviour.  
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New institutionalism defines institutions themselves as an essential variable in political outcomes 
(March and Olsen, 1989: 57). March and Olsen (1989: 57) add that institutions give meaning to 
interactions and provide the context within which interactions takes place. Cole (2008: 5) 
concurs as arguing that institutions are not merely organisations, but patterns of routinised 
behaviour and complex belief systems. The assertion upheld is that new institutionalism adopts 
both informal conventions and formal rules to explore how institutional stability is accomplished 
through human action. Lowndes in March and Stoker (2000: 98-99) adopts this claim, “new 
institutionalists concern themselves not just with the impact of institutions upon individuals, but 
with the interaction between institutions and individuals”.  
 
However, as time evolved, the body of literature on new institutionalism developed further to 
describe seven types of institutionalists, being: “normative institutionalists, rational choice 
institutionalists, historical institutionalists, empirical institutionalists, international 
institutionalists, sociological institutionalists and network institutionalists” (Peters, 1999: 115). 
This diversity-within-theory, while enriching (since it encompasses a variety of topics), at the 
same time presents an un-unified, confusing and contradictory body of theory (Peters, 1999: 
115). The confusion stems from numerous varieties of approaches inside this big umbrella 
termed ‘new institutionalism’. Peters (1999: 116) is concerned about this too fragmented 
approach, which he says will contribute nothing but confusion and disarray to the study of 
institutionalism. Giving consideration to this argument, the researcher has selected the following 
new institutionalism theories; historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism as 
being of most relevance to this study. According to Peters (1999: 116), these theories are 
important in terms of their impacts upon the ideological debates and the research paradigms in 
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public administration. Lowndes in March and Stoker (2000: 99) further states that, although 
these schools of thought developed simultaneously, they are in essence autonomous. What unites 
them is the fact that “they were developed in reaction to the behavioural revolution in the social 
sciences and that they all seek to explain the role that institutions play in the determination of 
political outcomes” (Lowndes in March and Stoker, 2000: 99), among other things. Hence the 
researcher does not only agree that these theories are autonomous, but they are complementary 
as well. The next point of research, discussion and analysis is the concept of historical 
institutionalism. 
 
2.2.1 Historical institutionalism 
According to Jean-Claude (2003: 127) citing Hall and Taylor (1996: 947) historical 
institutionalism as a theoretical construct was coined in the early 1980s. Rueschemeyer and 
Skocpol, Steinmo and Thelen are the earliest pioneers who explored the historical institutionalist 
school of thought (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992: 118). Steinmo (2008: 118) states that “historical 
institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor a specific method”. This means that the theory 
is better understood as an approach to studying politics. This is important for the study of public 
administration because political ideas (policies) are crafted by politicians, while administrators 
carry out, or implement them. It is also paramount to know how political ideas are carried out 
effectively by non-political actors. Steinmo (2008: 119) submits that “historical institutionalists 
pay attention to real world empirical questions, its historical orientation and its attention to the 
ways in which institutions structure and shape political behaviour and outcomes”. It is noted that 
through empirical investigation, institutional structures had profound effects on shaping political 
strategies, outcomes and, ultimately, political preferences (Steinmo, 2008: 119). In this regard, 
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historical institutionalists trace the past experiences to determine the future. Hall and Taylor 
(1996: 944) agree with this assertion as saying that the policy choices made at the inception of 
the institution will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into 
the future. Rose (1991: 12) explains further that policy choices are limited by past choices as the 
incumbent governments of the day cannot ignore past commitments that are given substance by 
complex legal systems and pre-existing institutions. A major premise is that “the current 
outcomes of public policies do not reflect the mere preferences or interests of the current 
strongest competitors, but that they are channelled by the existing and past institutional 
arrangements in which competition takes place” (Jean-Claude, 2003: 130).  
 
To explain this broadly, Steinmo and Thelen (1992: 120) introduce the term ‘path dependent’. 
Steinmo and Thelen (1992: 120) refer to institutions such as political and administrative 
organisations or conventions and procedures regulating the relationships of economic actors and 
the state as path dependent. This means that “modes of conflict-cooperation and the structure of 
outcomes are to a large degree persistently identical throughout time” (Jean-Claude, 2003: 127).  
The theory posits institutions as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape and one 
of the central factors pushing historical development along set ‘paths’ (Jean-Claude, 2003: 130). 
According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 939), when a government institution or organisation 
embarks upon a ‘path’, it is difficult to move away from the chosen path of this institution 
because of the institution’s tendency to persist in the chosen course of policies. Levi expands the 
definition of path dependence: “Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once 
a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be 
other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy 
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reversal of the initial choice” (Pierson, 2000a: 252) citing (Levi, 1997: 28).  According to the 
researcher, it appears that this explanation presents a persistent nature of institutions which is 
uneasy to be reversed once created. Peters (1999: 19) echoes this claim as he admits that the 
persistent nature of institutions could change only if there is sufficiently strong political force to 
counteract it. This statement fits well in the South African context during the apartheid era. For 
instance, the South African government system of apartheid changed from a structure where 
representation in Parliament exclusively catered for Whites, but persisted through the Tricameral 
Parliament, a system that merely provided Coloureds and Indians with voting rights and 
Parliamentary representation in separate houses, while excluding black people completely. 
Apartheid laws were created to provide legitimacy to this system. When the system was 
dismantled by the post-apartheid South African government, it was replaced by a constitutional 
democracy consisting of a three-tier system of government. An independent judiciary took over 
and all South Africans received the power to vote. However, despite this institutional overhaul, it 
does not necessarily mean that past institutional paths cannot be traced through the current 
system. This is what is meant by path dependency. 
 
According to Steinmo (2008: 123), historical institutionalists are fascinated by history because 
they believe history matters. Three important ways in which history matters is highlighted here: 
Firstly, historical institutionalists argue that “political events happen within an historical context, 
which has a direct consequence on the decisions” (Steinmo, 2008: 126). This could relate well to 
the example already provided above. The democratic government of South Africa set up in 1994 
sought to dismantle apartheid injustices as a result of past political events. The second reason 
history matters, as provided by (Steinmo, 2008: 126), is that “actors or agents can learn from 
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experience”. This stems from an understanding that behaviour, attitudes and strategic choices 
take place inside particular social, political, economic and even cultural contexts. For example, 
choices made during economic downturn or political instability give experience for future 
decisions. So, rather than treating all political action as if they are fundamentally the same 
irrespective of time, place or context, historical institutionalists attempt to situate their variables 
within context (Steinmo, 2008: 126). Basically, to address the current problem historical 
institutionalists bring past experience: how did we succeed in the past economic downturn or 
political turmoil to build a better socio-economic dispensation today and in the future? And this 
effect of historic institutionalism is ongoing. Historical institutionalists do this because they 
assume that what happened in the past and the actors involved at the time are able to offer more 
accurate explanations for the specific events that they travelled (Steinmo, 2008: 127). Thirdly, 
Steinmo (2008: 128) states that history matters because “expectations are shaped by the past”. 
This brings us to the conclusion that it is paramount to acknowledge the importance of history as 
this could provide a baseline for improving policy implementation, oversight and accountability. 
To a large extent, the researcher sees this to be what is in the mind of politicians when crafting 
policies. The past is observed in the hope that the future will yield improved results; and this is 
the case when it comes to the policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. As a result of 
this policy objective in South Africa, there are laws dubbed ‘reverse apartheid laws’ such as 
AAA and B-BBEE, among others, by which preference is given to Blacks to exploit economic 
opportunities.  
 
Proponents of this theory project a detailed picture of many sides of historical institutionalism 
and this assists in a better understanding of the phenomenon. Peters (1999: 67) presents the 
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historical institutionalists’ perspective as per the ‘formation of institutions’, ‘institutional design’, 
‘individual and institutional reaction’, and ‘institutional change’. Peters (1999: 67- 68) 
postulates institutional formation as one of the important focuses of historical institutionalism. In 
this regard, ‘ideas’ are positioned as paramount in defining the creation of an institution (Peters, 
1999: 67). When an idea becomes accepted and embodied into a structural form, then the 
institution has been created, according to Peters (1999: 67). Peters (1999: 68) goes on to 
demonstrate that, once these ideas are entrenched they have a framing effect, which ultimately 
becomes basic templates upon which other political decisions are made. The researcher submits 
that, to a large extent, there is an element of truth to what historical institutionalists propagate. 
For instance, governments or companies draft manifestos or ideas that project long-term vision 
that seeks to give direction to the institution going forward. The African National Congress 
Freedom Charter (1955) is prime example of this. In other words, ideas provide foundation for 
political behaviour and or decisions (Blyth, 2002: 23). Hall and Taylor (1996: 948), in 
supporting this claim, add that defining the exact moment when the institution starts taking form 
is crucial as this contributes to the importance of time and sequence in the analysis through the 
historical institutionalist approach. 
 
The explanation in the preceding section does not sit well with critics of historical 
institutionalism as they view it to be rather ambiguous in explaining institutional formation. For 
instance, Peters (1999: 67) states that, on the one hand, historical institutionalists focus in their 
literature on the more formal institutions like legislatures and bureaucracies. On the other hand, 
they assume that ‘ideas’ play a significant role in defining the existence of institutions (Peters, 
1999: 67). In any case, Hall and Taylor (1996: 962) are of the view that even though ideas play a 
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central role in institutions as ‘building blocks of action’, they are important because they are also 
constraints on choices. In this sense, Steinmo and Thelen (1992: 3) believe that ‘ideas’ as central 
components in defining institutions can be vague. The researcher agrees because the very same 
ideas that come in the form of policies or rules and programmes could have a harmful effect and 
could destroy the very same institutions being formed. Historical institutionalists need to tell us 
what informs or constitutes a good or bad idea for better understanding of the phenomenon. 
However, some critics may argue that ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are subjective concepts in the sense that 
what appears to be good to one individual may appear bad to another. This gap in the literature 
calls for a closer interrogation of this approach.  
 
Progressively, ‘institutional design’ is explained minimally as compared to the explanation of 
‘institutional formation discussed above. Peters (1999: 72) concurs with this statement: “given 
the importance attached to the moment of institutional creation that determines the further 
development of these institutions, the limited attention for how these institutions are ‘designed’ 
is a bit surprising”. Furthermore, Peters (1999: 72) observes that, in terms of an understanding of 
institutional design, the historical institutionalists appear to assume a lack of intentionality and of 
design criteria in the initial formulation of policies and institutions. Historical institutionalists 
rather are viewed as putting more focus on ‘redesigning’ institutions than institutional design 
itself (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993: 19, Peters, 1999). Brunsson and Olsen (1993: 19) argue that 
this process, in which an existing institutional framework is no longer fully applicable to the 
nature of the institution, does involve conscious policy choices for redesigning the institution, 
and these are adequately captured and analysed by the historical institutionalists. This is so 
because historical institutionalists depend on history to analyse this approach. Basically, there 
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must be a starting point for historical institutionalists to study this phenomenon, and this is where 
the theory falls short. Historical institutionalists appear to be able to explain the existing 
phenomenon by tracking the past. This compels Brunsson and Olsen (1993: 19) to provide a 
simple argument to the design of institutions thus: “successfully designed reform of institutions 
must be a ‘top down’ process”. They go on to assert that any attempt to build reform from the 
‘bottom up’ is viewed as almost certainly doomed to failure, given the need for a clear vision of 
the future direction of the institution (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993: 19).  
 
Historical institutionalists, furthermore, analyse individuals’ reaction within institutions. In this 
regard, individuals are viewed as shaping institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 950). This is bound 
to happen because human beings are social constructs. Hall and Taylor (1996) goes on stressing 
that individuals make institutional decisions that then persist throughout the future life of the 
institution. This corresponds well with the notion of ‘ideas’ as discussed previously. The notion 
of ideas was shown to play a crucial role in the formation of institutions and the paths they 
embed going forward. Individuals come up with ideas which then shape the very same 
individual’s behaviour. Hall and Taylor (1996) discuss this further, “individuals attracted to a 
particular set of ideas will come into the institution ready to accept those ideas”. As such, the 
capacity of structures to communicate these ideas successfully to individuals joining the 
institutions, form a link between individuals and institutions, as Hall and Taylor (1996: 951) 
explain. This is how individuals react within institutions, as seen by historical institutionalists. 
But what do historical institutionalists say about individuals who do not react or share similar 
ideas within the institution? The assumption made by historical institutionalists is that 
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individuals will voluntarily or involuntarily accept and implement these ideas and that this will, 
in turn, shape their behaviour.  
 
The researcher submits that it is rather a narrow way of concluding that individuals will react in a 
projected and prescribed manner. It is important that historical institutionalists understand that 
when they talk of individuals within institutions, they are informed by two types of thinkers that 
could occupy the same organisational space. These are the binary and dialectic thinkers. For an 
individual at an intrapsychic, level for instance, a binary thinker will process decision making 
with the choice among alternatives, which is usually between two alternatives, thus “will it be 
right for me to choose action A or action B” (Denfeld and Petriglieri, 2005: 32). Similarly, it is 
normally an assertion that policies formulated are informed by best choices, but curiously, policy 
implementation yields unintended outcomes. This compels one to question historical 
institutionalists’ assertion that assumes that the actions of individuals are shaped by their 
institutions. It is also not clear at this stage if the cause of poor implementation of these ideas can 
be blamed on implementers or the ideas themselves. According to Denfeld and Petriglieri (2005: 
32), “reducing complex phenomena or choices to a binary set of alternatives is part of human 
nature, a fundamental mechanism deeply engraved in our nervous tissue and passed on from 
generation to generation for our survival”. The researcher submits that this kind of thinking does 
occur at a group level as well, where ideas are discussed. For instance, the decision made by the 
American government during George Bush’s era to attack Iraq could be argued as being 
informed by binary thinking. Thus, the researcher assumes that George Bush and his team chose 
between two decisions whether to attack Iraq in order to gain access to oil, and or disarm Bin 
Laden, who was directly associated with the attack of America. As such, George Bush achieved 
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the former, while the latter was carried out by his predecessor. Historical institutionalists could 
place their argument better if dialectic thinkers are brought into the institution decision-making 
process whereby discrimination of differences is required, even though this can lead to tension 
and conflict. Denfeld and Petriglieri (2005: 33) assert that this is so because it is where linear and 
transformative process takes place, leading to better results. Dialectics imply that “progress is 
made by sequentially resolving a series of emerging conflicts” (Denfeld and Petriglieri, 2005: 
33). This takes us to a discussion on institutional change, as adopted by historical 
institutionalists. 
 
The topic of institutional change proves a difficult one to tackle in the historical institutionalist 
paradigm. This is because of its static nature. According to Pierson (2000a: 265) the 
omnipresence of the path dependency discourse discussed previously, implies the risk of 
suggesting an exaggerated view of the social world as a ‘frozen landscape’. Naturally, this frozen 
landscape-impression does not correspond with the reality that life is dynamic and makes it 
difficult for historical institutionalism to explain how institutions cope with new challenges or 
developments that they face (Pierson, 2000a: 265). It is important to note that institutions operate 
in a constantly changing environment, and an investigation on how institutions respond to 
change requires attention. The effectiveness of policy implementation, accountability and 
oversight are dependent variables that are prone to shaping by the environment. A fitting context 
that bears no history ought therefore to be determined. However, historical institutionalists 
provide a response to this concern by bringing two kinds of change. The first one takes us to 
incremental policy changes, not impossible to consider (Pierson, 2000a: 265), even though 
institutions are posited as being static. Historical institutionalists consider this as part of 
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institutional development (Lindblom, 1965: 113), meaning that path dependence, as explained 
earlier, is not a story of inevitability, in which the past neatly predicts the future, but more a way 
to link decision making through time (North, 1993: 11).  
 
However, this approach could be perceived as a way of downplaying the influence changes can 
exert on institutions. For instance, environmental influences can bring a big shock to an 
institutionalised idea. There is strong evidence that companies may react differently to similar 
challenges addressed by policy adjustments. Businesses perform more efficiently if they receive 
institutional support, in particular a policy enabling environment. It is, therefore, more 
problematic for historical institutionalism to come to terms with sudden, profound changes that 
upset the whole system and the institutions within; for this reason, historical institutionalism 
tends to proceed by making only incremental adjustments to policy formulation. Pierson (2000a: 
265) argues that such changes “swamp or erode the mechanisms of reproduction that generate 
continuity”, and hence can severely disrupt the institutional development altogether. Importantly, 
several scholars dealt with this problem of profound changes in different ways, and they bring 
forth the concept of “punctuated equilibria” (Pierson, 2000a: 265). In essence, this concept 
refers to slow or gradual evolution, which also occurs at ‘idea’ or ‘policy-formulation’ level. The 
well-known author of the theory of evolution is Darwin, whose philosophy goes by the name of 
‘Darwinism’. When this evolution happens past traits can still be traced. Pierson (2000a) further 
explains this evolution: institutions are thought to be in a constant equilibrium, carrying out 
policy decisions that were made at the time of institutional formation. However, at certain 
moments in time this equilibrium is ‘punctuated’ (Pierson, 2000a: 265). This means that the 
continuous process is disrupted or halted as a result of policy adjustment. In South Africa for 
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example these punctuation points or amendments to policy happen after a decade of 
implementation. Specific reference is made to the Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter (LFEC), 
which outlines how to go about ensuring HDSA transformation in the petroleum downstream 
industry. The LFEC was developed in 2000, and in 2011 an audit report was developed to gather 
the extent to which transformation is achieved. From this time onwards the LFEC has been going 
through amendments. Pierson (2000a) observe these punctuation points to explain profound 
policy changes in an institution.  
 
However, the challenge is that, as new behaviours, norms, schemas, rules, and culture emerge 
during this evolution period, historical institutionalists fail to tell us what rules are being used in 
the meantime while policy is still undergoing through adjustments. Furthermore, the theory does 
not clarify how the new formed rules converge with the existing one. While scholars of Public 
Administration do not rule-out change, the possibility of resistance in adopting incremental 
changes is also not tackled well by historical institutionalists. The claim made by Bacalso (2010: 
7) is that, new rules may be compelled to compete with and contest the already existing ones. It 
is paramount to note that rules do not just get easily understood and internalised. Rules must first 
be socialised in order to reach a stage where they are deemed institutionalised. Bacalso (2010) 
notes that rules or norms go through three stages in order to get full institutionalisation: rules 
emerge, cascade and then get internalised. Figure 2.1 ought to be observed as demonstrating this 
argument. 
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Figure 2.1: Norm Cycle in organizational context 
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
For the purposes of the chapter under discussion, the inference is that, norm emergence derives 
from the top management, which then cascades down information to other levels of operation 
where finally it gets adoption and implementation. The researcher is of the opinion that the gap 
during punctuation period may pose complications related to institutional governability and 
disturb policy implementation process, because it is not clear which rules (old or new) would 
take precedence. Consequently, there may be no oversight, allowing for an opportunity of poor 
resource management. Policy non-compliance during this period may further go unaccounted 
for. 
 
The second way of explaining how historical institutionalism explains institutions’ response to 
new challenges or changes is through stressing what they call the “unintended consequences and 
inefficiencies generated by existing institutions in contrast to descriptions of institutions as more 
purposive and efficient” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). The assumption here is that there were 
some form of initial descriptions and expectations that certain results would be obtained, but 
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failed to yield as envisaged. Historical institutionalists referred to this as unintended consequence 
rather than policy or programme failure, which eventually lead to what (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 
942) call ‘branching points’ from which historical development embarks upon a new path. These 
profound changes are said to be sometimes not only stemming from internal inefficiency but can 
also be generated by ‘exogenous shocks’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 942). Collier and Collier (1991: 
78) submit that these major change points then converge with a variety of internal political forces 
and turn into ‘critical junctures’. A clear example of this in South Africa is the transition phase 
between apartheid and post-apartheid in the early 1990’s.  
 
According to Pierson (2000a: 267) “junctures are ‘critical’ because they place institutional 
arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.” This holds true 
because many African countries during critical juncture or transition stage engage into civil 
wars. Hall and Taylor (1996: 942) say, policy decisions taken at these moments of critical 
juncture will then persist and create a new period of relative institutional stability until different 
external and internal forces converge again into a new critical juncture. Pierson (1996: 147) also 
introduces the notion of ‘increasing returns’ to describe this process.  Pierson (1996) argues that 
there are strong incentives not to change direction once decisions have been taken at critical 
junctures. Pierson (1996: 147) posits policy continuity to be very effective at this stage and that 
this could provide optimum returns over the long run. However the truthfulness of the statement 
made by Pierson will be tested as the study unfolds. According to Cole (2008: 12), the model of 
historical institutionalism can support a bureaucratic model of politics. For instance, decision-
making involves a process of sedimentation, as successive layers of decisions become acceptable 
to most actors by reducing uncertainty, even though each may, in some senses, be sub-optimal 
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(Cole, 2008: 13). This is because generally, policy networks embrace stability rather than 
change. Taken literally, this rather static portrayal of institutions could be seen to underplay the 
prospects for policy change (Cole, 2008: 13). 
 
The researcher submits that this approach is well-suited to explain the persistently poor 
performance of policies and their implementation, but is much less promising as a means of 
explaining changes in policies, environment and/or structures governing the effectiveness of 
policy implementation, accountability and oversight. Furthermore, the approach assumes that 
unintended consequences bares negative outcome. There is, however, overwhelming evidence in 
which policy implementation yield positive unintended consequences and historical institutions 
do not unpack this notion. Additionally, public administration operates in a changing 
environment which determines whether unintended consequences are positive or negative. 
Historical institutionalists need to assist us in understanding how they accommodate constant 
environmental changes, and how institutions cope when faced with critical junctures, the so-
called branching points. Sharing similar argument is Weaver and Rockman (1993: 226), who 
speak of “automatic government” and are skeptical around government’s capacity to implement 
change. This view is also supported by Hogwood and Peters (1983: 55), who argue that changing 
organisations and policies is often more problematic to accomplish than it is to achieve their 
initial formulation. Gaining a theoretical understanding will enable scholars to advise on the right 
direction to take when effecting policy changes. But Cole (2008: 17) counters this argument as 
saying that policy programmes pursue their autonomous development irrespective of the 
activities of governments in power. Stressing this point, Pierson (2000a: 255) adds that there are 
increasing returns even if policies are dysfunctional, as with time there is increasing buy-in by 
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key actors. Holding on to this approach, Pierson (2000a: 256) contends that “past experiences are 
predictable, whereas change is unpredictable”. In such a context, the researcher submits that a 
climate in which policies are repeatedly amended, suggests an inability on the part of policies to 
cope with the constantly changing environment. This has been a persistent problem in South 
Africa’s petroleum industry, as the management of policy has suffered ongoing neglect. This 
assertion is supported by the fact that there is no National Petroleum Act giving specific attention 
to South African petroleum matters. Arguments put forward associated with this theory are 
summarised by Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) as follows: 
 
Historical institutionalists tend to: 
• “Conceptualise the relationship between the institutions and individual behaviour in 
relatively broad terms;  
• Emphasise the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of 
institutions; 
• View institutional development as emphasising path dependence and thus resulting in 
unintended consequences;  
• Be especially concerned with integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that 
other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes” (Hall and Taylor, 
1996: 938). 
 
The researcher is of the view that historical institutionalists have provided a basic idea of what 
constitutes institutions, how they are created, how the individuals react within institutions and 
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how institutions face change. However, the researcher has a concern with historical 
institutionalists, because for them to explain institutional formation there must be a historical 
event. Certainly policy development may be prompted by societal challenges, but this does not 
necessarily constitute an historical event. Rules are formed because there may be a need to 
control or manage certain behaviours. The researcher is of the view that efficiency in policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability are determined by whether individuals are willing 
to champion these functions, but historical institutionalists do not interrogate this. Also, while the 
environment is a strong determinant of the current state of affairs, it is important to unpack how 
it could impact on key dependent variables of this study such as policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability. Historical institutionalists cannot explain institutional architecture 
beyond history, and this poses a challenge in understanding the phenomenon under discussion. 
This propels the researcher to examine the phenomenon further, looking at the second theory, 
which also falls under the umbrella of institutional theory. This theory is called ‘rational choice 
institutionalism.’ 
 
2.2.2 Rational choice institutionalism  
Rational choice institutionalism arose initially from the study of congressional behaviour in the 
United State of America in the late 1970s (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 957). Rational choice 
institutionalism is a theoretical approach to the study of institutions arguing that “actors use 
institutions to maximise their utility” (Peters and Pierre, 2002: 2). Similar to the view of 
historical institutionalists, rational choice institutionalists argue that “actors face rule-based 
constraints provided by the institutional environment which influence their behaviour” (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 957). Logic underlying the rational choice institutionalism is that institutions are 
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formed through set of rules and the members of the institutions behave in response to those rules 
(Peters and Pierre, 2002: 2). Institutions are not observed to be bearing norms or values, nor does 
history play a significant role, according to rational institutionalists. Rather, norms and values are 
seen to be the result of human behaviour, which then acts as a constraint on individual actors. 
However this constraint sets parameters for action rather than shaping preferences (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996: 957). This view, shared by historical institutionalists, as discussed above, says that 
individuals create ideas, which in turn shape their behaviour. The difference is that rational 
choice institutionalists assume the intention of these ideas is to maximise the utility of 
individuals. 
 
The rational choice theory assumes that individuals are egoistical in character and that people 
have a tendency to calculate the costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do 
(Kamel, 2009: 72). This is said to be true because it is natural for organisations to analyse 
different scenarios against costs and benefits prior to making a final choice of action. The 
expectation is that choices made will yield the envisaged results, be beneficial to the institution 
and, sometimes, to the actors. Kamel (2009: 72) states that the fundamental assumption of 
rational choice theory is that the primary unit of analysis is the individual as decision‐maker. In 
this regard, individuals are viewed as egotistical and self-interested actors. According to Kamel 
(2009: 73), this assertion does not assume that rational choice is only about individuals. For 
instance, self-interested actors can agree to abide by common rules if they consider this to be in 
their interest. Cole’s (2008: 20) argument is that the key interest is how to design institutions that 
can limit that ‘egotistical’ behaviour, which may be detrimental to society as a whole. The 
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inference is that this is where rules are applied in order to contain the unwarranted behaviour of 
individuals.  
 
Within the rational institutional theory, three different approaches are introduced: 1) principal-
agent models, 2) game-theoretic models; and 3) a rules-based approach (Jean-Claude: 2003: 
137). It is paramount that an explanation of these sub-theories is given as they provide deeper 
insight into the study. The first leg is explained by Jean-Claude (2003: 137) and posits a 
principal- agent model as a model that is applied in the institutional setting aimed at addressing 
the control of the bureaucrats by the elected politicians. For example, the principal (which is the 
parliament or political cabinet) must make the agent (which is a public agency or a bureaucrat) 
act in a way the principal would like the latter to behave. The agent is assumed to be more 
knowledgeable about the area where he/ she is supposed to act, and to have access to better 
information (Jean-Claude, 2003: 137). The problem is that his/her preferences and sometimes 
even his/her actions cannot be observed directly by the public, which has to judge performance 
on the basis of observable outcomes (Jean-Claude, 2003: 137).  
 
Furthermore, principals are public figures and thus vulnerable to criticism when the policy is not 
achieved. According to Downs and Rocke (1994: 362), this introduces a discrepancy between 
what the principal wants the agent to do and what is in the agent’s own interest. The researcher is 
of the view that this is where power asymmetry challenges between the principal and the agent 
originate. This phenomenon is explored further as the study unfolds. Anonymous, for instance, 
asks the question: “nine times out of ten Ministers side with their officials. So, do you want a 10 
per cent or 90 per cent chance of success?” The inference is that there could be a contractual 
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agreement based on performance between the principal and the agent. While the agent may be 
propelled to execute policy goals he/she may not agree with, the principal may also have other 
political agendas to achieve, hence the support. This is so because the principal’s contractual 
renewal may be based on performance, which is to ensure that policies are implemented.  The 
fact of the matter is that agents also find their lives easy if they side with their principals in terms 
of good working relationships. This is explained further below.  
 
Downs and Rocke (1994: 362) explains that in order to ensure cooperation, specific incentives 
and punitive measures are set around bilateral contracts. This is evident in the petroleum industry 
of South Africa where the ‘principal’ is the Energy of Department, (representing government) 
and the ‘agents’ are institutions reporting to the Department and the civil servants that work 
within the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy outlines policy ideas, and these are 
then handed over to the implementing agencies to implement against envisaged deliverables. 
Bilateral agreements between the principal and the agents are in the form of a performance 
contract, or legal binding documents such as a Memorandum of Co-operation or Shareholder’s 
Compact that enforces compliance and provides terms of reference. Notably, these are political 
decisions that bureaucrats must implement even if they do not agree with the policies dictated by 
the principal. This evokes concerns for March and Olsen (1984: 747), regarding the performance 
and the internal management of public organisations in this particular setting. Their main 
concern is the capacity of the elected institutions of government to hold the non-elected 
accountable and to have a set of desired policies enacted, even if the bureaucracy is not 
particularly supportive of those policies (March and Olsen, 1984: 747). In support of this claim is 
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Peters (1999: 5) arguing that the capacity of governments to put constraints on individual choice 
in order to produce certain results might not be possible without strong institutional architecture. 
 
Game theory is the second leg of rational choice institutional theory, which explains interaction 
in the institutional setting as a study of strategic decision-making (Aumann, 1989: 936). Game 
theory is a model of optimising outcomes by taking into consideration not only benefits against 
costs, but also the interaction between participants (Aumann, 1989: 936). Wildavsky (1992: 45) 
agrees that game theory looks at the relationships between participants in a particular model and 
predicts their optimal decisions. According to Aumann (1989: 937), game theory is informed by 
two other main branches: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. These two branches of 
game theory are portrayed to differ in how they formalise interdependence among the players in 
institutions. In non-cooperative game theory for instance, a game is a detailed model of all the 
moves available to the players (Aumann, 1989: 937). As Calvert (1995: 226) says, “a non-
cooperative game is any game in which the players are unable to coordinate their strategy 
choices”. Players may be unable to make coordinated choices for a number of reasons. For 
instance, participants may be unable to communicate, coordination may be disallowed by statute, 
or no agent may exist to enforce an agreed upon joint strategy (Calvert, 1995: 226). The 
researcher notes that these reasons explain clearly how oversight and accountability may be too 
weak to have the desired impact, which then would lead to poor policy implementation. 
Therefore, the researcher adopts Communication, Coordination, Collaboration and Cooperation 
4C0s (developed further in the study) as foundation for this theoretical development, since they 
are paramount for ease of policy facilitation, oversight and accountability. 
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By contrast, the cooperative branch of game theory, according to Aumann (1989), starts with a 
formalisation of games that is altogether removed from procedures. It concentrates instead on the 
possibilities for agreement. Calvert (1995: 226) declares that institutions involve cooperation. 
Even so, the researcher states that this does not mean cooperation connote efficiency in policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability. However, Calvert (1995: 226) believes that 
institutions have a way of compelling people to work together to yield better results in ways that 
those same people would not without the institutional constraint. Calvert (1995) contends that 
institutions usually produce some form of cooperation among at least some subset of the 
participants. For example, when politicians or executive officials follow the rules of the game 
specified by a written constitution, they are cooperating (Calvert, 1995: 226). If they did not, 
they would not be co-operating and in the workplace they would refer to this as insubordination - 
a punishable offense, which, some instances, may lead to dismissal. Calvert (1995) explains that 
“the expression of adherence to a value or ideal constitutes an act of cooperation in that it 
reinforces the expectation of social adherence to that value and of willingness to impose 
sanctions on its behalf” (Calvert, 1995: 227). Calvert (1995) goes on to argue that “whenever 
people operate within an institution they need to establish precedent, assign specialised roles, 
define appropriate levels of cooperation, or take individual roles, define appropriate levels of 
cooperation, or take individual private information into account, they can do it most effectively 
by communicating, by starting suggestions, intentions, or information” (Calvert, 1995: 227). This 
means that even though this theory views individuals as egotistical, these individuals must do 
this in the context of cooperation, communication and coordination with other individuals and 
comply with policies and procedures that are provided by institutions. However, the challenge is 
that so far, there is no proof that coordination, communication and coordination yields efficient 
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implementation of policy,  oversight and accountability, because further resources may be 
needed. A deeper discussion unfolds. 
 
The ‘rules of the game’ is the third leg of rational institutionalism theory, which presents  
institutions as laying down the rules of the game, in defining the range of available strategies and 
the sequence of alternatives (Jean-Claude, 2003: 144). Rules in this instance are seen to be 
paramount as they are assumed to constrain human behaviour. So, what types of rules would be 
suitable to control certain unwarranted behaviour at a particular time and space? Jean-Claude 
(2003: 144) argues that rules are considered the best mechanism by which administrative 
behaviours can be influenced so as to exploit resources in the most appropriate way. March and 
Olsen (1999: 25) introduce a term called ‘logic of consequences’, which means that “action is 
understood as being based on conscious self-interested calculation of costs and benefits” (March 
and Olsen, 1989: 25). Actors according to March and Olsen (1989: 25) always choose the action 
that best maximises their convenience, in that they always choose the course of action that makes 
them better off rather than worse off. In this sense, the ordering of preferences is presumed to be 
stable and consistent, and actors will always choose actions that give them the best outcome 
(March and Olsen, 1989: 27). The objective then is to make the outcomes of behaviour fulfil an 
actor’s personal desires and interests, and in this way (March and Olsen, 1989) observes this 
action as more preference-based than rule-based. Under such a logic of consequences, the role of 
norms or rules is seen as “negotiated constraints on fundamental processes of self-serving 
rationality, rather than constitutive” (March and Olsen, 1989). For rational choice 
institutionalists, norms and the institutions within which they are embedded are socially 
constructed. To enforce these norms, rational institutionalists then apply sanctions for non-
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compliance, using the rules rendered by institutions. The logic of consequences means punitive 
measures are employed where there is non-cooperation, in order to make sanctioning effective. 
The researcher argues that this could be where accountability is enforced or encouraged. 
However, still this needs clear understanding of the rules by those who enforce them and robust 
oversight. 
 
March and Olsen (1989) suggest that rules provide the main and most effective vehicle for 
conformity. Hall and Taylor (1996: 957) share similar sentiments as they state that “the 
institutional environment provides information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce 
uncertainty for each actor about the corresponding behaviour of others”. In this context, the 
actors’ behaviour is seen to be highly influenced by the expectation of how other players will 
bargain (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 957). However, this study would not rely on the ‘rules’ as 
prerequisite to enforcing compliance, because the same rules could lack application and therefore 
be rendered weak. So far there is instead knowledge gathered from historical institutionalists, 
which suggest that rules themselves at some point face punctuation point. Furthermore, as the 
study progresses it will be shown that positing rules in this manner is rather a misleading 
argument.  
 
Hall and Taylor (1996: 957) further introduce a term called ‘calculus approach’ which explains 
how the institutional setting influences individual behaviour, and stresses how strategic 
interaction discussed in game theory determine policy outcomes. The researcher argues that this 
is tantamount to offering a prescriptive perspective, which furthermore demands conformity to 
those prescriptions. Similarly to historical institutionalists, this theory assumes that once rules are 
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set there will be automatic application of them. They appear to argue that once there is 
cooperation towards the rules, envisaged results will be achieved. The theory offers little or no 
insight on the reasons why there are critical junctures or punctuation points, and how the 
egoistical policy creators ensure cooperation in such a situation. People however cannot be 
treated as if they are machines or robots, because machines may respond exactly in the manner 
they are programmed. In this study reference is made to policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability as particular institutions conducted by human beings who are social constructs. 
When humans are faced with exogenous and endogenous shocks may respond contrary to the set 
rules while a programmed machine may not. Stressing this point, Ward in March and Stoker 
(1995: 69) argue that no one knows about the provenience of the preferences of people; the 
knowledge which is there is based on assumptions, respectively.   
 
However, even though rational choice institutionalism is a comprehensive theory that seeks to 
explain all human behaviour, it has gained extensive criticism from various opponents. Criticism 
put forward by Scott (2000: 2) for example, is that rational choice institutional theory denies the 
existence of any kind of action other than the purely rational and calculative. Rational choice 
institutionalism views all social action as rationally motivated, as instrumental actions meaning; 
“social actions pursued after evaluating its consequences and consideration of the various means 
to achieve it” (Wikipedia), however much it may appear to be rational or irrational (Scott, 2000: 
2). In essence, the rational choice institutionalists conceptualises actions as rational strategies for 
realising the preferences of the actor, reducing the motives of political actors to self‐interest, 
according to Berkeley (2001: 14). Furthermore there may be instances where poor corporate 
governance within institutions becomes apparent even though there are robust rules to constrain 
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such behaviour. The rational choice institutionalists do not explain what informs individual 
choices in such a case, even though they term it as non-cooperative behaviour. For instance, is 
non-cooperative a rational or a non-rational choice, or the other way around? An employee can 
decide to be non-cooperative by not conforming to what they view to be inappropriate. 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that non-cooperative behaviour is irrational. Actions that lead to 
killing other people cannot be regarded as rational because they cause harm even if there maybe 
authorisation to do so. In this instance, one may choose to be non-cooperative and this does not 
suggest irrationality. Furthermore, policies that care little about eradicating poverty cannot be 
assumed to be rational. There is, therefore, a need for expansion on the theory so that it explains 
what constitutes a rational action that maximises utility on behalf of institutions that pursue 
policy implementation, oversight and accountability. Broadly speaking, critics of rational choice 
institutionalist theory consider this approach to be too individualistic, too minimalist, and too 
focused on rational choices in social action (Berkeley, 2001: 14).  
 
There are also some important empirical criticisms related to the rational choice approach as 
espoused by Green and Shapiro (1994: 6). One of the strongest criticisms of the rational choice 
institutionalism theory involves not the theory itself, but how it is used. Green and Shapiro 
(1994: 6) imply that “this theory does not account adequately for observed phenomena, because 
the developer of a theory does not even attempt to test it empirically”. Green and Shapiro (1994: 
6) go on saying that, rational choice theory is rather appropriate when it explains the markets, but 
it fails when it claims to act as a hegemonic theory.  
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In addition to the above criticism, the researcher’s claim is that this approach is useful for the 
purposes of understanding building blocks of institutional architecture, and how individuals or 
collective organisations come to make decisions. However, it does not explain or show the path 
for institutions to achieve effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability. While 
rules are seen as yardsticks to identify non-cooperativeness, yet there is no clear definition of 
what behaviour is non-cooperative. In addition, the trend shows that policies are likely to fail 
during implementation. The question to ponder is, does this suggest cooperativeness or non-
cooperativeness? A final choice here would be subjective in the sense that one may decide to 
choose which is more beneficial. Furthermore, the researcher is of the view that if being non-
cooperative is defined according to policy failure, then rational choice institutionalists have more 
focus on individual behaviour than on the actual policies, or ideas themselves. In addition, there 
is no proof suggesting that rule-bound institutions achieve effective policy implementation, 
accountability and oversight. There is, instead, mounting evidence that rules themselves do 
create red tape and inefficiency, especially where public institutions are concerned. The theory 
employs a blanket approach, as if rules are an answer to all institutional understanding. In reality, 
individuals are likely to make decisions that give space for manoeuvre, for example, where 
corruption becomes a common practise. Some rules and procedures are determined by the 
change in environment requiring alteration, and rational choice theory should keep pace with this 
context in terms of strengthening its argument.  
 
But none of these studies explain how institutional architecture achieves effectiveness where 
policy implementation, oversight and accountability are concerned. The researcher argues that 
institutional theorists do not test the theory against these variables. This leaves the key 
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components of this study in disarray, providing rules as a yardstick to measure conformance and 
not performance. Even so, out of the entire institutional study the researcher adopts four 
important C0s, thus Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation as major 
drivers for effective institutional architecture. The rationale for this is that the researcher views 
these 4C0s as an umbilical cord in facilitating policy implementation, accountability and 
oversight effectively. It becomes clear in the study of institutional architecture that there are two 
major actors, thus, 1) principal, (enact rules) and 2) agent (implement rules) that interact with 
institutions. A theoretical understanding of policy implementation is next illustrated.  
 
2.3 Policy Implementation Theories 
An understanding of public policy implementation gained momentum in the 1970s, particularly 
in the United States of America, and later in Europe (Adamolekun, 1983: 39). There are various 
explanations of what policy implementation entails. Brought to the fore is Adamolekun (1983: 
39), who sees policy implementation as referring to the activities that are carried out in the light 
of established policies. Edwards III (1980: 11) defines policy implementation as a stage of policy 
making between the establishment of a policy and the consequences of the policy for the people 
whom it affects. Policy implementation, according to van Meter, Donald and van Horn (1975: 
447), “encompasses those actions by public or private individuals or by groups that are directed 
at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions”. Egonmwan (1984: 22) is of 
the view that implementation is the process of converting inputs such as financial, material, 
technical, human, into outputs. Van Meter, Donald and van Horn (1975: 447-8) observe a close 
relationship between policy implementation and service delivery in the sense that in their 
explanation of this concept, implementation seems to include all activities that happen after the 
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statement of a policy is issued. Due to the context of this study, an adopted definition of policy 
implementation is that proposed by Brynard (2005: 9), which says “policy implementation is an 
accomplishment of policy objectives through the planning and programming of operations and 
projects so that agreed-upon outcomes and desired impacts are achieved”. Adopting this 
definition aims at coming into this conclusion at the end, and that this is done by agents.  
 
Policy implementation is a well-researched phenomenon but it appears that there is no consensus 
on the definition. According to Brynard (2005: 8), while this is the case, a theoretical framework 
is seen to be lacking. Sharing similar sentiments is Goggin (1996: 9), who sees confusion over 
when implementation begins, when it ends, and how many types of implementation there are. 
The conclusion made by researchers is that countries including South Africa follow their own 
approach in executing government policies that may suits its context. However, the reader should 
note that the two approaches for implementing policy, top-down and bottom-up, are still 
common and prominent. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 155) argue that the top-down approach 
indicates theoretical orientations that take implementation as a separate stage of the policy cycle, 
characterised as an enforcement and execution of the state’s policy decision. A normal course of 
policy implementation in South Africa employs this approach. It is the Government at the top 
that gives orders for political decisions to be implemented by bureaucrats and or agencies. It 
appears that government at the top disassociates with policy implementation process, as they 
assume that their role ends once a statute is completed. This assertion is supported by other 
critics of the policy implementation paradigm.   
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Berman (1978, 157-184) argues that the top-down model take policy language as their starting 
point. This means that it fails to consider the significance of actions taken earlier in the policy 
making process as the focus is on the completed statute (Berman, 1978: 157-184). The researcher 
holds the view that, observed from this angle, there could be a communication breakdown in 
understanding the originality of issues that the policy sought initially to address. This 
communication breakdown would be between the three actors, thus, the principal, the agent and 
the agency which conducts actual implementation. This is so because top-downers see 
implementation as a purely administrative process that must be done in isolation of other policy 
processes. Top-down implementers put exclusive emphasis on policy makers as key actors, and 
as such, policy makers are seen as non-actors where implementation takes place. Thus, top-
downers ignore the 4C0s Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation 
adopted in this study. They object to the inherent assumption that policy-makers control 
processes that affect implementation and, in turn, local service deliverers, who are experts and 
have the knowledge of true problems on the ground, are ignored in proposing policy. In such a 
situation, Elmore (1979: 603) holds a view that the top-down model is unachievable in practice 
because it will always be implementation failure.  
 
Bottom-up, on the contrary, summarises theoretical orientations conceiving implementation as “a 
process of interpretations, figuring out what to do and delivering concrete services to policy 
recipients on diverse localities and situations by street-level bureaucrats within different 
organisational setting” (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983: 155). The main focus of the bottom-up 
approach is on groups and service deliverers. This means that implementation is determined by 
officials in the implementing agency and/or the client, rather than by the central decision-makers 
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(Matland, 1995: 150). The South African government, for example, does allow a system 
whereby provinces can formulate and implement policies, but the central government remains a 
reporting point. Matland (1995: 150) stresses this point in explaining that for bottom-up “all 
actions may fall within a limited range where the borders are set by centrally determined policy”. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 153), observes policy implementation as going through a 
process in order to realise outcomes. They unpack the process as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.2: Stages in the Implementation Process 
 
Source:  Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 153) 
 
Policy implementation as an important process of service delivery goes through these channels. 
However, the researcher argues that the process shown above does not tell us which approach 
between the two is being employed. It also does not tell us where oversight and accountability 
start and or end. Similarly, Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation are 
not emphasised as anchors to achieve the desired goals. Nor does the process itself seem to be 
assisting policy implementers.  
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According to Brynard (2005: 4-5), there are three generations of research that literature on 
implementation has travelled. Firstly, the classical generation hold the thinking that 
implementation would happen automatically once the appropriate policies are signed into law. 
This is top-down view, which observes policy implementation as an administrative mechanism 
in the machine. However, the researcher is of the view that, in the petroleum industry of South 
Africa, traits of this behaviour are still in existence in the sense that policy mandates are imposed 
on institutions, with the hope that they will automatically be implemented. A grasp of the 
complicated nature of the industry is still at a minimal level where policy implementation is 
concerned. According to Najam (1995: 97), this “machine-like manner is founded on three 
concepts: organisational hierarchy, the discrete nature of politics and the administration thereof, 
and efficiency”. Presented in this way, policy implementation was seen as impossibly complex to 
study (Sabatier, 1986: 27). In support, DeLeon and DeLeon (2002: 469), points out that the first 
generation primarily focused on the “immense vale of troubles that lay between the definition of 
a policy and its execution through case study analysis”. In the second generation the emergence 
of a bottom-up approach as an alternative analytical approach (Lipsky, 1971: 391) was brought 
to the fore. Thus, rather than begin with a policy decision, this approach analyses the interaction 
of actors at the operational level (Lipsky, 1971: 391).  
 
The third generation moved towards a general understanding of implementation and how this 
might be improved (Najam, 1995). Najam (1995) presents two famous researchers in this area, 
Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, whom proposed a framework of five variables for 
effective policy implementation. Brynard (2005: 22) suggests that these variables form the 
important causal factors which embrace divergent implementation perspectives on different 
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political systems and in countries at varying economic levels of development. This study sees 
these variables as important to highlight, because they provide a better understanding of policy 
implementation. The five variables identified by Brynard (2005: 16) are firstly, the content of 
policy, which could either be distributive, regulatory or redistributive. Fundamental to this is the 
assumption that policies determine politics and the most significant political fact is that 
governments coerce. Secondly, the context of the institution is seen as “shaped by the larger 
context of social, economic, political and legal realities of the system” (Brynard, 2005: 17). 
Thirdly, is commitment in which Brynard (2005: 18) suggest that it is important at all levels of 
the process, which includes state level as well as street level. Brynard (2005) proposes that 
commitment influences and is in turn, influenced by the other four variables in the 5C protocol. 
The fourth is capacity and is viewed by Brynard (2005) in both tangible resources such as 
human, financial, and technological, as well as the intangible requirements such as leadership, 
motivation, courage and endurance, among many others. The fifth and last is clients and 
coalitions wherein Brynard (2005) suggests government enjoins a coalition of interest groups, 
opinion leaders and other outside actors who support a particular implementation process, since 
power shifts can strongly influence a particular policy implementation process. However, while 
all these five C protocols of policy implementation are important and well accepted by scholars, 
the researcher suggests an addition of four more variables, namely Communication, 
Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation as adopted in the context of this study. The 
researcher argues that the effectiveness of policy implementation needs cooperation from all 
levels, a coordinated effort, intact collaboration and clear lines of communication, both vertical 
and horizontal. However, it ought to be highlighted that policy implementation does face 
challenges, to be unpacked below. 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 Policy implementation has been described as one major problem confronting developing 
countries, according to Egonmwan (1984: 25). Egonmwan (1991) says the implementation 
problem in developing countries is the problem of a widening gap between intentions and results. 
This gap manifests itself in the form of the rich getting richer, while the poor are getting poorer 
in spite of the ‘better life for all’ ANC bandwagon. Exogenous shocks may take a different form 
in the petroleum industry all together, due to the environment in which it operates and the nature 
of the industry itself. A technical understanding of the industry might deprive this industry of 
good policy orientation. If it fails at this stage, all other steps of policy process may be impacted 
to the extent of threatening sustainability of institutions. Furthermore, the implementation gap 
can also be manifested in the widening of the distance between stated policy goals and the 
realisation of such planned goals (Egonmwan, 1991). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 20) put 
forth that policy implementation challenges must be closely observed since they may affect 
policy objectives. These variables can be broadly categorised as: “tractability of the problems 
being addressed; the ability of the statute to favourably structure the implementation process; and 
the net effect of a variety of political variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives” 
(Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983: 20-21). Each variable is unpacked in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Figure 2.3: Challenges affecting policy implementation
 
Source: Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983: 20-21) 
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home where a child must account to the parents for its actions. It is paramount to unpack this 
institution and bring empirical understanding to the fore. Historical institutional theory holds that 
actors in institutions create ideas which, in turn, shape their behaviour. Within the rational choice 
institutonalists there is the principal-agent sub-theory, which lays a foundation in discussing 
accountability as understood in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The principal-agent sub-
theory emphasises the institutional mechanisms whereby principals identify ideas, monitor them 
as carried out by agents, and compliance is employed through coercive means, among other 
things. The researcher holds the view that accountability is a phenomenon created by principals 
in order to subject the agent’s behaviour to answerability.   
 
In this way, interplay between principal and agent is evident when the principal makes the agent 
follow its instructions. Achen and Bartels (2002); Healy and Malhotra (2010); Lenz (2012); 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) in Bovens (2010: 1) provides an understanding of the public 
accountability function. They present it as the capability of principals to judge the performance 
of their agents. Analysis and evaluation of accountability as applied in the petroleum industry 
requires a specification of who is supposed to be accountable, to whom and for what. According 
to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005: 535), this is a core ingredient of principal-agent theory, which 
further provides power to the principal to make decisions that affect the incentives of the agent 
when effecting various possible actions. This process of structuring incentives for the agent is the 
central focus of principal-agent theory, embodied in the rational choice institutional theory. As 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005: 535) claim, the decisions made by the principal that structure the 
agent’s incentives to take various actions, constitute a contract. The discussion below should be 
understood in this context. 
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Frink and Klimosky (2004: 1) see academic interest in the accountability phenomenon to have 
grown significantly over the years. Accountability is a long-standing and well-contested 
phenomenon with multiple understandings. Pollitt (2003: 89) agrees that accountability could 
mean many different things to many different people. The researcher holds a view that 
accountability with its various dichotomies has a potential to be challenging, mainly in selecting 
a suitable approach for those who are placed with this role. The dichotomies of accountability are 
explained in the extensive work done by Blind (2011: 3-23). It is important to note two 
predominantly known components of accountability studied by scholars, thus there are those 
who present accountability as active and there are those who observe accountability to be passive 
(Bovens, 2010: 1). In the former case, accountability is used primarily as a normative concept 
such as a set of standards for the evaluation of the behaviour of public actors (Bovens, 2010: 1). 
In the latter case, accountability is used in a narrower, descriptive sense as it is seen as an 
institutional relation or arrangement in which an actor can be held to account by a forum 
(Bovens, 2010: 1). According to Frink and Klimosky (2004: 3), “social systems in general can be 
defined in terms of common sets of shared expectations for behaviour”. They go on arguing that, 
accountability, then, could be seen as the glue that binds social systems together (Frink and 
Klimosky, 2004: 3). The concept of accountability has further induced a dichotomous analysis of 
accountability in the social science literature, which the relevant concepts to the study ought to 
be unpacked. As espoused by Blind (2011: 3), the “dichotomies of accountability can be 
explained along the prescriptive, descriptive, operational and longitudinal dimensions”, among 
others, even though these categories are neither thorough nor mutually exclusive. Next, 
prescriptive dichotomies of accountability are discussed. 
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2.4.1 Prescriptive Dichotomies of Accountability 
According to Blind (2011: 3) in prescriptive terms, a dichotomous understanding of 
accountability is summarised as the philosophy versus the means of government. Llyod (2008) in 
Blind (2011: 3), refers to this as the ‘hardware’ versus the ‘software’ of accountability. Blind, 
(2011: 3) explains that the hardware, or the structures of accountability, includes the procedures, 
mechanisms and processes, while the software refers to the attitudes and behaviour, perceptions 
and the mindset. According to Frink and Klimosky (2004: 3), organisational responses to the 
need for accountability from its members include the creation of mechanisms such as formal 
reporting relationships, performance monitoring and evaluations, and employment contracts, 
among others. Indeed, while procedures, mechanisms and rules might be in place, nonetheless, 
people’s behaviour and attitude needs to embrace and champion them so that the desired policy 
outcomes are achieved. As Frink and Klimosky (2004: 3) concur, in addition to these formal 
mechanisms, organisations promote several informal sources of accountability, such as group 
norms, corporate cultural norms, loyalty to an individual’s superior and colleagues, among 
others. Blind (2011: 3) citing Bowens (2010) also offers a dichotomous understanding of 
accountability along prescriptive terms as consisting of ‘virtue’ versus ‘mechanism.’ In the 
former accountability entails a positive quality in organisations (Gallie, 1962: 121). In the latter, 
accountability is seen as an institutional arrangement where an accountee is held to account by a 
forum (Gallie, 1962: 121). Here, the gist of accountability is not the behaviour of public agents, 
but the way in which the principal-agent nexus operates in converging formal and informal ways 
of accountability. To be discussed next is descriptive dichotomy of accountability is explained.  
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2.4.2 Descriptive Dichotomies of Accountability  
The descriptive dichotomies of accountability include the following: “market-based versus 
administrative accountability, political versus legal/judicial accountability, and social versus 
institutional accountability” (Blind, 2011: 5). Market-based accountability views citizens as 
consumers, whom must be accounted to on the basis of the services they receive (Blind, 2011: 
5). The researcher is of the view that this is tantamount to ‘People First’ bandwagon concept 
cited in the South African Batho Pele Principles, borrowed from the private sector. A challenge 
observed by the researcher is that, this may work well in the private sector even though it is 
government’s ambition to see them work well in the public sector. Accountability enforcement 
measures if not employed effectively in the private sector setting may mean loss of clients that 
are critical for business sustainability. This however does not apply in the public sector. In 
contrast to market-based accountability, Blind (2011: 5) portrays administrative or organisational 
accountability as referring to rules, regulations and norms of hierarchical obligation to answer to 
principals. Blind (2011) adds that, Max Weber’s constructs of hierarchy, rules, regulations and 
budgets, as also applicable to market-driven concepts and practices,  does feature in 
administrative accountability, hence there is observed convergence with market-based 
accountability. The next dichotomy to be discussed is the political versus legal/judicial 
accountability. 
 
2.4.3 Political versus Legal/Judicial Accountability 
Political accountability can be defined as the “elected officials’ obligation to answer to the 
public, and of public servants to the elected officials” (Blind, 2011: 7). The researcher points out 
that this accountability is applicable in the petroleum industry of South Africa. For example, the 
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Minister of Energy accounts to the public while government officials account to her/him. Blind 
(2011: 7) argues that this is generally ensured through elections and the legislative system, and is 
supported by political party systems and the executive-legislature division of labour.  
 
Goetz and Gaventa (2001: 7) observe legal accountability as assured by the judiciary, which 
checks whether politicians and officials act within the confines of their prescribed jurisdictions. 
As such, this has more to do with guarding against the abuse of power. In the same vein Blind 
(2011), distinguishes between political and legal accountability on the grounds that the former is 
more subjective. Blind (2011) furthermore claims that, in political accountability, the political 
principle (the elected official) can hold the agent (the selected official) accountable without 
observing any procedures to go about this. Legal accountability on another spectrum is based on 
substantial evidence upon breach of rules (Blind, 2011). Blind (2011: 7) observes legal 
accountability as based on reason, while political accountability is not. The researcher declares 
that while such a distinction is useful as it may block abuse of power by the principal and this is 
applicable in a democratic country like South Africa. A complementary convergence is observed 
between political and legal accountability, which watches over the interests of both the principal 
and the agent (Blind, 2011). The next divergence of accountability to be discussed is institutional 
versus social.  
 
2.4.4 Institutional versus Social Accountability 
The institutional versus social accountability divide is given many names, thus it is also called 
“the supply-driven versus the demand-led or top-down versus bottom-up accountability” (Blind, 
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2011: 8). Institutional versus social accountability is seen to be more recent than the two 
previous descriptive sub-dichotomies. According to Ackerman (2005: 16) the institutions of 
accountability are the parliament, electoral system, the judiciary and the myriad audit 
organisations, among others. Social accountability, on the other hand is made up of ad hoc 
initiatives of direct and indirect civil society and citizen engagement in public affairs with the 
purpose to wield accountability (Ackerman, 2005: 16).  
 
It is paramount to note that social accountability is further sub-divided into two sub-components; 
thus: 1) “voice-led social accountability which is defined by citizen participation in policy-
making, advocacy and deliberation processes” (Blind, 2011: 9) citing (Malena, Forster and Sigh, 
2004). An example of this is that Parliamentary Portfolio Committees champion this kind of 
dialogue in South Africa, wherein, interested and affected partied are given a chance to 
participate in policy developments through public participation forums. However, whether 
citizen’s concerns are taken into consideration is totally another discussion. Blind (2001: 7) 
mention another sub-component of social accountability as “the control-oriented social 
accountability defined by citizens’ watchdog role, often in cooperation with other societal actors, 
such as the media and professional associations” (Blind, 2011: 9). In order to understand 
institutional architecture effectiveness, this concept is taken seriously in this current study.  
 
There are challenges in the accountability as observed by various scholars. The challenge with 
this dynamic nature of accountability is that it does not conform to real life situation (Blind, 
2011: 15) where it is needed heavily. As Ackerman (2005: 25) states “to be accountable is to be 
in motion, not simply sitting in an office while being open to criticism”. Hence the researcher 
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observes accountability to be everywhere and necessary for effective policy implementation. The 
researcher therefore views academic literature on accountability to be disconnected, as it gives 
various explanations for different context of accountability. Supporting this claim is Dowdle 
(2006: 178-9) as makes reference to newly edited volume on accountability, which portrays 
differing concepts, conceptualisations, and frames for studying accountability. Dowdle (2006) 
goes on arguing that even when this is apparent no attempts is made to provide a consistent 
analytical framework for the analysis of this accountability crisis. As such, literature show 
researchers giving different definitions of accountability and addressing very different 
accountability dilemmas, practices, and potential crises. The researcher holds a view that this 
dynamic conceptual understanding of accountability is observed to be useful for the current 
study in terms of understanding this complex phenomenon. Mosher (1979: 236) accent to this as 
stating that, accountability is essentially an informing function which also entices the questions 
of who is accountable to whom, for what are they accountable, what are the means or processes. 
Also of importance is to understand the impact this has to the actual practice of accountability to 
those placed with this role in the light of inability to reach consensus on the approach to embark 
on.  
 
Also the researcher argues that, since it appears that there are various dichotomies, this may pose 
a challenge on assessing accountability effectiveness, monitor and strengthen it in a coordinated 
manner. For instance, prior to embarking on policy redevelopment, does government collect 
information from communities where social accountability was conducted? Also who give the 
terms and conditions on how to conduct such accountability? There is however more that needs 
to be uncovered, especially on the topic of accountability. All that we know at this stage is that 
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there are various divergent dichotomies in the literature of accountability, which appears to be 
applicable to all walks of petroleum industry, but there are unexplained gaps. Furthermore, to 
what extent can we agree that accountability successfully informed us the manner is practised 
where there is policy implementation and oversight? The following discussion is informed by 
conceptual understanding of oversight. 
 
2.5 Oversight Theories  
Similarly to accountability theory or concept, an explanation of oversight concept is also drawn 
from the principal-agent sub-theory embodied in the rational choice institutional theory. A 
theoretical understanding of oversight is explained in the context of principal-agent sub-theory. 
Prior to that, an important note to acknowledge is that the petroleum industry of South Africa 
cannot be explained in isolation of the system of separation of powers as it ensures that there are 
checks and balances in place. The Legislative authority (Parliament) is mainly the power to 
make, amend and abolish rules of law. Executive authority (Minister) is given the power to 
execute and enforce rules of law. Judicial authority is the power that ensures that disputes are 
solved according to the relevant laws. All these are oversight institutions in the public 
administration functioning. For example, the Parliament monitors the Ministers to check if 
government mandate are implemented. However, the legislative assembly calls on the Ministers, 
as members of the assembly, to explain and account directly for the way in which a statute is 
executed and other executive functions performed. Ministers monitor the bureaucrats or state-
owned agencies. A point to note is that Ministers themselves do not execute policies; they leave 
implementation at the discretion of bureaucrats and relevant petroleum institutions. The judiciary 
monitors application of state rules and monitors abuse of these rules by Parliamentarians.  
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There is a school of thought which views rational choice institutional theorists as recognizing the 
democratic importance of top-down political control, but they narrowly approach the relationship 
between politics and administration within the frame of self-interested conﬂict between 
principals and agents (Kassim and Menon, 2003: 122). However, dovetailing on the concept of 
oversight we learn that it is seen as a monitoring and control of one person or institution 
generally termed the agent by another (the principal) such that the agent acts in the principal’s 
interest, a claim strongly upheld by rational choice institutionalists. In Morgenstern and 
Manzetti’s (2007: 132) view, “the concept of oversight is based upon the notion that, while 
government is necessary for democracy to prosper in an orderly fashion, its institutions and the 
people who staff them must be accountable for their actions”. Then effective oversight would 
imply the principal’s ability to both verify actions and sanction wrongdoers (Morgenstern and 
Manzetti, 2007: 132). The concept of oversight is expressed best by the Russian term, kontrol’ 
(McGrath, 2013: 354). Kontrol’ is understood “as an instrument of political control over the 
bureaucracy, in which the Soviet state set up a number of different types of structures for 
monitoring the compliance of the state bureaucracy with policy-makers’ goals” (McGrath, 2013: 
354). These were the instruments by which one branch of the bureaucracy checked others 
(McGrath, 2013). There are two forms of oversight explained by scholars who studied oversight 
in which the researcher holds a view that the content is not that different from that of 
accountability explained previously. The researcher argues that where there is accountability 
there must be oversight as well even though roles and power relations may differ. This induces 
debate among scholars, unless a completely distinct understanding of oversight is brought to the 
fore. There are two well-known concepts of oversight, thus the ex ante oversight and ex post 
oversight, which in the next section are discussed. 
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2.5.1 Ex Post Oversight  
The ex post also known as police patrol oversight entails “permanent oversight of agency 
behaviour and looking at how it implements in practice the conferred powers” (Fox, 2003: 218). 
This kind of oversight is described to be dogmatic in nature, and suggests no harmony relations 
or human element between the principal and the agent. Smith (2003: 47) argues that in this kind 
of oversight, any deviation from the authority granted by the legislature may end up in 
sanctioning of the agency. However, as explained by political/ legal accountability previously, 
we leant that this is not always the case, as sanctions must be done within the confines of law. 
According to McCubbins and Schwartz (2007: 86) policy patrol oversight is similar to real police 
patrols where the principal micro manages the agent. This situation is evident in the petroleum 
industry wherein various Parliamentary Portfolio Committees call the Department of Energy and 
its supporting institutions to answer frequently on programme implementation and policy issues 
of the industry. Considering the type of industry this is, the researcher does not observe this to be 
an unwarranted idea as long as it assists policy implementers to achieve government’s intended 
goals efficiently. Thus, does frequent reporting or dogmatic oversight achieve the bottom line? 
The answer to this question will be made clear as the study unfolds. However, ex post oversight 
is argued to fall into two broad categories, “the ‘imposition of sanctions’, where principals 
attempt to control agency loss through budgetary restrictions, appointments or revising the 
agent’s mandate through legislative or regulatory means; and ‘monitoring’, whereby an attempt 
is made to rebalance the asymmetry of information by surveillance of agent behaviour” (Pollack, 
1997: 99).  
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However, although ex post oversight stood for several years in being considered to be one of the 
most important sources of control of the Executive branch; scholars, practitioners and 
researchers who looked at its performance noticed that this technique of oversight incur high 
cost. This makes sense because; the legislative arm in South Africa is in Cape Town Parliament, 
while the central Department of Energy is in Pretoria. This means that there could be travelling 
costs involved if such oversight was employed. According to Balla and Deering (2013: 29), ex 
post oversight is induced by environmental shocks which may be war-related, among others. Ex 
post therefore were considered to be the “event-driven activities of public administration that 
require more detailed scrutiny” (Balla and Deering, 2013: 29), hence deemed expensive. Next, ex 
ante oversight is explained. 
 
2.5.2 Ex Ante Oversight 
Ex ante oversight is known to be fire-alarm (McCubbin and Schwatrz, 2007: 88). Ex ante 
oversight is seen as where legislators scrutinise government activities effectively. According to 
Gerber, Maestas and Doetrius (2005: 4), the purpose ex ante oversight is to “constrain choices of 
government and enable legislator to hardwire agencies to make certain types of decisions or 
stack the deck in favour of particular interests”. This means that this oversight is a proactive 
approach that prevents unwarranted behaviour before it occurs, if it is wielded timeously. It 
should be noted that institutional theorists mentioned that institutions or laws are created by 
people, which in turn constrain their behaviour. It was not clear then whether the laws are created 
to prevent or correct what is already been done. Furthermore, institutional theorists could not tell 
us whether this is oversight or nor accountability. This part clears this notion.   
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It appears that as the principal must carry out fire-alarm oversight activity cannot do it alone. To 
a larger extent, principal may rely heavily on third parties to alert to the principal on 
transgressions.  Balla and Deering (2013: 9) also emphasise the importance of outsiders in fire-
alarm oversight since the initiation of legislative oversight relies on it. This oversight allows 
active citizen participation in raising the alarm whenever there is violation or diversion in 
statutory (McCubbin and Schwartz, 2007). The environmental lobby groups play an active role 
in the petroleum industry especially where harm on the environment is posed. Whistle blowers as 
well implement this kind of oversight. However as the focus of this is on critical evaluation of 
institutional architecture in relation to policy implementation, oversight and accountability, this 
type of fire-alarm oversight is needed to monitor compliance towards HDSA transformation. 
This is where the 4C0s: Cooperation, Collaboration, Coordination and Communication become 
relevant in this current study. Furthermore, ex ante or fire alarm oversight is different from the ex 
post in the sense that it may incur minimal costs (Balla and Deering, 2013: 9).  
 
So far the study has revealed that, according to institutional theorists history matters because it 
has a tendency of tracking what happened in the past in order to build a better today. Historical 
institutionalists argued that ideas are constructed by people which then constrain their behaviour. 
Rational choice institutionalists also observe ideas to be created by people, but assert that people 
create ideas for selfish purposes. Embodied in the rational choice theory is principal-agent sub-
theory, among others which provides a theoretical base for the understanding of how 
accountability and oversight is constructed and what is employed for. Basically, the principal 
initiate or create ideas while implementation is done by bureaucrats, but this is done in the 
understanding that the outcome must maximise the principal’s utility. So far, we have learnt that, 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
same applies to accountability discussed earlier, oversight as well is a norm applied in 
institutions even though at this stage it is not clear how they are both operationalised in the 
context under discussion. It is evident that both accountability and oversight are norms that must 
be adopted in informal and or formal institutions. The researcher sees this practice at homes as 
well where there are rules for the members of family to adhere to and must account for where 
there is non-compliance. Parents, in this instance, enforce both accountability and oversight.  
 
In South Africa, the concept of oversight contains many aspects which include political, 
administrative, financial, ethical, legal and strategic elements. General functions of oversight are: 
 To detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct 
on the part of the government and public agencies. At the core of this function is the 
protection of the rights and liberties of citizens. 
 To hold the government to account in respect of how the taxpayers’ money is used. It 
detects waste within the machinery of government and public agencies. Thus it can 
improve the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of government operations. 
 To ensure that policies announced by government and authorised by Parliament are 
actually delivered. This function includes monitoring the achievement of goals set by 
legislation and the government’s own programmes. 
 To improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public trust in the 
government, which is itself a condition of effective policy delivery (Oversight and 
Accountability Model, 2013 http://www.parliament.gov.za).  
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To remind the reader, this study sought to critically evaluate institutional architecture for 
effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the Energy Sector of South 
Africa; specifically from the perspective of the petroleum industry. There follows a discussion of 
the conceptual framework on monitoring and evaluation.  
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework on Monitoring and Evaluation  
The function and effectiveness of institutions and systems requires strong, ethical monitoring and 
evaluation (Ile, Eresia-Eke and Ile, 2012: 13).  The early proponents of the concept of monitoring 
and evaluation are Louw, 1998; Potter, 1999; Potter and Kruger, 2001; Babbie and Mouton, 
2001, among many others. In this context, monitoring and evaluation is observed to be a 
“participatory, democratic process for examining the values, progress, constraints and 
achievements of projects/programmes by stakeholders” (Umtha Strategy Planning and 
Development Consultancy, City of Cape Town Monitoring and Evaluation, 2004: 7). The 
researcher holds the view that although monitoring and evaluation seem to be married concepts, 
these actually are two different organisational processes. Kearl (1976: 200) agrees with this 
claim. The commonality between monitoring and evaluation is that they are “geared towards 
learning from what you are doing and how you are doing it, by focusing on efficiency, 
effectiveness, and impact” (Kearl, 1976: 200). The focus of this study therefore is not on 
monitoring, but on evaluation. It is important to emphasise that evaluation does not happen in a 
vacuum, but rather it is applied systematically on programmes or projects in order to attest 
performance of agreed outcomes. Kearl (1976: 200) puts forward that “evaluation is the 
comparison of actual project impacts against agreed strategic plans”. This study critically 
evaluates institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight and 
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accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa. It is paramount to note that this 
evaluation is done in relation to the policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. This 
policy objective is translated into programmes/projects. So, it therefore makes more sense to 
evaluate programmes/projects that seek to address this policy objective. Programme evaluation, 
according to Rossi, Lipsey and Freeman (2004: 16), “is the use of social research methods to 
systematically investigate the effectiveness of social intervention programmes in ways that are 
adapted to their political and organisational environments and are designed to inform social 
action to improve social conditions”. It looks at what you set out to do, at what you have 
accomplished, and how you accomplished it (Umtha Strategy Planning and Development 
Consultancy, City of Cape Town, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2004).  
 
Since it is paramount that evaluation criteria must be employed in order to get tangible evidence, 
the researcher adopts Development Assistance Committee (DAC) / Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria. These embody relevance, 
effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. The rationale for adopting this model is that 
its measurement tools are comprehensive, but also complementary. The model is supported by 
various evaluation scholars, because it appraises data and information that informs future 
strategic decisions to improve programmes/projects. In the case of this study, the model will be 
applied to provide lessons to better speedily achieve HDSA transformation in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa. Chapter summary and conclusion is tabled next. 
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2.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
This Chapter explored concepts and theories that could serve to help understand the phenomena 
being explored in this study. Two theories were analysed: historical institutionalist and rational 
choice institutionalist. The rationale for choosing these theories is that they have been proven to 
be key models for ideological debate and research in public administration studies. Each 
provides a different, but complementary, understanding of the nature of institutions. The central 
argument posited by historical institutionalists is that past events matter in designing better ideas 
of today. Being designed by people, these ideas, when translated into policy, in turn constrain 
people’s behaviour. The rational choice institutional theorists share similar sentiments, though 
the translation of these ideas is supported by the idea of utility maximisation. In this theory, 
institutions make rational choices based on the dynamics existing between principal and agent. 
The principal is portrayed as protagonist in idea/ policy initiation, giving order for the agent to 
implement. The agent is expected to cooperate by carrying out the principal’s instructions, in the 
process achieving the fulfilment of its own interests.  
 
The three major components of this study – policy implementation, oversight and accountability 
– were analysed within these two theoretical constructs. The theoretical understanding of 
accountability suggested different things to different authors. Multiple, divergent accountability 
dichotomies, were analysed, using examples to provide context. Central to accountability is the 
principal-agent interplay, wherein the agent must account to the principal for non-cooperative 
behaviour. It was argued that accountability should not be seen as something that others have, 
i.e. in the sense of ‘power’, but rather should be seen as showing how players discharge their 
responsibilities to be accountable, and how this helps to improve efficiency and efficacy. 
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Similarly, the theoretical understanding of oversight is centred on the principal-agent nexus, 
which observes the principal discharging this role with the aid of ex ante and ex post oversight 
mechanisms. It is the effectiveness of these mechanisms that determine whether unwarranted 
activities are detected and acted upon with the appropriate sanction.  
 
The study went on to review available literature on policy implementation and the challenges 
thereof. This review revealed two primary directions that policy implementation takes: top-down 
or bottom-up. It became apparent that the three major mechanisms governing transformation, the 
subject of this study, are operating in isolation from another and therefore are vulnerable to both 
exogenous and endogenous pressures. This gap analysis is missing in the literature discourse. 
However, by accepting that these governing mechanisms coexist and are co-dependent, the study 
could more usefully adopt 4C0s (Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and 
Cooperation) as a foundation for this theoretical development, since they are critical for policy 
facilitation, oversight and accountability. At this point, the researcher explored the literature on 
monitoring and evaluation, in particular the difference between these two concepts. This resulted 
in the researcher focusing on the evaluation concept, being in line with the study, which seeks to 
critically evaluate the institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability. Focusing on evaluation, an analytical model needed to be identified that would fit 
the theory. The researcher adopted the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) / 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria. These 
embody relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, key aspects in evaluating 
programme/project effectiveness. However, the researcher went on to argue that for all these 
system to work effectively evaluation need to be done honestly in order to give best future advice 
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on policy implementation, accountability and oversight. The next chapter explores selected 
legislative and regulative framework governing the petroleum industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
CHAPTER THREE: SELECTED LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter discusses selected legislative and regulative frameworks governing the petroleum 
industry of South Africa, in particular with regard to HDSA transformation. As the previous 
chapter revealed, the aim of formal institutions that come in the form of policies and regulations, 
is to constrain the behaviour of human beings, and channel them into doing what law creators 
want, and in this case not for selfish ends, but for the greater good of the society. Prior to 
continuing with this, it is paramount to unpack the policy position that South Africa took after 
1994. Brynard (2005: 3) explains that the South African policy development in the period from 
1995 to 1996 was a ‘White Paper Era’. Historical institutionalists would refer to this period as 
the critical juncture or the branching point. During this era, past policies were reviewed in terms 
of the impact they had on the majority of people who live in South Africa.  
 
Brynard (2005: 3) goes on to show that the period from 1997 to 2003 was driven by the intent to 
achieve service delivery, with a renewed focus on the implementation of policy. From this time 
onwards, focus has been placed on service delivery, especially in the sphere of local government 
(Brynard, 2005: 3). Throughout this period, at the heart of policies is the drive to ensure HDSA 
transformation. The researcher states that the historical events that engulfed South Africa prior to 
1994 had everything to do with the trajectory taken by policy post 1994. As historical 
institutionalists revealed in the study, history matters because it is the source of where things 
started and how their persistent evolution or punctuated equilibria, follows the concept of path 
dependence. The researcher firstly discusses the South African Constitution, wherein selected 
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clauses related to this study are explained. The second part sets out related regulations and 
policies, such as the White Paper on Energy Policy (1998), the Energy Act, Preferential 
Procurement, and the evolution of Monitoring and Evaluation Framework in the South African 
context, among others. The last part provides a summary and conclusion to the chapter.   
 
3.2 Legislative Building Blocks in the Petroleum Industry of SA 
3.2.1 The South African Constitution  
The African National Congress Freedom Charter of 1955 provides a platform to understanding 
the motivation behind the government’s position in crafting the new post 1994 legislative 
framework, particularly in the sector under discussion. It states that:  
“The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth! 
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored 
to the people; 
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industries shall be 
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; 
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people; 
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all 
trades, crafts and professions” (Freedom Charter for African National Congress, 1955). 
 
The researcher spells out that the statement from the Freedom Charter gives effect to the post-
apartheid South African Constitution. The Constitution (Act 108 of 1996), which is the supreme 
body of law, was promulgated in 1996, shortly after the demise of the apartheid regime. The 
Constitution, amongst other things, seeks to solve societal problems, which were related to 
discrimination, racism and deprivation of basic rights concerning all South African citizens. The 
inference is that, the African National Congress Freedom Charter sought to ensure that South 
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Africa’s wealth is shared equally by all those who live in it, respectively. According to Camay 
and Gordon (2004: 107), many South African institutions were constructed to counteract the 
country’s racially motivated discriminatory policies. The Constitution has then set precedence 
for all other government related policies, so that all policies formulated by the government of the 
day encapsulate the intention of the Constitution. For example, in terms of the Constitution, the 
Department of Energy is given a mandate to govern the Energy Sector through reasonable 
legislative and other measures. This mandate is limited by Part B of Schedule 4 of the South 
African Constitution, which specifies rights and responsibilities regarding electricity and gas 
reticulation.  
 
Of note, the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) recognises and spells out a number of 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights section, some of which relate to basic services, such 
as the right to sufficient water, as contained in Section 27 (1) (b) of the Constitution. The Bill of 
Rights provides no guarantees when it comes to access to liquid fuels (such as paraffin, gas, 
petrol, diesel and kerosene) even though these are essential services that human beings cannot go 
on for long without them. These are, however, natural resources, which the Freedom Charter 
alludes to, and should be a critical area driving HDSA transformation. This begs the question: 
what does the Constitution say about transformation with regards to the petroleum industry? The 
South African Constitution does not only stipulate the rights directed at giving better lives to all, 
but also is directed at institutions that government created to implement such policies. As such, 
the energy sector is among the institutions that render services to the poor through the joint 
involvement of government, private companies and State Owned Companies in services 
delivery. Chapter 10 Section (195) of the South African Constitution instead provides principles 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
and values relating to how these institutions must conduct themselves during this process in 
order to ensure a level-playing field and to provide benefits for all. This study selects those 
clauses in the South African Constitution that resonate with the focus of the industry and are 
explained in the next section. 
  
 Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information.  
It is paramount to understand why this principle is itemised, especially when placed in the 
context of petroleum industry. Hughes (2012: 5) argues that “the apartheid regime primarily 
operated within and actively cultivated a legal, political, constitutional and policy environment of 
opacity and non-accountability”. Since the energy sector was governed by excessive secrecy, 
public debate on energy policy was an impossible endeavour. For instance, the Petroleum 
Products Act, No. 120 of (1977) prohibited the “publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure 
or conveyance to any person of information or the making of comment regarding the source, 
manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock-level of any 
petroleum product acquired or manufactured or being acquired for or in the Republic.” As such, 
the penalties imposed for offenders were severe, resulting in effective management of secrecy. 
The consequence of these secrecy provisions led to poor collection of data in the sector, thus 
making it difficult to improve policy formulation and subsequent implementation. This is the 
challenge that the DOE is still grappling with, as amplified in the (Department of Energy Annual 
Report, 2011/12). 
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An additional obstacle in this environment is to monitor how activities in the petroleum industry 
benefit all equally, regardless of race and religion. For example, the Commission for Africa Final 
Report (2005: 138) says that most African countries that are endowed with abundant natural 
resources struggle with the utilisation of these resources and sometimes the poor are impacted 
the worst. It further states that in some of the oil-rich countries the revenue from oil is often used 
only to the benefit of the ruling elite (Commission for Africa Final Report, 2005: 138) at the 
detriment of greater society, while information relating to the financial and economic benefits of 
the natural resource is also not shared. Secrecy is a strong driver to conceal the exploitation of 
resources for the benefit of the rich elite and at the expense of continued marginalisation of the 
poor. This needed to change through the intervention of the Constitution, thus the development 
of this principle.  
 
The Constitution as the supreme body of law incorporates this principle in order to reinforce 
transparency as an essential component that propels institutions to be accountable for their 
activities. Transparency in South Africa is promoted through two acts of Parliament, one: the 
Promotion of Administrative Act, No. 3 (2000), which among other things requires that reasons 
be given for any administrative action, thus promoting transparency in public administrative 
decisions and related actions, and two: the Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 (2000) 
requiring governmental institutions to provide information to its clients within particular 
guidelines, but as an important addition to promote transparency. The benefits that come with 
transparency are that it promotes better business practices, increases accountability and facilitates 
oversight easily. Furthermore, the impact of policy is much easier to measure, allowing 
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improvements and corrections to be made. Further reasons to promote transparency in the 
petroleum industry are noted by (Yates, 2009: 55) so as to: 
 Make contractor selection impartial, transparent and based on merit, where BEE or 
SMME involvements are concerned;  
 Monitor gifts and entertainment to or from government officials, potential or current 
suppliers, customers and politicians;  
 Prevent money-laundering;  
 Ban anti-competitive activities such as collusion with competitors on pricing or allocation 
of customers;  
 Monitor conflicts of interest – mainly, those employees with links to a company 
submitting a bid cannot then assess the proposal;  
 Maintain accurate records and internal controls, so that company payments are honestly 
described and corporate funds are used lawfully; 
 Co-operate with the collection of information by authorised government or regulatory 
officials – for example on safety performance, emissions or for tax assessment;  
 Not conceal, alter or destroy data subject to litigation or official investigation;  
 Implement community investment programmes transparently and ethically;  
 Comply with relevant trade restrictions and export controls, and; 
 Document financial, health, safety, environmental and social achievements and 
challenges. 
 
It is important to note that where transparency does not exist, the chances of corruption are 
greatly increased. Acknowledging this potential challenge, the Parliament of South Africa passed 
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the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, No. 12 of 2004, to, inter alia, provide 
for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and corrupt activities; to 
provide for the offence of corruption and related corrupt activities; to provide for the 
establishment and endorsement of a Register in order to place certain restrictions on persons and 
enterprises convicted of corrupt activities relating to tenders and contracts; to place a duty on 
certain persons holding a position of authority to report certain corrupt transactions; to provide 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the offence of corruption and offences relating to 
corrupt activities; and to provide for matters connected therewith. The Act also illustrates the 
commitment to curb corruption by providing whistle blowing and the protection of such 
informants. All this is to ensure that the institutional building blocks of this principle are 
supported by other regulations in order to enforce its compliance.   
 
 The provision of services impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias  
This principle is important in this study as it seeks to ensure that the benefits of democracy are 
felt by all who live in South Africa. As such, it is regarded as imperative to redress historical, 
social and economic inequalities, since certain segments of communities were deprived of these 
benefits prior to 1994. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), as alluded to in 
section (9) of the Bill of Rights, encourages the importance of equality and the dismantling of 
unfair discrimination. Section 217 (2) also refers to procurement, where the organs of state may 
implement a procurement policy providing for categories of preference in the allocation of 
contracts and the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination. In support of this Constitutional mandate, in the petroleum industry is 
the very same EPWP (1998), which provides that “sustainable presence, ownership or control by 
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historically disadvantaged South Africans, a quarter of all facets of the liquid fuels industry” 
must be achieved. The PLFC, which was developed in 2000, gives effect to this Constitutional 
mandate as well. This is explained further as the study unfolds. Another legislative framework 
addressing this principle is the Employment Equity Act (No 55 of 1998), the Competition Act 
(No 89 of 1998) (also referred to the Amendment Act No 35 of 1999 and subsequent 
amendments), and the Skills development Act (No 97 of 1998) are among the institutions 
designed to guard against impartial and unfair service delivery.  
 
 Responsiveness to people’s needs  
In the petroleum industry this is done through Social Labour Plans (SLPs), providing for critical 
skills development and job creation to ensure that licence holders contribute towards HDSA 
transformation – particularly in areas where they operate or have an impact. For instance, as 
PetroSA operations are based in Mosselbay, through compliance to government policy, there is a 
Centre of Excellence for critical skills development, clinics are built, schools are revamped, and 
jobs are created. There are however, challenges that should be noted. The findings of the KPMG 
Report (2013: 2) shows that even though there is sound implementation of SLPs, challenges such 
as minimal community ownership and participation, absence of systems and processes, as 
enablers for effective implementation, and lack of effective monitoring derail, or inhibit the 
implementation of policy. It is paramount to note that the Mineral Petroleum Resource 
Development Act of 2000 is being reviewed and it addresses this challenge by incorporating 
these SLPs into the municipal Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). This means that once each 
company completes the project it can be handed over to the municipality for further 
administration. The researcher claims that the 4C0s: Communication, Coordination, 
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Collaboration, and Cooperation, which are an ‘umbilical cord’ to hold policy facilitation process 
intact, are needed strongly in this regard so that programmes/ projects respond well to people’s 
needs. The researcher’s conviction is based on the philosophy that the 4C0s require the 
involvement of government, private companies and communities and the study expands further 
this notion as progresses. The South African constitution, however, paves the way to the 
development of other policies which sought to improve governability of the industry. The White 
Paper on Energy (1998) is further discussed. 
 
3.2.2 The White Paper on Energy Policy (1998)  
Energy Policy can be explained in three different periods, the first being the period of the 
apartheid regime, from 1948 to 1994. During the apartheid period, while the country was 
politically isolated by international community, the Energy Policy was mostly centred on energy 
security and self-sufficiency (Marquard, 2006: 338-9). In the domestic sector, this meant 
providing modern energy services almost exclusively to the ‘White’ population group, which 
formed eleven percent of the population (Davidson, Winkler, Kenny, Prasad, Nkomo, Sparks, 
Howells and Alfstad, 2006: 5). High priority was given to the needs of the industrial sector also, 
because of its role in the economy.  
 
The second is the period following the first democratic elections of 1994, up to 2000. With the 
end of apartheid South Africa experienced fundamental shifts resulting in significant changes in 
the energy policy context. According to Marquard (2006), the 1994 political transition opened a 
policy window as the political landscape was transformed, prompting influence relaxation by 
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individual energy supply communities. Within this window period, the 1998 Energy Policy 
White Paper was developed, to guide further the energy sector. The policy was swiftly aligned 
with new social and economic policies aimed at reconstruction and development. The White 
Paper on the Energy Policy (1998) specifically embodies the following objectives, to: 
 Improve social equity by specifically addressing the energy requirements of the poor; 
 Enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the South African economy by providing 
low-cost and high quality energy inputs to industrial, mining and other sectors; and 
 Work towards environmental sustainability by addressing both short-term environmental 
problems, and planning for a long-term transition towards renewable sources of energy 
with minimum negative environmental impact (www.anc.org.za; White Paper on the 
Energy Policy, 1998). 
 
From 2000 onwards, the energy policy focused on trying to achieve the targets that the 
government set after 1994. These targets relate to job creation and economic development 
(Davidson et al., 2006: 5) among other things. While the energy policies of all three periods are 
observed to differ, the policy paradigms shifts observed here are said to have contributed to the 
growth of the sector significantly. The claim made by historical institutionalists, relating to 
‘critical junctures’, warrants recognition, because South Africa is seen internationally to have 
done exceptionally well during the transition period, even though there are still some significant 
areas of learning. The National Energy Act is explained next.  
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3.2.3 National Energy Act 
The aim of the National Energy Act, No. 34 of (2008) is “to ensure that diverse energy resources 
are available, in sustainable quantities and at affordable prices, to the South African economy in 
support of economic growth and poverty alleviation, taking into account environmental 
management requirements and interactions amongst economic sectors; to provide for energy 
planning, increased generation and consumption of renewable energies, contingency energy 
supply, holding of strategic energy feed-stocks and carriers, adequate investment in, appropriate 
upkeep and access to energy infrastructure; to provide measures for the furnishing of certain data 
and information regarding energy demand, supply and generation; to establish an institution to be 
responsible for promotion of efficient generation and consumption of energy and energy 
research; and to provide for all matters connected therewith”. Critical highlights relevant to this 
study are noted: 
 Provide for optimal supply, transformation, transportation, storage and demand of energy 
that are planned, organised and implemented in accordance with a balanced consideration 
of security of supply, economics, consumer protection and a sustainable development; 
 Facilitate energy access for improvement of the quality of life of the people of Republic 
of South Africa; 
 Commercialise energy-related technologies; 
 Contribute to sustainable development of South Africa's economy (National Energy Act, 
No. 34 of 2008). 
Next selected key points in the Petroleum Products Act relevant to the context of this study are 
outlined.  
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3.2.4 Petroleum Products Act, 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977) 
The Petroleum Products Act, 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977) is one of the regulations governing the 
petroleum industry and its purpose is outlined below, thus;  
 Measures in the saving of petroleum products and economy in the cost of distribution 
thereof; 
 The maintenance and control of the price thereof; 
 The furnishing of certain information regarding petroleum products; 
 The rendering of service of a particular kind or standard in connection with petroleum 
products; 
 The licensing of persons involved in the manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing of 
prescribed petroleum products; 
 Promoting the transformation of the South African petroleum and liquid fuels industry; 
and 
 The promulgation of regulations relating to such licenses and matters incidental thereto. 
The South African Liquid Fuels Charter is outlined next. 
 
3.2.5 South African Petroleum and Liquid Fuel Charter 
The South African PLFC was inaugurated in 2000. The aim of the PLFC is to provide the 
necessary framework for transformation of the petroleum and liquid fuels industry. The Charter 
seeks to address objectives made in the White Paper on Energy Policy, particularly to achieve 
“the sustainable presence, ownership or control by HDSAs of approximately a quarter of all 
facets of the liquid fuels industry or plans to achieve this” (Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter 
Final Audit Report, 2011: 21). What this means is that 25% of ownership and control of the 
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industry by HDSA must be achieved within ten years of the Charter enactment. The PLFC 
carries thirteen elements that address this policy goal: namely ownership, management control, 
supportive culture, capacity building, employment equity, private sector procurement, access to 
joint facilities, refining capacity, retailing, wholesaling, financing, terms of credit and synfuels 
supply within the companies (Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter Final Audit Report, 2011).  
 
The Liquid Fuels Charter’s selected objectives are to be achieved through: 
 Fostering a supportive culture towards HDSAs; 
 Capacity building, including overseas training opportunities; 
 Employment equity; 
 Private and public sector procurement, including HDSA companies preferred supplier 
status wherever possible; 
 Improved access and ownership of joint facilities for the movement and storage of oil and 
petroleum products; 
 Improving access to refining capacity; 
 Creation of fair opportunities for entry into retailing and wholesaling; 
 Improving access to financing for HDSA companies, including through the creation of 
strategic partnerships; and 
 Improved terms of credit to HDSA companies, 
(http://www.atns.net.au/agreement.asp?EntityID=4476). 
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Since the Company’s Act stipulate critical areas that ought observance in relations to HDSA, it is 
important to outline it, and this is done next.  
 
3.2.6 Competition Act  
The Company’s Act defines HDSA as follows: “a person is a historically disadvantaged person if 
that person is one of a category of individuals who, before the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), came into operation, were disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination on the basis of race”, among other things. This Act is important in this current 
study because one of the DOE’s mandates is to ensure transformation and ownership. The 
researcher believes that this space requires regulation so that competition is healthy and is able to 
benefit all the players equitably and in an unbiased manner. The Competition Act (89, 1998), 
amended Act (35, 1999), subsequent amendments Act (15 of 2000); and Act (39, 2000) play this 
role. With regards to the context of this study, this statute makes provisions for the Competition 
Commission to exempt HDSA or SMME companies from certain “prohibited practices” that 
lessen or prevent competition in the market, such as horizontal (this means: collusive tendering 
and price fixing) and vertical (for example, the practice of minimum resale pricing) 
relationships. With regard to HDSAs the Act seeks to promote and maintain competition in the 
Republic in order to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons (Company’s Act, 2000). To protect this 
group, the Act goes on to exempt the HDSA companies from abuse of dominance in the market 
such as charging excessive prices. To this effect, the DoE enacted RAS in 2013, including the 
BFP for commodities such as diesel, illuminating paraffin, and liquid petroleum products in 
order to ensure that HDSA companies do not remain dormant and disadvantaged through unfair 
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competition. The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, in relation to the context of 
this study is explained next.  
 
3.2.7 The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act  
The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, No. 5 of (2000) is also a significant piece 
of legislation that seeks to ensure a level-playing field in the business operations in the petroleum 
industry. In Section 217 (1) of the South African Constitution, it is argued that when an organ of 
state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government or any other institution identified 
in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system 
which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Section 2 of the Act, deals 
with the Framework for implementation of preferential procurement policy and does make 
reference to the advancement of HDSA. It is also applicable to organs of state only, and both the 
Constitution and this Act are silent with regard to the private sector. The final Preferential 
Procurement Regulations, gazetted in 2011, aim to ensure that Government’s preferential 
procurement procedures are aligned with the aims of the B-BBEE Act of 2003 and associated 
Codes of Good Practice, as this is among prominent legislation designed to ensure 
transformation is achieved in the petroleum industry of South Africa. To remind the reader, this 
study critically evaluates institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight 
and accountability in the energy sector of South Africa, within a petroleum perspective. The 
framework on monitoring and evaluation is explained next.  
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3.3 Policy framework for Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation 
The development of monitoring and evaluation framework proves government’s seriousness in 
terms of improving service delivery and the impact on intended beneficiaries in South Africa. In 
post 2009, the South African government formed a unit named ‘The Presidency’ in which the 
Department of Monitoring and Evaluation, among many others is accommodated.  The strategic 
mandate of this Department is to monitor and evaluate the implementation of government 
policies and programmes. The Policy Framework for the Government-Wide Monitoring and 
Evaluation System (GWMES) was coined in 2005 with three data major areas underpinning the 
monitoring and evaluation system, namely: programme performance information; social, 
economic and demographic statistics; and evaluation (National Evaluation Policy Framework, 
2011: ii). The National Evaluation Policy Framework (2011: ii) confer that “monitoring and 
evaluation is designed to provide its users with the ability to draw some causal connections 
between the choice of policy priorities, the resourcing of those policy objectives, the 
programmes designed to implement them, the services actually delivered and their ultimate 
impact on communities”. Of interest to this study is the evaluation of the policy objective, which 
is to ensure HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The component of 
‘evaluation’ warrants explanation. In the South African context the components of ‘evaluation’ is 
not so different from the description given by DAC/ OECD given in Chapter Two of this current 
study. It embodies relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. For instance 
evaluation in the South African Evaluation Framework is described as “the systematic collection 
and objective analysis of evidence on public policies, programmes, projects, functions and 
organisations to assess issues such as relevance, performance (effectiveness and efficiency), 
value for money, impact and sustainability and recommend ways forward” (National Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Policy Framework, 2011: iv). It is therefore the programmes/ projects seeking to ensure HDSA 
transformation in the petroleum industry that will be evaluated in order to contextualise these 
elements. Next, the chapter summary and conclusion is given, but prior to embarking on that, it 
is important to outline selected South African Evaluation Policy Framework principles:  
 
 Promote, facilitate and institutionalise the use of evaluation in government; 
 Strengthen linkages between evaluation, policy-making, planning and budgeting; 
 Develop a common language and conceptual base for evaluation in government; 
 Clarify the role of evaluations in relation to other performance management instruments; 
 Frame the evaluation function in terms of its scope, institutionalisation, standards, 
process requirements, skill requirements, governance, financing and oversight; 
 Clarify distinctions in the roles and responsibilities of public institutions in relation to 
evaluation; 
 Improve the quality of evaluations undertaken in public institutions; 
 Increase the utilisation of evaluation findings to improve performance (National 
Evaluation Policy Framework, 2011: iv). 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
This Chapter explored selected legislation and regulations relevant to policy objective of 
ensuring HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. So far it is clear that 
historical events affected South Africa prior to 1994 is what led to the development of the 
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discussed ideas or policies. This means that if it was not for racial discrimination done during 
apartheid there would be no need to advance such ideas. This notion confirms the claim made by 
historical institutional theorists that, past events allow for the framing of new ideas. At the heart 
of the policies discussed is an attempt to redress past racial marginalisation, which came as result 
of the apartheid system. Basically, governance of the petroleum industry is shaped by history. 
Furthermore, there is no suggestion that these ideas are constructed to benefit the selfish ends of 
policy-makers. Specifically for the context of this current study therefore, the researcher 
disagrees with the rational choice institutional theorists’ view, which claims that policies are 
developed by egoistical individuals. It is paramount to point out that policies in the petroleum 
industry took a top-down approach, and the principals are protagonists in driving policy-making.  
 
Since the study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the institutional architecture to implement 
policy, and provide oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry, the first part of the 
study examined the ANC Freedom Charter whose vision is to ensure that all South Africans 
should benefit equally from the economic activities derived from its natural resources. The South 
African Constitution, as the supreme body of law, supports this dream and key areas relevant to 
this study were selectively explained. This was followed by a discussion of the White Paper on 
Energy Policy 1998, the National Energy Act of 2008, the Company’s Act, the Preferential 
Procurement Policy Framework Act and the development of a Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework in South Africa. It was observed that certain parts of the regulations are not 
applicable to the private sector, though this is a significant stakeholder in the petroleum industry. 
Therefore, potential for biased treatment and an unleveled playing-field is highly probable at the 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
policy-making level. The current institutional architecture in the petroleum industry of South 
Africa is next discussed and analysed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CURRENT INSTTUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF PETROLEUM 
GOVERNANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Institutions discussed here are organised according to the three critical variables of this study: 
accountability, oversight and policy implementation institutions in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa. There are a range of institutions in this industry, but only those relevant are 
selected and discussed. It is important to first touch base on international and regional 
institutions that impact on the petroleum industry since South Africa does not operate in isolation 
from the rest of the world. This part is important to unveil because it has a bearing on the South 
African institutional architecture, mainly in the petroleum industry, especially where 
transformation is concerned. The second part of the chapter explains regional bodies that have 
impact in the petroleum industry of South Africa. This part shows that South African institutions 
work closer and homogeneously with the regional bodies. The third part outlines selected 
institutional architecture in South Africa, mainly those with an oversight, accountability and 
policy implementation role in the petroleum industry. The last part analyses institutional power 
relations in the petroleum sector, how the principals and agents interact with institutions in order 
to forge an effective institutional architecture.  
 
4.2 International Institutional trends and developments in the Petroleum Industry  
Sturgeon (1974: 1) observes an oil industry characterised by instability since its inception in the 
1860s. According to Sturgeon (1974: 1) this situation has seen a steady development of 
techniques, agreements, organisational structures and public policies over the last century. Since 
this study views institutional structures as bearing a historical component and evolving over 
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time, it is important to note that early institutions played a dominant and leading role in this 
regard. This was done in order to ensure that industrial power was exercised in relation to the 
circumstances prevalent at the time. The origins of institutional architecture in the petroleum 
industry began with the creation of an International Petroleum cartel comprising seven big 
petroleum companies mentioned in Chapter One of the study. It is this Cartel that set up initial 
governance structures around the First World War period. The nature of the rules at the time was 
geared towards utility maximisation as observed by rational institutionalists. The inference is that 
the strategic game in the petroleum industry is often aimed at changing the rules in favour of the 
bigger players, and as such, these institutions benefited handsomely (Sturgeon, 1974: 3).  
 
Sturgeon (1974: 3-4) put forward an initial set of rules in the petroleum industry centralised 
around four elements: (I) “the licensing regime; (II) the fiscal regime; (111) issues of sovereign 
taxation, and (IV) methods of dispute settlement”. Since the end of the Second World War, a set 
of formal and informal institutions with different roles to govern the petroleum industry 
emerged. For example, the contract dubbed ‘As Is’ agreement was the first in 1926 and this was 
followed by the Memorandum on European Markets and The Red Line Agreement (Sturgeon, 
1974: 3). These agreements controlled the petroleum sector effectively, but were only sustained 
until the early 1950’s when they eventually reached a state of collapse due to political pressures 
(Sturgeon, 1974).  
 
A new structural form called ‘OPEC’ was developed around 1960, which wielded little control 
of oil until 1972 (www.opec.org). Currently, OPEC has a total of twelve Member Countries, 
inter alia; Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
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United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (www.opec.org). OPEC’s imperative is to co-ordinate and 
unify petroleum policies among Member Countries so that oil prices for petroleum producers and 
investment returns are realised. However, the muscle of this organisation as a consequence of 
political pressures, weakened its initial mandate. This phase led to ungovernability of oil prices 
and so, mistrust and anxiety around players submerged, prompting direct intervention of the 
OECD countries. According to Sturgeon (1974), the OECD intervention led to the establishment 
of the IEA, a structure which dealt, mainly with emergencies. This was followed by the creation 
of an Emergency Sharing System, which operated in close liaison with the international oil 
companies (Sturgeon, 1974). As the industry evolved further, more governance structures that 
emphasise transparency in conducting petroleum activities emerged. Thus far, the evolving 
nature of institutional architecture in the petroleum industry informs us as to how institutions 
developed, how they fall into disuse and re-develop again. The next section discusses certain oil 
governance structures developed during post 1990 to oversee governability of the petroleum 
industry in order to ensure that natural resources impacts positively on the lives of the poor.  
 
4.2.1 Transparency International  
According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 563-95); and Karl (1997: 55), Transparency 
International initiatives were developed to ensure transparent management of natural resources in 
order to address government corruption, among other things. The issue is that while wealth from 
oil extraction was discovered in abundance, a gap between the rich and the poor widened, and 
leaders took no accountability. In essence, citizens’ needs were not safeguarded so that poverty is 
alleviated through equal beneficiation (Darby, 2010: 78). Transparency International is, 
therefore, a response to these challenges. Transparency International, as advocated by Peter 
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Eigen in 1993, was adopted and applied by some countries involved in petroleum. Transparency 
International is relevant to discuss in this study because of its active involvement and guidance in 
all four critical stages of the policy process showcased in the Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4. 1: Policy Process 
 
Source: Author‘s configuration (wording adapted from Transparency International, 1993) 
 
Basically, Transparency International (1993) provides an oversight mechanism by raising the 
alarm on potential corruption and the need for transparency from the agenda setting stage of 
policy making. At the policy formulation stage, anti-corruption laws are advocated. At the policy 
implementation level, lobbying for application of anti-corruption laws takes effect. In the policy 
evaluation phase, the measurements on the changes in the perception of corruption are done, so 
that the next policy cycle is improved. More institutions such as Bribe Payer’s Index, Global 
Corruption Barometer, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
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Corruption were developed to tackle natural resource mismanagement (Yates, 2009: 11). Publish 
What You Pay, as another institution formed for similar purposes is next discussed. 
 
4.2.2 Publish What You Pay  
Publish What You Pay was pioneered in 2002 by George Soros (Publish What You Pay, 2011: 
5). This initiative is inspired by the idea of breaking the link between oil and corruption by 
requiring corporations to ‘publish what they pay’ to the governments of oil-exporting countries 
(Yates, 2009: 11-13). Central to this institution is ensuring that transparency is encouraged in the 
petroleum space. Publish What You Pay (2011: 5) supports this claim by declaring:  
 
“Investors need to be able to assess the risks of their investments. Investors need to know where, 
in what amount, and on what terms their money is being spent in what are often very high risk 
operating environments. These environments are often poor in developing countries that may be 
politically unstable, have lots of corruption, and have a history of civil unrest. The investor has a 
right to know about the payments. Secrecy of payments carries real bottom-line risks for 
investors. Creating a reporting requirement with the SEC will capture a larger portion of the 
international extractive industries corporations than any other single mechanism, thereby setting 
a global standard for transparency and promoting a level playing field. Investors should be able 
to know how much money is being invested up front in oil, gas, and mining projects”. 
 
Oil-exporting countries in Africa who have partnerships with Publish What You Pay are only 
present in three countries: Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Nigeria (Yates, 2009: 13). As 
Yates (2009) explains further, while the idea for the call for mandatory disclosures of what the 
oil companies are paying to the governments is perceived as good, it could also be a challenge to 
practise in countries where oil money is central to the political economy; hence some states are 
hesitant to be part of it. Next, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is discussed. 
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4.2.3 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EITI was launched in 2002 as a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, 
investors and international organisations (Acosta, 2012: 4). The EITI is based on the principle 
that “the wealth from a country’s natural resources should benefit all its citizens and that this 
requires high standards of transparency and accountability” (Beanland, 2013: 2). EITI basically 
is an initiative that supports the same objective as the institution discussed above, but with an 
objective to monitor compliance. Acosta (2012: 4) supports this claim, arguing that “EITI is a 
standard for monitoring compliance with contract disclosure and revenue transparency criteria to 
ensure that companies publish what they pay and governments disclose what they receive from 
the extraction and export of natural resources”. Transparency of revenue sources is achieved 
through: increased accountability; reduced risk of corruption; fostering democratic debate; 
improving macro-economic management; and access to finance (Yates, 2009: 13). These are 
deemed relevant on this current study in order to minimise chances of corruption and poverty. 
Yates (2009) confer that EITI conducts regular publication on oil payments and revenue in order 
to foster a culture of transparency. However, not all countries in the world have membership 
with EITI, including South Africa. The OECD is an important institution as well since it 
promotes good governance of petroleum industry. The discussion of it is next. 
 
4.2.4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The OECD echoes principles entrenched in the EITI discussed above. The OECD was officially 
created on 30 September 1961 and sought to promote policies designed to: 
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 Achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard 
of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to 
contribute to the development of the world economy; 
 Contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in 
the process of economic development; and 
 Contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in 
accordance with international obligations (Gurria, 2008: 2). 
 
Of relevance to this study is that the OECD outlines principles of corporate governance, not only 
to the member countries, but also gives standard guidelines to state-owned companies operating 
world-wide. It is important to note that OECD outlines certain principles in which to a larger 
extent are similar to the King III Report on Corporate Governance adopted by South African 
state-owned companies in the petroleum industry among other institutions. However, the major 
challenge facing these initiatives is the failure to recognise that the actors within institutions may 
have different strength and capabilities to effectively enforce accountability and transparency in 
order to realise the intended outcome. Next, selected regional institutions governing the 
petroleum industry are outlined.  
 
4.3 Selected Regional Institutions Governing the Petroleum Industry 
4.3.1 New Partnership for Africa’s Development  
It is paramount to mention regional bodies and their role in the petroleum sector management for 
the purposes of the benefit of this study. Poverty alleviation is at the heart of the NEPAD 
initiative (Davidson and Winkler, 2003: 2). The major objectives set for the energy sector are to: 
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 Increase African’s access to reliable and affordable commercial energy supply from 30% 
or more within 20 years; 
 Improve the reliability and lower the cost of energy supply to productive activities in 
order to enable economic growth to 6% per annum; 
 Reverse the environmental degradation that is associated with the use of traditional fuels 
in rural areas; 
 Exploit and develop the hydropower potential of Africa; 
 Integrate transmission grids and gas pipelines so as to facilitate cross-border energy 
flows; 
 Reform and harmonise petroleum regulations and legislation on the continent; 
 Build capacity to strengthen the African Energy Commission (AFREC) and its sub-
regional organisations (NEPAD, 2001: 2). 
 
It is paramount to note NEPAD’s energy agenda for Africa as aligned with its key objectives of 
eradicating poverty, putting Africa on a sustainable growth and development path (NEPAD, 
2001), among other agendas. In recent years NEPAD adopted a partnership strategy to promote 
development of the African energy infrastructure to promote this dream. For example, there is 
NEPAD’s Energy Infrastructure Initiative, which observes power systems and gas or oil projects, 
mainly those that are ready for implementation (NEPAD, 2001: 2). To this effect, a short-term 
Action Plan was put in place, which identifies priorities in the energy sector, comprising twenty-
three energy projects that fall into four categories: power systems; gas/oil studies; capacity 
building and facilitation (Zhou, 2003: 8).  
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However, challenges such as poor infrastructure financing and skills shortages constrain Africa’s 
efforts in harnessing energy resources abundantly. Zhou (2003: 6) argues that most of the 
lucrative energy resources, such as oil, are rather exploited by foreign oil companies (or renting 
states) for their markets in the developed world. In essence, oil natural resources extracted in 
Africa benefit rather the rich renting States, while African poverty is left unaddressed. It is a 
well-known fact that Africa is endowed with abundant natural resources, but conflict and 
corruption decelerates further development. However, it is unclear why international renting 
States manage to obtain wealth in Africa, which does not benefit its own citizens even in the 
light of international initiatives discussed above. Instead, the so called first-world countries 
remain wealthy regardless of its dwindling oil resource. Next to note is the role of Southern 
African Development Community in the petroleum industry. 
 
4.3.2 Southern African Development Community in the Petroleum Industry 
According to Davidson and Winkler (2003: 7) “the SADC is an intergovernmental legal entity 
grouping fourteen southern African States: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with a commitment to equitable economic 
integration and sustainable development”.  
The objectives of SADC in this regard are to:  
 Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and 
quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged 
through regional integration;  
 Evolve common political values, systems and institutions;  
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 Promote and defend peace and security;  
 Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the 
interdependence of Member States;  
 Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;  
 Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the 
Region;  
 Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment;  
 Strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and 
links among the people of the Region, (www.sadac.int). 
 
The researcher is of the view that these principles are important as they may hone good business 
between the Member countries. It is important to acknowledge that efforts for economic growth 
and poverty alleviation in the African continent are fraught by civil or religious wars and in some 
cases even by acts of terrorism. For example, Nigeria is one area of concern as an economic 
power-house abundant in oil in Africa. Mozambique recently discovered gas, but its political 
climate remains volatile. Indeed, the involvement of South Africa with some of these 
international and regional bodies needs to be recognised since this plays a significant role 
regarding accountability, oversight and policy implementation and efforts to address HDSA 
transformation.  
 
As discussed earlier, international bodies are more concerned about transparency and of course, 
accountability. The researcher is of the view that, with the consideration of the sector under 
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review, this could cause paranoia. The industry in general is highly competitive and this 
perpetuates secrecy. In some nations, the petroleum industry is viewed as a political economy 
and a means to only certain ends. South Africa has showed signs of scepticism as international 
membership with some major bodies are minimal (Hughes, 2012). However, South Africa has 
informally and unofficially considered becoming a supporting country of some of these 
initiatives, but has turned down responsibility of being an implementing country (South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 2013: 8). Being an implementing country where EITI is 
concerned is most often translated in terms of ensuring increased transparency in the collection 
of resource revenues. The researcher views this on its own as a sensitive matter especially in a 
context where there are trust issues among countries. It should also be noted that vested interests 
are rife in the petroleum industry and this intensifies the information unevenness further (Lahn, 
Marcel, Mitchell, Myers and Steven, 2009: 5). Next, accountability, oversight and policy 
implementation mechanism used in the South African context are analysed and discussed. 
 
4.4 South Africa’s mechanisms to conduct accountability, oversight and policy 
implementation  
Selected instruments to conduct effective oversight, accountability and policy implementation in 
the petroleum industry are examined. Accountability mechanisms are discussed first. 
 
4.4.1 Accountability mechanisms  
South Africa in post 1994 created a number of institutions supporting constitutional democracy 
within the Constitution itself, known as the Chapter nine Institutions. Of relevance to the study 
are the Public Protector, and the Auditor‐General. These institutions are expected to be 
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independent of government, while they are subject only to the Constitution and the law. In 
addition, they are required to be non-partisan and impartial when exercising their power, free 
from favour, fear and prejudice. To ensure that they are doing their intended work, these 
institutions are required to submit annual reports to the National Assembly, stating what progress 
or challenges they experience. According to Naidoo (2011:40), these bodies are expected to 
ensure effective oversight and ensure that performance information on government is placed 
within the public domain.  
 
The mandate of the Public Protector is particularly relevant to public accountability (Hughes, 
2012: 4). The Public Protector was formed in terms of South Africa’s Constitution to investigate 
complaints against government agencies or officials with regards to maladministration and abuse 
of power in state affairs, among other things (Hughes, 2012: 4). The Public Protector is generally 
permitted to investigate: 
 Government at any level. This includes central and provincial government, state 
departments and local authorities. 
 Any person performing a public function. This includes anyone performing any official 
duty which affects South Africans, for example a state employee such as a policeman or 
an electoral officer. 
 Corporations or companies where the state is involved, for example Eskom and PetroSA. 
 Statutory councils, for example the Human Sciences Research Council or the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (www.publicprotector.org).  
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The Public Protector’s role is reactive in the sense that its activity is induced by a particular 
event. The public lodge complaints to the Public Protector only where maladministration is 
suspected, so that those involved can be held accountable. The Public Protector in the South 
African context is functioning well, but critical skills, lack of enforcement measures and funding 
shortages limit the potential this institution has.  
 
The role of the Auditor-General (AG) also warrants recognition. AG prevents, detects and 
investigates economic crimes. This means that the AG wields both ex ante and ex post 
mechanisms to forge accountability. By so doing, the AG publicly reports audited financial 
statements which may expose financial mismanagement of public sector institutions at national, 
provincial and local level, including that of state-owned Companies. The AG is subject only to 
the National Assembly where audit reports are submitted. However, while this Chapter nine 
institution has been described as ‘watchdog’, which keeps government in check and transform 
society, it is confronted by similar challenges to that of Public Protector because it is not directly 
a branch of government. This means that it does not have the power to employ punitive measures 
against offending public officials or institutions. Their role is purely investigatory and 
administrative, providing a link between government and citizens, and giving recommendations. 
In this way AG is viewed as toothless by the researcher. Selected oversight mechanisms are 
discussed next. 
 
4.4.2 Oversight Mechanisms 
As was observed in Chapter two of this study, oversight is both ex ante and ex post. The 
researcher holds the view that for these mechanisms to be employed effectively, transparency is 
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crucial. Transparency in the petroleum value-chain is essential for improving the governance and 
management of the industry. It could also assist the bodies that are responsible for oversight to 
know what they are monitoring. As petroleum is a multi-disciplinary industry, activities related 
to licensing, the implementation of contracts, the collection and distribution of revenue, and 
service delivery is done efficiently through robust monitoring in a transparent environment. 
Various institutions tasked with this role are discussed below. 
 
Parliament and the Portfolio Committees  
Through its oversight function, Parliament acts as the watchdog of the policies, mainly its 
development and implementation of those that govern the petroleum industry. This could be 
done through closely monitoring and evaluating government policies and actions in this industry, 
and by actively engaging with all actors involved. There are numerous tools of oversight used by 
Parliament, which are inter alia; through Portfolio Committees, the question period, public 
hearings, parliamentary debates, and audit agencies among others. These are developed in detail 
as the study unfolds. For the purposes of this study, it is paramount to give a full view and 
structure of oversight and of where the orders for governing the petroleum industry originate. At 
the apex of oversight is the National Assembly. Section 42 (3) of the South African Constitution 
of 1996 empowers the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures with an oversight role 
over their respective Executives. Furthermore, Section 92 (3) (b) of the Constitution provides 
guidelines on how oversight should be conducted, stating that Members of Parliament (MPs) 
must provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control. As 
McGee (2002: 1) states “strong parliamentary oversight and scrutiny regimes are an essential 
part of combating corruption and promoting good governance generally”. Parliamentary 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
oversight role is structured amongst the various Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. The 
industry under discussion is monitored by the PPCE at the legislative level.  
 
The reader should note that PPCs are not something new in South Africa, as they existed in the 
pre-1994 Parliament, where only thirteen Committees existed (Streek, 1997: 25). The difference 
between pre 1994 PPCs and those formed in post 1994 is that, in the former, “hearings were held 
in secret; they had very limited powers, and existed essentially to rubber-stamp legislation put 
forward by the National Party government” (Streek, 1997: 27). There was also no public access 
to the committees as there is today, to allow public participation in the state affairs. What is 
significant about the post-apartheid Parliamentary Portfolio Committees is that the rules 
governing Committees were overhauled and their number increased. In post 1994, Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committees suit a democratic state where they are open to the public and press scrutiny 
(Calland, 1999: 73). They further exercise oversight and accountability over the service delivery 
performance and economic contribution of state-owned Companies and the Government 
Departments (www.treasury.gov.za). However, the gradual development of this institution in 
South Africa attest to the theory espoused by historical institutionalist, in which institutions are 
seen to possess the so called ‘path dependence’. Specific oversight on sectoral service delivery 
and other matters, as explained by (National Treasury, 2006: 18; Du Toit, 2005: 4; and 
www.parliament.gov.za) is conducted through: 
 
 Monitoring the economic, efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery as measured by 
performance indicators presented in the annual reports of Departments; 
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 Evaluating management’s explanation as to why the entity’s service delivery 
performance did not attain the targets set in the corporate plans; 
 Equity of service delivery, and investigating the circumstances that led to financial 
underperformance and the impact this had on service delivery and the measures taken by 
management to rectify the situation; 
 They consider and amend Bills, and may initiate Bills; 
 They consider private members’ and provincial legislative proposals and special 
petitions; 
 They consider international treaties and agreements; 
 They examine specific areas of public life or matters of public interest; 
 They take care of domestic Parliamentary issues. As such, Committees have the power to 
summon any person to appear before them, give evidence or produce documents;  
 They may require any person or institution to report to them. Committees may also 
receive petitions, representations or submissions from the public. Each Committee is 
headed by a Chairperson.  
 
However, clarity must be made between certain roles of organs of state, where oversight in the 
petroleum industry is concerned. For instance, the Portfolio Committees oversee the work of the 
Department they are responsible for, and enquire and make recommendations about any aspect 
of the Department, including its structure, functioning and policy (www.parliament.gov.za). 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committees also conduct oversight through the evaluation of 
performance of state-owned entities, mainly the annual non-financial statements. SCOPA’s role 
is to examine the financial part of annual reports, e.g. the annual financial statements. However, 
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the researcher holds the view that South Africa should be commended for the establishment of 
Committees in forging a transparent and a democratic watchdog function. Laski (1938: 149) 
maintains that “a government that is compelled to explain itself under cross-examination will do 
its best to avoid the grounds of complaint”. 
 
McGee (2002: 1) is of the view that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight depends upon 
an active committee system that allows members to wield oversight below the surface of 
government administration. Importantly, in the South African system, each PPC is made up of 
political deployees from various political parties. The strength of this structure is that it 
encourages objective discussion on policies and programmes. These are ‘norm leaders’, 
responsible for enacting and monitoring compliance to a norm. However, effectively discharging 
its oversight authority is dependent on a number of factors which are key in the industry under 
discussion, including the ability of Parliament to access adequate information, the technical 
capacity of individual Members of Parliament within committees, committee leadership, and the 
political environment in Parliament (Du Toit, 2005: 2). It is important to note the role discharged 
by DoE as the department administers policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation in the 
petroleum industry. This means that the DOE plays an oversight role over the petroleum industry 
and this is explained below. 
 
The Department of Energy 
The DOE is responsible for administering the National Energy Act of 2008 and the following 
Acts: Central Energy Fund Act (Act 38 of 1977) Petroleum Products Act (Act 120 of 1977), 
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Nuclear Energy Act (Act 131 of 1993), and Electricity Act (Act 41 of 1987 as amended), among 
others. In terms of these Acts the Department of Energy performs certain regulatory functions, 
particularly in relation to the liquid fuels sub-sector, oversight of the National Energy Regulator, 
and the Council for Nuclear Safety (South African Energy Discussion Document, 1995). In 
terms of Public Finance Management Act of 1999, the DoE has a role to oversee state-owned 
Companies as schedule (2) and schedule (3a) cites. Broadly, the DoE has policy oversight over 
the sector. According to Marquard (2006: 355), “the Department of Energy has its strongest 
policy capacity in the liquid fuel arena followed by electricity”. Policy matter relevant to this 
study is HDSA transformation, in which the DoE wields oversight for. 
 
The Department of Energy has a specific mandate to ensure that the petroleum industry has 
sufficient support to achieve this policy imperative. There are other mandates placed on this 
Department, which include Constitutive, Legislative, Policy, and a mandate to implement 
relevant court rulings and planned policy initiatives (DoE Revised Strategic Plan, 2011/12-
2015/16: 14-18). Constitutionally, the DoE has a mandate to loyally execute the lawful policies 
of the government of the day, as enshrined in Section 197 (1) of the South African Constitution 
(1996). It is paramount to note that the DoE’s administrative mandate, to a large extent is 
handled in cooperation with other stakeholders. For instance, in the fuel industry the National 
Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) has a role to regulate the liquid fuels, gas and 
electricity sectors (National Treasury, 2006: 23). Policy implementation mechanisms are 
explained next.  
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4.5 Policy Implementation Mechanisms  
Selected instruments referred to in this section guide the industry on policy outcome expected 
from them. It also refers to institutions that conduct implementation of policies. 
 
4.5.1 The National Development Plan (2012-2030) 
At the centre of transformation, the National Development Plan (NDP) (NDP, 2012-2030) 
outlines the structure of the economy which will be transformed through industrialisation, broad-
based black economic empowerment and through strengthening and expanding the role of the 
state in the economy. The National Development Plan is a long-term strategy that seeks to see 
socio-economic challenges as part of the past by 2030. Among other things, the NDP aims to 
ensure that all South Africans attain a decent standard of living through the elimination of 
poverty and reduction of inequality (NDP, 2012-2030). As such, all sectors of economy in South 
Africa are compelled to attack poverty.  
 
However, while the energy sector responds to this through various programmes/ projects, the 
researcher’s view is that the NDP (2012-2030) appears to be biased towards the electricity 
industry and lacks strong commitment on the direction of petroleum industry. To support this 
claim, the NDP (2012-2030) for instance is not certain whether to invest in the new oil-to-liquid 
refinery, build coal-to-liquid refinery, upgrade the existing refineries, or build a refinery in 
Angola or Nigeria (NDP, 2012-2030: 148). The researcher is of the opinion that this uncertainty 
in the long-term plan delays policy redevelopment, programmes/ projects and resource 
alignment. SAPIA, which is overarching body encompassing oil and gas companies, is explained 
next.  
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4.5.2 South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) 
The SAPIA group subsequently arose after the democratic government was launched in 1994. 
The 1994 political freedom appears to have allowed the squashing of a number of restricting 
measures, which among others include the Official Secrets Act No.16 of 1956 as it implemented 
stringent secrecy in the petroleum industry. However, as institutions embark on path dependence, 
simply means that, traits of secrecy among companies cannot be absolutely dismantled. Oil 
companies for example are bounded by contracts that bear confidentiality clause, and this is due 
to competitive nature of the oil business. The six major petroleum companies specializing in 
refining and marketing operations in South Africa formed this group to represent its various 
interests. These companies are BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd, Chevron South Africa (Pty) Ltd, 
Engen Petroleum Limited, PetroSA (Pty) Ltd, Sasol Limited, Shell SA (Pty) Ltd and Total South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd. Basically, this is a legitimate coordinating body in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa with representatives from each of the said companies. Among other things, SAPIA 
monitors HDSA transformation implementation by member companies in close liaison with the 
Department of Energy. According to SAPIA’s Annual Report (2003) the petroleum industry was 
the first industry in South Africa to implement the transformation agenda. Of note, is SAPIA’s 
significant contribution to the process of developing and adopting the Liquid Fuels 
Empowerment Charter in 2000. This Charter is observed to be the first empowerment charter in 
the history of South Africa. In the following discussion institutional power relations is analysed. 
 
4.6 Institutional Power Relations in the petroleum industry 
This chapter was organised in a manner that would allow the reader to understand institutional 
architecture in the petroleum industry. Developing the chapter from this angle enabled the 
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understanding of how power is important and wielded by international, regional and national 
actors. Power is an old and broad phenomenon informed by several disciplines, which created 
extensive literature discourse. According to Van Dijk (2012: 19) some recent work includes 
studies by Dahl (1957, 1961), Debnam (1984), Galbraith (1985), Lukes (1974, 1986), Milliband 
(1983), Mills (1956), Therborn (1980), White (1976), and Wrong (1979), among many others. 
As Van Dijk (2012: 19) explains, “most of this work is carried out within the boundaries of 
sociology and political science”. The researcher accepts a view cited from Van Dijk (2012: 19) 
that, in order to understand power relations, it is better to think of it as simply one particularly 
important way of defining relationships between different actors. So power relations discussed 
here focuses on two actors, thus the principal and the agent. Lahn et al. (2009: 20) note that 
power balance may differ according to topic. 
 
As the study established, there are two major actors in the petroleum industry: the principal and 
the agent. The relationship between them warrants deeper exploration, to allow contextual 
understanding of how actors react to institutions. What the researcher unveiled also in the study 
is that these two actors play either a role for exerting accountability, oversight and policy 
implementation. In these roles, the study has consistently shown the principal as protagonist who 
identify policy ideas and gives orders. It has portrayed the agents to be obedient, receiving orders 
and implementing them according to the principal’s requirements. However, it is important to 
note that these two key actors may compete for power in many different ways. In order to be 
specific Lahn et al. (2009: 20) recognises inherent asymmetries between government (principal) 
and oil companies (agent). Thus, on the one hand for example, the government has ultimate 
authority, while on the other; the oil companies have technical capacity (Lahn et al., 2009: 20). 
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In the petroleum industry space, governments normally dominate decisions on policy and 
production targets, while the oil companies may offer advice, mainly on technical matters (Lahn 
et al., 2009: 20). The power of oil companies emanates therefore from their technical know-how 
of the industry, which policy initiators may not fully have. Hence Lahn et al. (2009) observes 
two power asymmetries in the petroleum sector.  
 
However, in situations where the Ministry of petroleum is institutionally capacitated, a good 
knowledge of the sector’s capabilities and doable objectives are developed for the oil companies 
(Lahn et al., 2009). In this scenario, decision-making is largely top-down and is dominated by 
the involvement of an elected official, which in many instances is the Minister. Lahn et al. (2009: 
40) observe a challenge for effective operation of the oil companies when the Ministry is 
dominant. For instance, the Ministry tends to interfere too much on oil companies’ operational 
decision-making. Lahn et al. (2009: 40) claim is that, when this happens the oil company ceases 
to be run like a business, but instead, it becomes an extension of the Ministry. The researcher 
argues that any decision that arises from the oil company may be treated with suspicion and at 
times incite no attention. Too much involvement of Government to PetroSA’s (a state-owned 
Company) affairs for example can be seen in this light. Its Board of Directors takes orders from 
the Ministry which dictates the direction into which the company must take. For example, in the 
Energy Security Master Plan: Liquid Fuels (2007) PetroSA is mandated to source 30% of oil into 
the country. This applies also to policy objective to ensure HDSA transformation as it is dictated 
from top-down. Key factor is that, when this happen “a bureaucratic corporate culture and a lack 
of entrepreneurial drive for employees” (Lahn et al., 2009: 40) takes precedence. The reason for 
this is that most often, top-down decisions tend to encounter resistance during implementation 
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and the usual culprit is resource and policy objectives misalignment. Thus, while the Ministry 
may have autonomy on decision-making, unavailability of resources may prevent these decisions 
to materialise.  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, particularly where the company dominates the Ministry in 
terms of knowledge and capacity, it may take the lead in determining broad objectives (Lahn et 
al., 2009). The researcher holds the view that in such a situation it may appear that government is 
out of control of its own destiny, and this may open a possibility to manipulate policy direction 
in favour of oil company’s needs. It further diminishes government capacity and therefore 
accountability and oversight over management of the industry may too, become a challenge, 
because information to conduct this may derive from the oil companies and may lack objectivity. 
Lahn et al. (2009: 22) confer further, “while the operators may be better equipped to propose 
industry-specific policy, particularly in the early stages of petroleum sector development, this 
system risks the company in pursuing its own business objectives at the cost of the government’s 
development policies”.  
 
According to Lahn et al. (2009) the power asymmetries between government and oil companies 
is not static, because while they may be in the process of being redefined, the balance of power 
could change. This argument goes against the assertion made by historical institutional theorists 
earlier in this study since it could not explain what happens when institutional change takes 
effect and how it shapes future decision-making, because to them institutions are static or either 
top-down or bottom-up. A summary and conclusion of the chapter is next given. 
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4.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
Current institutional architecture in the petroleum industry was discussed and arranged according 
to three critical variables that are the focus of this study: accountability, oversight and policy 
implementation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. Selected institutions, from the range 
existing in the petroleum industry, have been analysed in this chapter. These bring a broader 
view of how the petroleum industry operates, for they inform the direction currently being taken 
by institutions in South Africa. The first part of the chapter looked at institutional trends and 
developments in the international petroleum industry, with particular focus on the context of this 
study. This showed the petroleum industry as being initially characterised by instability and 
mistrust, owing to intense competition. Institutions and rules of the game were initiated to protect 
the interests of bigger players in the industry during this era. These rules focused on four areas: 
the licensing regime, fiscal regime, issues of sovereign taxation and methods of dispute 
settlement. Notwithstanding these rules, a lack of transparency characterised the marketplace, 
caused by vested interests seeking to reduce competition. This led to a situation wherein natural 
resources were not benefiting the poor. It is upon this situation that institutions such as Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and Publish What You Pay, among others, were instituted to build trust, 
entrench good corporate governance, improve transparency in financial payments, and generally 
improve the overall legitimacy of the petroleum industry. However, not all countries adopted 
these positive governance principles and behaviours.  
 
The second part of the chapter explained regional bodies in the petroleum industry. Rules of the 
game and expected behaviour in operating in the industry on the African continent were 
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discussed. Some countries however have memberships, while others are still skeptical. While the 
African continent is trying its best to be on par with developed countries, certain issues such as 
limited infrastructure, skills shortages and financial shortages, prevent full developmental 
impact. Instead, developed nations exploit the abundant African natural resources for their own 
markets. Furthermore, political instability and corruption prohibits full exploitation of petroleum 
resources, especially beneficiation by poor.    
 
The third part presented South Africa’s institutional architecture, mainly those institutions whose 
role it is to conduct oversight, accountability and policy implementation in the petroleum 
industry. Where accountability is concerned, it became clear that both ex ante and ex post 
mechanisms, as carried out by the Auditor General and the Public Protector, are developed to 
ensure protection of democracy and enhance legitimacy. Upon investigation, it was found that 
these institutions encourage transparency through public reporting, amongst other actions. 
Institutions that conduct oversight, such as the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and the 
Department of Energy, were also investigated, and ex ante and ex post mechanisms are in place. 
The central argument in this part of the study is that transparency is essential in improving 
governance and in allowing the oversight bodies to know what they are overseeing. Room for 
improvement was found: there are no mechanisms in place to enforce compliance in the roles of 
both accountability and oversight bodies; rather, their roles are limited only to the making of 
recommendations. Policy implementation tools such as the National Development Plan, and 
SAPIA, were also discussed. Finally, institutional power relations in the petroleum sector were 
analysed, in particular the relationship between the principal and agent in forging an effective 
institutional architecture. The study here observed power asymmetries between the principal and 
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agent: while the principal may appear to have all the authority in setting policy, in practice, 
government’s technical know-how of the industry is limited and the agent often takes the lead in 
influencing policy. Given this advantage, the agent is positioned as an idea initiator, a point 
missed in the explanation given by institutional theorists. Instead, institutional theorists placed 
the principal as an ultimate protagonist in the formulation of ideas or norms, while presenting the 
agent as per its definition: a body that takes and implements orders given from the principal. The 
next chapter explains the road-map for collating information for this study.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter expounds the process that the researcher undertook when collecting information 
useful to this study. In so doing the researcher primarily unpacks the research design, which is 
underpinned by a qualitative research tool. Secondly, the study discusses the research 
methodology, wherein a qualitative-triangulation research paradigm is employed. A rationale for 
selecting this design is informed by a natural setting involving human interaction as social 
constructs. Furthermore, it is seen as the best method for obtaining various forms of data in 
enhancing validity and reliability of the study. Qualitative-triangulation embodies ethnographic, 
case study and historical research. Thirdly, the research process and the tools used in gathering 
information are explained. Fourthly, the study shows the road map that ensures reliability and 
validity of this current study. Lastly, the delimitations of the study are explained. 
 
 The well-known debates on social research are mainly two: quantitative and qualitative. Each 
tradition is seen as having different ontological and epistemological points of view in how they 
view the social world. That is, “the quantitative research regards the social world as separate to 
the observer in such a way that the social world is seen as a measurable object” (Cooper and 
Emory, 1995: 21). The qualitative research on the contrary takes the social world as a construct 
of the researcher and the researched. The word ‘research’ in the social sciences is rather observed 
as a problematic concept. Cooper and Emory (1995: 21) define research as a systematic enquiry 
aimed at providing information to solve problems. According to Kumar (2005: 6) the basic term 
‘research’ can be understood, as ‘one of the ways to find answers to your questions’. The 
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researcher adopts this view because this explanation is all-encompassing as it includes various 
research strategies, designs and methods in order to understand a phenomenon of enquiry. Next, 
the research design is discussed.  
 
5.2 Research Design 
Polit and Hungler (1999: 155) describe a research design “as a blueprint, or outline for 
conducting the study in such a way that maximum control is exercised over factors that could 
interfere with the validity of the study of the results”. Research design in this current study is 
done so that the data collection and research questions are adjusted according to what the 
researcher seeks to understand. Burns and Grove (2001: 223) infer that in designing a study, 
researchers are assisted to putting their plans in the manner that will encourage effective 
implementation so that intended research output are realised. Research design in this study 
mainly ensures that the data gathered allows the researcher to answer the research questions 
logically. It is vital to note that the research design could either be quantitative or qualitative. 
This study is heavily embedded on qualitative research design to critically evaluate institutional 
architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa. As the study falls into the category of qualitative research design it is 
paramount to justify the researcher’s choice. Prior to embarking on this justification, qualitative 
research design is broadly explained since it is the preferred choice of this research. 
 
5.2.1 Qualitative research design 
Creswell (1998: 1-2) explains that qualitative research “is an inquiry process of understanding a 
social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, 
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reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a natural setting”. Burns and Grove 
(2001: 223) perceive qualitative research as normally conducted in a natural setting and involves 
a process of building a complex and holistic picture of the phenomenon of interest. Patton (2002: 
39) concurs by stating that qualitative research uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to 
understand phenomena in context-specific settings. 
 
Grahame (1999: 14) is of the view that there is a general challenge with defining qualitative 
research. Grahame (1999) posits that to regard the qualitative research as non-quantitative is 
understandable, but it is “…uninformative: as such, we need more than a negative definition”. 
Gurbrium and Holsten’s (2001: 55) provide various definitions of qualitative research, thus: 
there is (a) “naturalism, which tries to understand the social reality per-se; (b) ethnomethodology 
studies social interaction to understand the creation of social order; (c) emotionalism studies 
apprehension with subjectivity in relation to humans and finally; (d) postmodernism, 
constructing a variety of the social realities through discourse”. However, paying close attention 
to all four types Bryman (2008: 59) picks up some common characteristics: first, the centrality of 
social reality and humans; second, investigating a changing reality; third, interpreting the 
researched reality in a constructive manner, that the researched contributes meaning to the 
research and fourth, an attempt to understand and seek meaning. Bryman (2008: 59), goes on to 
say that these common characteristics introduce an idea about what qualitative research ‘is’ all 
about. Edson (1986: 13) in Bryman (2008) puts forth that there is no qualitative method per se, 
what we have is only the methods to gather information with which we construct our qualitative 
understanding. This study holds a view presented by Creswell (1998: 1-2) which presents 
qualitative research “as an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on 
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building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, 
and conducted in a natural setting”. This definition is adopted because it provides the entire 
setting in which this study is based. The rationale for selecting qualitative research is presented 
next. 
 
5.2.2 Rationale for qualitative research  
The choice made in this study is motivated by seeking to understand a social or human problem 
from multiple perspectives. The researcher argues that the problem that this study seeks to 
address is a social problem that involves human interaction whose role is to implement public 
policy, conduct oversight and accountability effectively. Some social problems are inexplicable 
through the means of employing quantitative analysis, especially where study is centred on 
seeking cause and effect. Qualitative methods should qualify this study because it is the only 
effective and useful way assisted the researcher to solicit information that could not be obtained 
well with quantitative methods. However, it is important to acknowledge that even though 
qualitative research can be differentiated from a quantitative methodology in several ways; to 
some degree these research designs in some way complement one another.  
 
There are other assumptions of qualitative research that propelled the researcher to believe that 
an informed choice is made. This is based on the vital view that every research methodology is 
induced by certain fundamental assumptions. The methodological and philosophical assumptions 
of qualitative research are articulated by Creswell (1998: 75-7) and a selected few are 
highlighted. 
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 Qualitative researchers are more concerned with process rather than outcomes. In this 
study, the process by which effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability 
are effected is of paramount to know and unveil. This process guided the study openly 
into deeper understanding of the phenomenon. 
 Qualitative research is interested in meaning, more particularly, how people deal with 
and makes sense of life experiences. This is an area that requires the researcher to 
interview those involved in the process of employing policy implementation, oversight 
and accountability because of experiences they have. This path furthermore was followed 
with the purpose to uncover the nature of challenges that the petroleum industry is 
experiencing in relation to the phenomenon of enquiry of this study.  
 In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary agent for data collection and 
analysis. The data collection for this study is done by the researcher through interviews, 
observation and documentation where deemed necessary.  
 Qualitative research is descriptive. This study describes the phenomenon in the process 
of enquiry and is heavily focused in this area due to the nature of the study and the 
question it sought to address. 
 Qualitative research is concerned with the nature of reality. Creswell (1998: 76) says that 
“reality is constructed by the individuals involved including the researcher, the 
individuals being investigated, and the reader or audience interpreting the study”. The 
role of the researcher in this instance is to report these realities, rely on voices and 
interpretations of informants through extensive quotes, present themes that reflect words 
used by informants, and advance evidence of different perspectives on each theme 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
(Creswell, 1998: 76). This study, therefore, relied upon the statements that are obtained 
from the respondents to build on the researcher’s hypothesis. 
 
It is paramount to note that there are researchers who interpret qualitative research as concerned 
with the role of values in a study. Creswell (1998: 76-77) concurs, contending that, in a 
qualitative study, “the investigator admits the value-laden nature of the study and actively reports 
his or her values and biases as well as the value-laden nature of the information gathered from 
the field” to maximise the integrity of the research. However, it is important to bring to the 
attention of the reader that the researcher’s values are influenced by what is socially constructed 
from childhood. These values are ingrained and guide the researcher into determining what is 
right and wrong throughout life. For instance, naturally the researcher is aware that poor 
corporate governance, which has, to some extent brought a poor reputation in the sector, is 
wrong. However, it must be clear that this is not part of research per se, the research sought to 
critically evaluate effectiveness of policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa. This means that the DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria 
diminish any opportunity to influence the outcome of this current study. This is so because it 
provides an undeniable fact about the phenomenon studied. The researcher’s values do not form 
the foundation of this study because this would be subjective. The origins of values adopted in 
institutions is rather traced and sourced through the respondents and live documents such as 
Annual Performance Plans, Strategic Plans and Portfolio Committee Legacy Reports that 
outlines policy implementation, through programme/projects among others, in order to gain 
factual information of the phenomenon.  
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In a nutshell, qualitative research studies are recommended as they provide details about human 
behaviour, emotion, and personality characteristics that quantitative studies cannot match. 
Furthermore, as human beings are social constructs, it became essential that a qualitative 
research tool is adopted so that information about behaviours, needs, desires, routines, norms and 
a variety of other information is collected in order to improve institutional architecture in the 
petroleum industry. As the study unfolds, a triangle-conflict in the petroleum industry is 
observed. The researcher is of the view that this conflict is caused by human behaviour or 
interaction that quantitative research cannot not elucidates and this is what further qualifies this 
study to fall under the qualitative research paradigm. 
 
5.2.3 Shortcomings of qualitative research design 
Research shows that there is a downside of using qualitative research as a tool for collecting 
facts.  Shortcomings in this tool are caused by the fact that the researcher must focus and study 
small numbers of subjects because data collection methods are so labour intensive (Frederikson, 
Chamberlain and Long, 1996: 62). These scholars go on to argue that qualitative research is 
subject to researcher bias, and the difficulties in analysing qualitative data rigorously 
(Frederikson et al., 1996). This viewpoint is shared by Griffin (1985: 173), stating that 
qualitative research appears to depend heavily on the individual judgment of the researcher and 
on the researcher’s interpretation. However, Mays and Pope (1995: 109) argue that there is a way 
of escaping this. Mays and Pope (1995) furthermore claim that there are strategies available to 
the qualitative researcher to protect against these potential biases and to enhance credibility of 
the findings. A checklist they recommend, deduced from Mays and Pope (1995: 109-112) is 
presented: 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
 Was the research question clearly identified? The question of this study is clear because 
it sought to critically evaluate institutional architecture for policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability effectiveness in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The 
researcher focused mainly on policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation in order 
to assess the effectiveness of these variables. 
 Was the setting in which the research took place clearly described? The research mainly 
is conducted in the petroleum industry in order to gauge transformation progress by 
HDSAs. 
 If sampling was undertaken, were the sampling methods described? Sampling methods 
explained and adopted in this study are purposive, quota and snowballing. These 
sampling methods are explicated as the study unfolds. 
 Did the research worker address the issues of subjectivity and data collection? In this 
instance, the researcher adopted the views of the participants which are also supported by 
credible documentation. 
 Were methods to test the validity of the results of the research used? The researcher 
employed reliability and validation strategy that is explained later in this chapter. In 
addition to this qualitative-triangulation is employed to safe-guard the study so that it 
remains valid and reliable.  
 Were any steps taken to increase the reliability of the information collected, for example, 
by repeating the information collection with another research worker? It is important to 
note that the researcher works in the petroleum industry. This allows the researcher to 
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continuously confirm facts from colleagues who are experts in the sector so that the study 
is well informed.  
The research methodology undertaken in this current study is next outlined.  
 
5.3 Research Methodology 
This part focuses on the tools used to conduct the research process and procedures. Leedy and 
Ormrod (2001: 14) consent that research methodology is “the general approach the researcher 
takes in carrying out the research project”. According to Mouton (1983: 124), the research 
methodology deals mainly with how the research should be planned and executed. The research 
methodology in this study digs deep into explaining the research methodology adopted in this 
study whereby the overall plan shows how the qualitative research is conducted. In this regard, 
the study adopted a “qualitative-triangulation research model, which is explorative, analytical 
and evaluative in nature” (Campbell and Fiske, 1959: 89). Qualitative-triangulation research is 
well-known in acquiring various forms of data while exploring a single phenomenon. The 
concept triangulation warrants an explanation. Triangulation is defined as the “use of multiple 
methods, mainly qualitative and quantitative methods, in studying the same phenomenon for the 
purpose of increasing study credibility” (Denzin, 1978: 156).  
 
There are many different approaches to triangulation presented by Denzin (1978: 157-158) that 
warrant recognition:  
 Data triangulation, meaning that data is retrieved from a number of different sources to 
form one body of data,  
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 Investigator triangulation, meaning that using multiple observers instead of a single 
observer in the form of gathering and interpreting data,  
 Theoretical triangulation, the researcher here uses more than one theoretical positions in 
interpreting data, and  
 Methodological triangulation, which utilises more than one research method or data 
collection technique.  
 
Golafshani (2003: 604) declares that “triangulation may include multiple methods of data 
collection and data analysis, but does not suggest a fixed method for all the researches”. 
Golafshani (2003) further states that the workability of the triangulation technique depends upon 
the criterion of the research methods chosen to test the validity and reliability of a study. 
Therefore, out of the four types of triangulation presented above, the researcher succumbs to the 
last named technique. The rationale for choosing this method is that it allows for a balanced 
authentic research outcome that anchors this study going forward. Furthermore, methodological 
triangulation contains the use of multiple qualitative and or quantitative methods to study the 
phenomenon in order to augment validity and reliability of the study (Golafshani, 2003: 604). 
The research tool of this model heavily relies on the use of ethnography, case study, and 
historical approaches for data and information collection. These properties are critical in this 
study and are highly recommended by various scholars to safeguard social science studies 
Golafshani (2003: 604). The research tools are further discussed in the next section. Ethnography 
is explained first. 
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5.3.1 Ethnography  
This method developed in anthropological field research, whereby the researcher’s central study 
focus is patterns of behaviour, customs and ways of life by getting involved in the day-to-day 
lives of the people or by interviewing one-on-one members of a group (Bickman and Rog, 2009: 
2). Ethnography explores real human life behaviour in natural setting. It seeks to understand the 
relationship between culture and behaviour, with culture referring to the beliefs, values, and 
attitudes of a specific group of people. Wiersma (1986: 23) understands that ethnography is 
concerned with what people are, how they and how they interact; furthermore it tries to reveal 
what lies beneath. Tuckman (1999: 98) states that ethnography is a matter of observing and 
interviewing rather than manipulating variables by external instruments. This is the case because 
what ethnographers observe is the behavioural context under which the study occurs. Wiersma 
(1986: 173) terms this as ‘characteristic of contextualisation’. Wiersma (1986) adds that this 
characteristic requires the data to be interpreted in the context of the situation in which they are 
observed. The next characteristic of ethnography observed by Wiersma (1986: 173) is the 
characteristic of ‘holistic’ as data is viewed as a whole in order to get a basis for explanation 
about the phenomenon. Another characteristic is that the ethnographic approach does not 
formulate a hypothesis prior to the research (Wiersma, 1986). This means that the researcher 
embarks on character contextualisation research without prior determination of what to search 
for.  
 
There are various types of ethnographic research which may be employed to study human 
behaviours mentioned by various scholars. Thus, some of these include macro-ethnographic 
research, which entails studying a larger group of people; and micro-ethnographic research, 
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which involves observing a smaller sample of humans and practices (Geertz, 1973: 3). This study 
therefore subscribes to the latter research type. Geertz (1973: 3) state that “ethnographic accounts 
are both descriptive and interpretive:  descriptive because detail is critical and interpretive 
because the ethnographer must determine the significance of observations without gathering 
broad, statistical information.”  Geertz (1973) devised the term ‘thick description’ to further 
convey the methodology of the ethnographer. To conduct their research, ethnographers, also 
called fieldworkers, often live among the people they are studying, or at least spend a 
considerable amount of time with them. The researcher engages in participant-observation, 
meaning that the researcher participates in daily life, while also making careful observations and 
taking notes relevant to the phenomenon being studied. The researcher is of the view that policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry relies heavily on 
interaction, culture, behaviour and attitudes among the actors. It became relevant for the 
researcher to employ this approach in Parliament, where the researcher watched the behaviour of 
participants on numerous occasions where people shared a common organisational culture. This 
means that an understanding of a phenomenon is done through description of what is observed 
rather than theory generation. 
 
According to Ile (2007: 45), “ethnography is primarily defined not by the methodology adopted 
but by the subject matter of a research study that is embedded in ethos, or strong in terms of the 
cultural perspective sought in the exploration of the research problem”. For the purposes of the 
variables under investigation it is paramount to know what culture organisations uphold in the 
petroleum industry. Thus, is there a culture of high performance adopted in the petroleum 
industry towards achieving HDSA transformation? Is there oversight over this and upon poor 
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performance, is there accountability? Prasad (1997: 103) concurs: the central aim of ethnography 
is to provide rich, holistic insights into people’s views and actions, including the location they 
inhabit. Information is collected in this setting through the collection of detailed observations and 
interviews. Furthermore, as there are many players in the petroleum industry, government, 
private sector and state-owned Companies, ethnographic research unravels this web of 
interdependence and of these group behaviours and interactions, and it thus plays an instrumental 
role in unpacking what is hidden behind the triangle-conflict latter explored in the study. The 
researcher holds the view that institutional arrangements arise from interactions among 
individuals; thus ethnographic methods brings meaning to understanding these interactions. This 
part of research therefore is evaluative and it suits this current study well as it sought to critically 
evaluate institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa.   
 
There are many advantages that come along with this approach. Among these is the fact that 
ethnographers expose qualities of the group experience in a way that other research methods may 
not (Gray, 2003: 222). Furthermore, ethnographers can help unearth future questions and types 
of follow-up research questions. Because ethnographers are interested in expanding knowledge, 
they are able to understand why certain behavious occur Gray (2003), and bring empirical 
meaning on this. There are, however, challenges as well to be observed. Gray (2003: 222) claims 
that while ethnographic research brings a unique technique in soliciting empirical information 
through behaviour observation, it can also be daunting, time consuming and may furthermore 
require an experienced researcher as well. Short-term studies suffer in this research since it can 
take long to understand and analyse certain behavious. Furthermore, it may take time to build 
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trust with informants in order to facilitate full and honest discourse. Bias on the part of the 
researcher is also noted as affecting both the design of the study and the collection and 
interpretation of data (Gray, 2003). Gray (2003) goes on arguing that too little data may lead to 
false assumptions about behaviour patterns, while large quantities of data may not be processed 
effectively (Gray, 2003: 222-3). However, the researcher states that while this could be true, it is 
important to pin-point on various types of ethnographic research that might escape this fatal 
flaw, and are each expounded below.   
 
The various kinds of ethnography identified by Ile (2007: 46) citing Silverman (2002: 17), are as 
follows; there is integrative ethnography (which is participatory in approach), narrative 
ethnography (focus on individual life stories that can be either in writing or oral and they allow 
the understanding of patterns, culture and behaviour in an organisation (Fielding, 1993:155-71), 
and there is combinative ethnography (basically the combination of the two). For the purposes of 
this research investigation, the researcher employed the narrative ethnographic type in an attempt 
to capture emerging interaction patterns that may directly affect institutional effectiveness. This 
technique assisted the researcher to acquire numerous ways in which people make and use stories 
to interpret the world, particularly that of the petroleum industry. Ile (2007) citing Rubin and 
Barbbie (2001: 391) explain that this approach captures the meaning as a naturalistic observation 
and holistic understanding of the cultures and subcultures, which augments better understanding 
of the phenomenon. By selecting narrative ethnography the researcher believes that shortcomings 
highlighted by Gray (2003) are overcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
Ile (2007) indicates that an ethnographic research study may be ‘basic’ or ‘applied’. Applied 
ethnography is adopted in this study as it “strives to improve our understanding of a problem, 
with the intent of contributing to the solution of that problem” (Bickman and Rog, 2009: x). The 
selection of this approach is informed by the complex nature of challenges unraveled in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa. However, Yin (1994: 27) warns against confusing case 
studies with qualitative methods using ethnographic methods. This means that this part is 
different from the case study, which will be explained as the study progresses. 
 
In summary the term ‘ethnography’ generally speaking refers to social research that has most of 
the following features, espoused by (Hammersley, 1990: 45).  
 People’s behaviour is studied in everyday contexts, rather than under experimental 
conditions created by the researcher.  
 Data are gathered from a range of sources, but observation and/or relatively informal 
conversations are usually the main ones.  
 The approach to data collection is unstructured in the sense that it does not involve 
following through a detailed plan set up at the beginning; nor are the categories used for 
interpreting what people say and do pre-given or fixed. This does not mean that the 
research is unsystematic; simply that initially the data are collected in a raw form, and on 
a wide front.  
 The focus is usually on a single setting or group, of relatively small scale. In life history 
research the focus may even be a single individual.  
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 The analysis of the data involves interpretation of the meanings and functions of human 
actions and mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions and explanations, with 
quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate role at most.  
 As a set of methods, ethnography is not far removed from the sort of approach that we all 
use in everyday life to make sense of our surroundings. It is less specialised and less 
technically sophisticated than approaches like the experiment or the social survey; though 
all social research methods have their historical origins in the ways in which human 
beings gain information about their world in everyday life.  
Next to be explained is the case study research as another research tool used in this current study. 
 
5.3.2 Case study  
The case study discussed here is the second component of qualitative triangulation. According to 
Yin (1989: 18) a case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
using multiple sources of evidence. Case studies concern with how and why things happen and in 
so doing, contextual realities are investigated in which, differences between what was planned 
and what actually occurred is studied (Davids, Theron and Van Rooyen, 2001: ii). This part suits 
the research well as it seeks to critically evaluate policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability effectiveness in the petroleum industry. As mentioned in Chapter One of this 
current study, policy implementation, oversight and accountability appears to be less effective in 
the petroleum industry, particularly where HDSA transformation is concerned. By adopting case 
study research, the researcher was able to understand the gap between what was planned and 
what actually happened.  
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There are three types of case study research: exploratory, descriptive, and causal research 
(Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 1991: 21). According to Feagin et al. (1991) the aim of exploratory 
research is to determine insights and ideas. In an exploratory case study, “the collection of data 
occurs before theories or specific research questions are formulated” (Feagin et al., 1991). The 
initial stage in this type of case study is to define the issues to be researched (Feagin et al., 1991: 
21). It is important to note that the researcher preliminary sought to understand the current state 
of policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa, 
with regards to policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. Pertaining to this, data 
collected provided factual information to inform the research further. The descriptive research on 
the other hand is contrary, because theory is required prior to the collection of data (Davids et al., 
2001: ii). Hence Feagin et al. (1991: 21) observe descriptive research to be more concerned with 
analysing a population with respect to important variables. Three important variables: Policy 
implementation, Oversight and Accountability, which are anchors of this current study were 
theoretically studied prior to understand the information to be gathered. Causal research is used 
to establish “cause-and-effect relationships between variables” (Yin, 1994: 22). It furthermore 
searches for an explanatory theory of the phenomena. For Yin (1994) this situation offers the 
most suitable conditions for adopting the case study as the research strategy of choice. 
 
This study therefore subscribes to exploratory research as it provided in-depth and new insight to 
policy implementation, accountability and oversight effectiveness in the petroleum industry, 
which is not explained by institutional theorists. The study is exploratory because it explored the 
factors contributing to poor policy implementation, accountability and oversight in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa, pertaining to policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. 
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According to Brink and Wood (1998: 312), “exploratory research studies reveal what has not 
previously been studied and attempts to identify new knowledge, new insights, new 
understandings, and new meanings and to explore factors related to the topic”. The research is 
exploratory because it meets the criteria described by Polit and Hungler (1999:17), namely that 
the study investigates the full nature of the phenomenon, as it critically evaluates institutional 
architecture for effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
industry. The strong point of this approach is that it does not provide definitive answers for the 
overall population (Faegin et al., 1991). There are two reasons for this; thus: (1) “exploratory 
research usually involves only a relatively small group of people, and (2) these people are almost 
never randomly selected to participate” (Feagin et al., 1991: 27-9). This benefited the researcher 
in time and cost management as well. This stance is confirmed by Reiter (2013: 1) who states 
that exploratory research normally demands less money to conduct since most projects can be 
done by one researcher alone, without the need to mobilise many resources. Another crucial 
benefit for selecting this kind of research is that results gathered are not necessarily generalisable 
to a larger population, because its purpose is to understand the sample being studied (Burns and 
Grove, 1999: 296).  
 
The study succumbs to descriptive research as well, because there is body of knowledge existing 
on institutional theory, policy implementation, oversight and accountability, which informs this 
study. Indeed, the study seeks to unravel knew knowledge, but theories that already exist assisted 
the researcher to understand what is missing in the literature. However, research shows that 
descriptive and exploratory research may be combined while studying the same phenomenon, 
contingent on the research question. This study picks up that there is complementarity in these 
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approaches. For instance, exploratory research examines the relevant factors in detail so that an 
appropriate description of the reality of the existing situation is understood better (Brink and 
Wood, 1998: 283-286). On the other hand, descriptive research provides an accurate account of 
characteristics of a particular individual in real-life situations (Polit and Hungler, 1999: 189). 
Apparently, “descriptive research may be used for the purpose of developing theory as well, 
identifying problems with current practice, justifying current practice, making judgements, or 
determining what others in similar situations are doing” (Waltz and Bausell, 1981: 7). According 
to Burns and Grove (1993: 293) the purpose of descriptive research is to provide the perceptions 
and views of the respondents about the phenomenon being studied. It is the aim of this study to 
identify and describe factors that contribute to phenomenon observed. Uys and Basson (1991: 
38) dub this marriage as ‘exploratory-descriptive’ research. More features of exploratory-
descriptive research are revealed by Uys and Basson (1991: 38) as follows: 
 It is a flexible research design that provides an opportunity to examine all aspects of the 
problem being studied; 
 It strives to develop new knowledge; 
 The data may lead to suggestions of hypotheses for future studies. 
 
However, in the process of research nit-picking, the researcher discovered that case studies do 
have some criticisms, in which one of them is as a result of weak scientific rigor and reliability, 
and that they do not address the issues of generalisability (Yin, 1984: 49). To safeguard this 
weakness the study carefully ensured that a fair spread and varied opinions from correspondents 
are authentically taken so that subjectivity is diminished. However, there are some strengths of 
case study as well. Case studies as Yin (1984) suggests, enables the researcher to gain a holistic 
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view of a certain phenomenon or series of events. Next, the study explores historical methods 
usefulness in this study.   
 
5.3.3 Historical methods 
Historical model is a third leg of the triangulation approach, which became useful in this current 
study. Historical methods are used in this study on the premise that past institutional architecture 
or arrangements have a great deal in understanding how institutions operate today, and this is 
significant in providing the background for the research. Historical institutionalist theorists in 
Chapter Two of this current study observe the importance of history when studying institutional 
architecture. This further justifies the rationale for using this approach in this current study, so 
that the phenomenon is understood from its organic setting. Historical analysis is observed to be 
a method of discovering from archived records what happened in the past. This method was 
required in this study in terms of verifying the accuracy of statements about the past, regarding 
policy implementation, accountability and oversight in the petroleum industry of South Africa, 
where HDSA transformation is concerned. The aim of the study is not to dwell on this, but gain 
an understanding of how the past is addressing the today challenge. For example, we now know 
that the ‘policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation’ did not just come from nowhere. 
Historical events happened. So, in order to gain factual understanding of what really happened, 
historical or archived documents must be viewed so that the study is informed better.   
 
Ile (2007: 45) citing Welmon and Kruger (2002: 179) concur as arguing that, an understanding of 
this phenomenon can be obtained through a number of sources including newspapers, reports, 
correspondence, official statistics, government documents, regulations/ordinances, opinions, 
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editorials, speeches, fictions, songs, poetry, myths and archives. This process of reviewing is 
called ‘document analyses’. According to Corbin and Strauss (2008: 88), “document analysis is a 
procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, both printed and electronic material”. 
Furthermore, document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to attain 
meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The 
gathering and analysing of documents was useful for this current research because it supplement 
information gathered through participant observation and interviewing. In addition it anchors and 
benefits this study well because the review of documents is an unobtrusive method (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). Additionally, events are documented in the natural setting where biasness could 
be minimal.  
 
According to Elo and Kyngas (2007: 107), the use of documents often entails an approach called 
‘content analysis’, which is the systematic examination of forms of communication to document 
patterns objectively. The researcher is of the view that this part of the study is skewed towards 
analysis of content in the sense that a general text on the nature of institutional architecture, 
policy implementation, accountability and oversight is employed. Content analysis is 
recommended “since it makes replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, with the 
purpose of providing knowledge, new insights, a representation of facts and a practical guide to 
action” (Elo and Kyngas, 2007: 108).  As Elo and Kyngas (2007) further describes, the aim is to 
attain a condensed and broad description of the phenomenon. This view is supported by Cole 
(1988: 53), since the assumption that content analysis is a method of analysing written, verbal or 
visual communication messages is promoted.  
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However, the challenge that comes with content analysis is that documents cannot be regarded as 
always presenting an objective description of the situation at the time. Instead, these documents 
should be viewed as having more or less degrees of reality congruence because they are not 
written in order to convey an impression, one which will be favourable to the authors and those 
whom they represent (Bryman, 2008: 527; Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 75). Therefore, there 
could be some kind of bias from the authors and this study has considered this aspect. To guard 
against this, the researcher reviewed multiple sources to help gain a balanced understanding of 
the phenomenon. However, Cole (1988) explains that historical analysis cannot use a direct 
observation approach since there is no way to test a historical hypothesis. Furthermore, Cole 
(1988: 54-55) spells out weaknesses in the classification of historical data, thus: 
 May be subject to incorrect interpretations on the part of the recorder; 
 Words and phrases used in old records may now have different meanings; 
 Documents may be falsified deliberately; 
 The meaning of relics are perceived and interpreted by the investigator, among other 
things. 
 
Observing these challenges, the researcher argues that this could happen only if the researcher 
relies on one author. Many authors reaching the same conclusion of historical events cannot all 
distort the same information, especially if facts are the same. Overall, challenges in this approach 
warrants further unravelling as Thurmond (2001: 256) warns against hoping for a smooth run of 
research process. Thurmond (2001) claims that triangulation poses some disadvantages which 
include time wastage. For instance, collecting more data requires greater planning and 
organisational resources that are not always available to lead researchers (Thurmond, 2001). 
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Hence the researcher organised findings of this study according to three prominent variables of 
this study, which are: policy implementation, oversight and accountability. Other disadvantages 
include the “possible disharmony based on investigator biases, conflicts because of theoretical 
frameworks, and lack of understanding about why triangulation strategies were used” 
(Thurmond, 2001: 257). However, the researcher holds the view that adopting qualitative-
triangulation approach diffuses all the negative myths because it digs deeper into explaining the 
phenomenon in all possible angles and in its real context. The researcher argues that Thurmond 
(2001) is rather employing a blanket approach in observing these challenges. This approach is 
recommended by many scholars and without it the study is likely to fall into traps of poor 
thoroughness. The three-sibling approach used in this study is displayed in the below figure.  
Next, this study looks at the instruments used in collating data. 
 
Figure 5. 1: Qualitative-triangulation  
 
Source: Author’s configuration  
Ethnography  
•Narrative 
•Integrative 
•Combinative 
Case study 
•Explorative 
•Descriptive 
•Causal 
Historical 
•Document analysis 
•Content analysis 
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5.4 Data collection instruments 
So far the study has shown that institutional architecture requires more understanding of 
effectiveness of policy implementation, accountability and oversight because this knowledge is 
missing where institutional analysis is concerned. In order to unpack this phenomenon, in-depth 
enquiry through interviews is conducted. Interview schedules are used to collect primary data 
and to explore the views, experiences, beliefs and motivations of individual participants in the 
industry of concern. Semi-structured interviews are employed as they provide space for 
generating pre-set questions in order to give an interview guide. Pre-set questions furthermore 
allowed greater scope for open-ended answers so that truth about a phenomenon in its real life 
context is uncovered. Interviews also contributed in the explanation of observed behaviours, as 
another tool used for this current research. To collect secondary data, document analysis 
technique was employed. A theoretical understanding of these instruments is explained.  
 
5.4.1 Interviews 
Creswell (1994: 148) presents that an “idea of qualitative research is to purposefully select 
informants (or documents or visual material) that will best answer the research questions”, and 
that no attempt is made to randomly select informants. According to Gill (2008: 291) interviews 
and focus groups are the most common methods of data collection used in qualitative research, 
especially in the field of public administration. Gill (2008) goes on positing that interviews are 
used to explore the views, experiences, beliefs and motivations of individual participants, while 
focus group are used to generate group dynamic qualitative data. Interviews are believed to 
provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely 
quantitative methods, such as questionnaires, according to (Britten, 1999: 11-12). There are three 
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fundamental types of research interviews studied by academics that are unpacked below thus; 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured.  
 
Structured interviews: Silverman (2000: 3) states that this type of interview question is normally 
predetermined and verbally administered with no intention to follow up on questions that need 
clarity. The researcher sees this as challenging because is it uninformative. The study may have a 
number of unanswered loop holes. Silverman (2000) concurs; structured interviews only allow 
for limited participant responses and are, therefore, of little use if ‘depth’ is required. This 
method of interviewing was therefore not recommended for this study since the phenomenon of 
enquiry is broad, and would require a great deal of flexibility on the interviewee and the 
interviewer.  
 
Unstructured interviews: According to Patton (2002: 23), there are no official and agreed-upon 
guidelines for how to conduct an unstructured interview. However, this would not assist focus of 
the research and may be time consuming to analyse the findings. Lack of predetermined 
interview questions provides little guidance on what to talk about (Patton, 2002: 23), and as a 
result the researcher could end up not achieving the intended objectives. So, clear evaluation 
guidelines and need for specificity is recommended. As contrary to the above, their use is, 
therefore, generally only considered where signiﬁcant ‘depth’ is required, or where virtually 
nothing is known about the subject area (Patton, 2002: 23). This type of interview is therefore 
not suitable for this study. 
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Semi-structured interviews: are “more or less open-ended questions that are brought to the 
interview situation in the form of an interview guide” (Flick, 1998: 94). The interview questions 
are pre-set and allow more scope for open-ended answers; to uncover the truth about a 
phenomenon in its real life context. According to Griffin (1985: 88) from inception of structuring 
interview questions the focus is on obtaining an understanding based on textual information 
obtained. This type of interview is recommended in this current study since it is an appropriate 
tool for exploring sensitive topics, where participants may not want to talk about such issues in a 
group environment (Britten, 1999: 11-19). Semi-structured interviewing is seen as an important 
tool for gathering data in qualitative research, which is the study choice. Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews in this study allowed flexibility and fluidity in the structure of the 
questionnaire, as organised around an aid memoire. It allowed the interviewee’s own 
understanding of the phenomenon to be known better by the researcher, which feeds well to 
researcher’s interest. This model, furthermore, assisted in determining whether and how 
particular areas might require further interview follow ups.  
 
The challenge in this approach is its very own strength because a lot of extra information may 
surface during interviews. Scholars argue that this could result in poor management of 
information received (Britten, 1999: 19). However, to counteract this shortcoming, the researcher 
firstly infiltrated information according to the theories already studied in Chapter Two of this 
current study. Secondly, pre-set questions were organised according to major variables of this 
study: policy implementation, oversight and accountability so that answers are logically placed 
in category of belonging. The next paramount research tool used in this study was observation. 
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5.4.2 Observation research 
Observational research is particularly prevalent in the social sciences. This technique involves 
the direct observation of phenomena in their natural setting. This instrument basically bears 
similarities with the ethnographic research explained earlier under qualitative-triangulation 
approach. So, ethnography or observation is often used where what we are trying to uncover are 
the norms, values, and shared meanings of those we are observing (Fox, 1998: 3). The setting of 
observation warrants explanation. The setting of observation was in Parliament of South Africa 
where Portfolio Committee meetings are held. The researcher attended Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee meetings which would approximately take three hours on the day selected. The 
researcher made observation in this setting for the period of six years. This means that the 
researcher managed to understand how Parliamentarians operated from the time they took office 
in 2009, when knowledge of the petroleum industry was still little among MPs. The main issue 
studied in this regard was to understand alignment of Portfolio Committee on Energy activities 
with the policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. As the role of Parliamentarians is to 
oversee and hold the Executive branch to account for performance, observations were conducted 
in order to gauge principal-agent interaction with regards to policy implementation effectiveness 
and employing robustly ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Upon gathering information needed it 
was placed well in the study within its fitting context. In conducting this research the researcher 
encountered no major challenges since Parliamentary Portfolio Committee meetings are open to 
the public. Document analysis is also utilised in gathering information to support this study and 
this is explained next.   
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5.4.3 Document analysis 
The third data collection instrument used in this study was document analysis. Some of the 
documents were collected from the Department of Energy website, Parliament of South Africa 
library, university library centres, and various institutional websites, among others. These 
institutions are important because it is where archived documents with rich history and facts on 
the phenomena being studied can be obtained. It is paramount to state that some documents are 
available electronically and others were requested over the telephone to gain access as they were 
not accessible on the internet. Documentary used in this study includes the following; workshop 
speeches, budget vote speeches, Cabinet Lekgotla decisions, policy statement related documents, 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee legacy reports, various legislation, media statements, 
journals, ruling political party manifesto, Freedom Charter, Annual and Strategic Plans, among 
many others. Once these documents were satisfactory obtained they were analysed in order to 
inform this study. Target population and setting is discussed next. 
 
5.5 Target population and setting  
Target population refers to the entire group of individuals or objects to which researchers are 
interested in generalising the conclusions (Yin, 1989: 18). Polit and Hungler (1999: 232) concur 
as they define “a population as the totality of all subjects that conform to a set of specifications, 
comprising the entire group of persons that is of interest to the researcher and to whom the 
research results can be generalised”. Alreck and Settle (1995: 5) state that, when studying a 
population for a study it is important to ensure that it consists of people who have the relevant 
information needed by the researcher. Eligibility criteria recommended by Polit and Hungler 
(1999: 278) was used by the researcher in identifying the characteristics that people in the 
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population must possess in order to be included in the study. Next the research sample is 
discussed.  
 
5.6 Research sample  
LoBiondo-Wood and Haber (1998: 250) describe a sample as a portion or a subset of the 
research population selected to participate in a study, representing the research population. This 
study used purposive, quota and snowball sampling. In purposive sampling, groups participate 
according to pre-selected criteria relevant to a particular research question (Creswell, 2005: 204). 
For this particular study, the variables to which the sample is drawn up are interrelated to the 
research enquiry of this study. This means that the sampling is done with a purpose in mind and 
so, the targeted groups are predefined. It is paramount to note that the sample size is not fixed 
prior to data collection since it is unstructured (Creswell, 2005).  
 
Quota sampling which is also sometimes considered as a type of purposive sampling is used in 
this current study. In quota sampling, it is when the researcher decides, while designing the 
study, on how many people with specified characteristics to include as participants (Creswell, 
2005: 204). The researcher therefore drew sixty six participants who operate in the petroleum 
industry downstream to give an account on challenges related to policy implementation. The 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Energy assisted with information related to oversight and 
accountability on policy implementation and other related matters affecting the petroleum 
industry. However, even though the Department of Energy has a regulative role it assisted with 
information related to policy implementation such as ensuring HDSA transformation is achieved 
by the petroleum industry. This criterion chosen allowed the researcher to focus on people who 
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would most likely have experience, know about, or have insights into the research topic, 
respectively.  
 
Furthermore, snowballing according to Creswell (2005) is considered as another type of 
purposive sampling and was adopted in this study. Creswell (2005) argues that in this method, 
participants with whom contact has already been made use their social networks to refer the 
researcher to other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study. Babbie 
and Mouton (2001: 19) is of the opinion that snowball sampling is appropriate when the 
members of the special population are difficult to locate. It is important to note that when the 
researcher started interviews, elections in South Africa were already taking place; so changes 
were made in the Portfolio Committee on Energy in which many Parliamentarians were 
dislocated. What assisted the researcher in locating other people relevant to the enquiry of this 
study is this approach. For example, one or two people the researcher had contacts with provided 
a lead to more participants by asking the first located participants to provide information needed 
to locate other members of the population, until the desired ration was met. Creswell (2005) 
supports this strategy of locating more participants as arguing that, the snowball sampling is an 
approach for locating information-rich key informants. Creswell (2005) further states that 
snowball sampling is not a stand-alone tool, it is rather a way of selecting participants and then 
using other tools such as interviews or surveys. The validity and reliability of the study is next 
explained. 
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5.7 Validity and Reliability of the Study 
Similar to other studies, this part thoroughly addresses issues related to validity and reliability. 
Reliability and validity are seen as essential tool of a positivist epistemology (Winter, 2000: 7).  
Basically, what positivist epistemology say is that, only ‘facts’ derived from the scientific 
method can make legitimate knowledge claims (Winter, 2000). The researcher proposes that 
even though validity and reliability as concepts appear to be used interchangeably, there is a 
huge difference in the meaning of each, and this is unpacked in this study. Reliability according 
to Joppe (2000: 1) is the extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate 
representation of the total population under study. Joppe (2001) goes on explaining that if the 
results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is 
considered to be reliable. Babbie and Mouton (2001: 75) agree with this notion in saying 
reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, 
would yield the same result each time. Therefore, reliability is seen as equated with the stability, 
consistency or dependability of a measuring pool (Polit and Hungler 1991: 242). In ensuring 
accuracy in this regard, the researcher often look for the answers in the research of other 
researchers and present herself as the ‘third person’, respectively. Furthermore, the researcher 
declared in the study that the research tools chosen do not only embody strength, they do also 
contain shortcomings, in which the researcher attempted to address. 
 
According to Burns and Grove (1987: 294) “the validity of an instrument is the determinant of 
the extent to which the instrument actually reflects the abstract concept being examined”. Burns 
and Grove (1987: 294) further explain that data is valid if it provides a true picture of what has 
been studied. In this instance it is important to provide the view from various scholars, which 
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says that, researchers tend to use various approaches to strengthen validity and reliability, 
especially where the study is heavily skewed towards qualitative research method. The 
researcher used triangulation in this study to guard against observed shortfalls, by usage of 
multiple sources of collecting data. However, to further ensure robust trustworthiness of this 
study, the researcher employed verification strategies espoused by (Morse, Barret, Mayan, Olson 
and Spiers, 2002: 11-13). Its essential tools are expounded as follows: 
 Firstly, methodological coherence is observed to ensure that there is similarity between 
the research question and the components of the method. Here, Morse et al. (2002) 
suggests that the interdependence of qualitative research demands that the question match 
the method, which matches the data and the analytic procedures. This features well in this 
study since it sought to evaluate institutional architecture effectiveness, oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa. To boost congruity of data 
triangulation is employed to evaluate variables. However, Morse et al. (2002) warns that 
as the research unfolds, the process may not be linear, as such, this may require data to be 
treated differently, and so the question may have to be changed or methods modified. The 
researcher ensured fit of these components with data so that analytic goals and 
methodological assumptions adopted in this study are coherent. Even so, the reader 
should note that semi-structured interview adopted in this study allows for such 
flexibility. 
 Furthermore, Morse et al. (2002: 11) stresses that sample must be appropriate when 
collecting data. This can only be done if the participants selected best represent or have 
knowledge of the research topic. The purpose is to ensure efficient and effective 
saturation of categories, with optimal quality data and minimum dross (Morse et al., 
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2002: 11). In this regard, the researcher deliberately selected key participants explained 
earlier to collect data, because this is where knowledge on institutional architecture 
effectiveness on accountability, oversight and policy implementation in the petroleum 
industry is best known. Morse et al. (2002: 12) citing Morse (1991) argues that sampling 
adequacy, evidenced by saturation and replication means that sufficient data to account 
for all aspects of the phenomenon have been obtained. Morse et al. (2002) further 
explicate that saturating data ensures replication in categories; then replication verifies 
and ensures comprehension and completeness. 
 Progressively, it is presented that collecting and analysing data concurrently appears to 
form a mutual interaction between what is known and what to be known. The researcher 
in this regard, as participant observer took notes from the informants while concurrently 
analysing data. At some point notes taken were not sufficient enough to fully study the 
phenomenon. In this instance the researcher verified answers with the identified 
population through the scheduled interviews. According to Morse et al. (2002: 12), this 
iterative interaction between data and analysis is the essence of attaining reliability and 
validity. In addition, another aspect that glues validity and reliability is thinking 
theoretically. In this aspect, Morse et al. (2002) is of the view that ideas emerging from 
data are reconfirmed in new data; which gives rise to new ideas that, in turn, must be 
verified in data already collected. They go on saying that thinking theoretically requires 
macro-micro perspectives, moving forward without making reasoning leaps, constantly 
checking and rechecking, and in so doing a solid foundation is built.  
 The aspect of theory development is also mentioned by Morsi et al. (2002), which is to 
move with discussion between a micro perspective of the data and a macro 
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conceptual/theoretical understanding. In this way, theory is developed through two 
mechanisms: (1) as an outcome of the research process, rather than being adopted as a 
framework to move the analysis along; and (2) as a template for comparison and further 
development of the theory (Morse et al., 2002: 13). The study conforms to the former.  
 
However, since rigour of qualitative inquiry should be beyond question, beyond challenge, and 
provide practical scientific evidence that must be integrated into our developing cognitive base 
(Morse et al., 2002), this verification strategy is employed in this study. By using triangulation to 
obtain data firms reliability and validity of this study even more. It should be acknowledged that 
reliability and validity is not static, but is a continuous process. The Figure 5.2 demonstrates a 
continuous process that ensures reliability and verification of the study. Ethical consideration is 
explained next.  
 
Figure 5.2: Verification Strategy 
 
Source: Morse et al. (2002) 
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5.8 Ethical consideration of the study 
It is paramount to note that the researcher works in the industry where research is conducted. To 
ensure that objectivity is observed, the researcher was a participant observer until data were fully 
collected. It is important to note that interviews were done with selected senior project managers 
who are at the heart of policy implementation. Relevant MPs and government officials to the 
context of this study were further interviewed to gather better understanding and challenges 
regarding oversight and accountability. These were done to clarify certain issues in order to 
present the study on the view of participants. This process was conducted with quality and 
integrity. In so doing, the researcher sought proper channels in obtaining information relevant to 
this study which is also presented on a ‘third person’ perspective. The researcher respected 
confidentiality and anonymity where it is obligatory. Next, the delimitations of the study are 
clarified.  
 
5.9 Delimitation of the study 
According to the White Paper on Energy Policy (1998: 5-16) the energy sector encompasses 
industries such as; “the petroleum industry, which includes oil companies, petroleum refiners, 
fuel transport and end user sales at gas stations, the gas industry includes natural gas extraction, 
and coal gas manufacture, as well as distribution and sales, the electrical power industry includes 
electricity generation, electric power distribution and sales the coal industry, the nuclear power 
industry, the renewable energy industry” (White Paper on Energy Policy, 1998). The traditional 
energy industry based on the collection and distribution of firewood, the use of which, for 
cooking and heating, is particularly common in poorer communities (White Paper on Energy 
Policy, 1998) falls under the energy sector as well. While all these industries engage the sector 
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well, it is paramount to note that reference is exclusively made to the ‘petroleum downstream 
industry’, wherein, HDSA transformation is concerned.  
 
Furthermore, as policy implementation in the petroleum industry is jointly done by various 
stakeholders, this current study is confined only to the role played by the Department of Energy 
in ensuring that policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation is achieved. It is so far 
revealed in this current study that there are numerous players who conduct oversight and 
accountability vertically, horizontally and diagonally. In this regard, evaluation of oversight and 
accountability effectiveness is only restricted to that conducted by the legislative branch.  
  
5.10 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This Chapter described the process undertaken by the researcher in gathering information for this 
study. A qualitative research paradigm was explored as a first approach. The three components 
of this study: policy implementation, oversight and accountability, operate in a natural setting 
involving human interaction as social constructs. The researcher found that the aspects involving 
human interaction fit well into the qualitative-triangulation research paradigm and this was thus 
used in the entire research gathering process. The research suited this approach due to its 
versatility in obtaining various forms of data in order to enhance validity and reliability. As such, 
qualitative-triangulation embodying ethnographic, case study and historical research was used in 
the research process to collect information that supported this study. Ethnography, for example, 
was useful as it sought to understand the relationship between culture and behaviour, with 
culture referring to the beliefs, values, and attitudes of a specific group of people. Case study 
research allowed the investigation of contextual realities and the gathering information on the 
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differences between what was planned and what actually occurred. Historical method was also 
seen to be useful in establishing baseline information prior to observing and interviewing 
participants. Scheduled interviews, observation and document analysis were used as research 
tools. The study focused on the petroleum industry, rather than more broadly on the energy 
sector. The next chapter discusses research findings on the evaluation of policy implementation 
effectiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ISSUES ON POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVENESS IN THE PETROLEUM INUSTRY OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This part of the study evaluates the effectiveness of policy implementation in the petroleum 
industry of South Africa. Among the responsibilities that the Department of Energy sought to 
achieve is to ensure that the regulation of petroleum and petroleum products allows optimal 
functioning of the petroleum industry to achieve government’s intended developmental goals. 
Embodied within this policy is a role to ensure that the petroleum industry of South Africa 
achieves 25% of transformation by HDSA. The chapter focuses on the findings, analysis and 
emerging data trends with regards to the extent to which this 25% of transformation target is 
attained. Firstly, the Chapter presents the general status of policy implementation in the 
petroleum industry. Secondly, the DAC/ OECD Evaluation criteria to assess policy 
implementation effectiveness in relation to transformation targeted at HDSA, is employed. 
Thirdly, best practice and conceptual framework of a well-considered institutional architecture 
construct in the petroleum industry of South Africa is determined. Lastly, chapter summary and 
conclusion is provided. Next, to be discussed and analyses is the status quo of implementation in 
the petroleum industry of SA.  
 
6.2 Policy implementation status quo in the petroleum industry of South Africa and 
analysis of emerging data trends 
Prior to the 1990s, capital in South Africa was heavily preserved for whites. This status quo 
elapsed since the post-apartheid epoch. As such, South Africa has been the driver of 
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transformation to ensure even beneficiation and skills development, through the enactment of 
Affirmative Action and BEE Codes of practice, among other statute. The Charter for the South 
African Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry (2000) views transformation as legal requirement 
and business imperative. To this effect, this Charter seeks to bring about 25% HDSA ownership 
and control of all facets of the industry over a ten-year period. This means HDSAs would own in 
total, by the end of that period, not less than 25% of the aggregate value of the equity of the 
various entities that hold the operating assets of the South African oil industry (Charter for the 
South African Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry, 2000). It is this objective that gave rise to 
the researcher attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation of this policy goal, 
and to gauge the progress of transformation in the petroleum industry, especially by HDSAs. The 
term ‘HDSA’ refers to all persons and groups who have been discriminated against on the basis 
of race, gender and disability (Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter, 2000). In the petroleum 
industry (downstream) of South Africa, the Department of Energy plays a regulative role even 
though implementation is undertaken inclusively with the industry. In so doing, the Department 
of Energy pursues various programmes, but of relevance to this study is ‘Petroleum and 
Petroleum Products Regulation’. The said programme comprises of three sub-programmes 
displayed in Figure 6.1. These sub-programmes are evaluated by the researcher to determine the 
effectiveness of HDSA transformation. Of note is that the assessment of policy implementation 
effectiveness is selected for the period 2009 to 2014. This time-frame is significant for the 
researcher because it marks two decades since the collapse of apartheid. The researcher believes 
that lessons would have been learned and improvements made.  
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Figure 6.1: Flow of selected policy objective and its alignment to programme, sub-
programmes and activities 
 
Activity    1                                     Activity 2                                     Activity 3 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s configuration   
 
6.2.1 Petroleum Licensing  
As alluded to earlier in the study, transformation in the petroleum industry is seven-pronged, 
thus: ownership, management control, employment equity, skills development, preferential 
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OECD/ DAC EVALUATION CRITERIA 
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procurement, enterprise development, and socio economic development. With reference to this 
sub-programme the aim is to “facilitate participation of Historically Disadvantaged Individuals 
in the petroleum industry by enforcing compliance by wholesalers, manufacturers and retailers 
with the Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter in the adjudication of licences on an ongoing basis” 
(Department of Energy Annual Performance Plan, 2012/13: 24). Basically this activity is done 
by the Controller of Petroleum Products, who is appointed according to the Petroleum Products 
Act, 1977 (Act No. 120 of 1977) to mainly facilitate wholesale and retail licences on behalf of 
Department of Energy. The Controller of Petroleum Products could be the Minister of Energy or 
any person he/she delegates. The target performance is based on the percentage of arbitration 
requests finalised within the prescribed timeframes. Furthermore, the said sub-programme 
“manages the adjudication of petroleum licence applications; regulates the permitting of the 
export and import of petroleum products; monitors fuel stock levels; and co-ordinates corrective 
actions to avoid fuel shortages” (Department of Energy Annual Performance Plan, 2012/13: 24). 
This sub-programme also includes conducting of licence analyses, and ensuring that prices are in 
accordance with internationally competitive pricing of petroleum products so that investment is 
enabled in the industry (Department of Energy Annual Performance Plan, 2012/13). 
 
Performance of this sub-programme by the Department of Energy is put in a logframe displayed 
in Table 6.1. According to Ile, Eresia-Eke and Ile (2012: 100) “the logframe is a matrix that rests 
on a hierarchy of aims or objectives that consists of activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts”. 
The logframe adopted by the Department of Energy exhibits the performance indicators, planned 
targets, and actual achievements over the years. Of note is that it was only in 2009 that this 
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department was made a standalone after being separated from the previous Department of 
Energy and Mineral Resource. 
  
Table 6.1: Log-frame exhibiting performance for Petroleum Licensing sub-programme 
Strategic 
objectives 
Performance 
indicator 
Actual 
achievements 
in 2011/12 
Planned targets 
for 2012/13 
Revised targets for 
2012/13 
Actual 
achievements for 
2012/13 
License 
analysis 
Process all 
applications within 
90. 
95,5% 
applications 
were processed 
within 90 days. 
Process all 
applications 
within 90 days. 
100% compliance 
rate by the 
Controller on 
finalising all 
applications within 
90 days excluding 
site and Retail New 
to Industry (NTI) 
applications. 
Partially Achieved: 
67,8% compliance 
rate on finalising all 
applications within 
90 days (excluding 
Site and NTI 
applications).  
1050 licence 
applications were 
received (excluding 
site and retail NTI) of 
which 712 
applications were 
finalised within 
90 days.  
576 licence 
applications 
from the previous 
years were also 
finalised. 
 Finalise all new to 
industry 
applications within 
60 days. 
No targets set. Finalise all new 
to industry 
applications 
within 60 days. 
90% compliance 
rate by the 
Controller on 
finalising site and 
retail NTI 
Partially achieved: 
86,7% compliance 
rate on finalising site 
and retail new to 
industry applications 
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applications within 
60 days. 
within 60 days. 
30 site and 30 retail 
new to industry 
licence 
applications were 
received of which 
26 site and 26 retail 
applications 
were finalised within 
60 days. 
Charter and 
Permit 
Compliance 
Number of site 
inspections. 
1 718 site 
inspections 
conducted. 
Conduct 1500 site 
inspections. 
1500 Compliance 
Inspections 
conducted at sites. 
Achieved: 1717 
Compliance 
Inspections 
conducted. 
 Number of fuel 
samples and tests. 
No targets set. 1080 fuel samples 
and tests. 
Number of fuel 
samples tested for 
compliance to fuel 
specifications and 
standards. 
Not Achieved. 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Fuel stock levels 
monitored and 
corrective 
actions to avoid 
distribution 
shortages 
coordinated. 
No targets set. Fuel stock levels 
monitored 
and corrective 
actions to avoid 
distribution 
shortages 
coordinated. 
Fuels stock levels 
monitored and 
corrective action to 
avoid distribution 
shortages 
coordinated. 
Achieved: No fuel 
supply shortages 
were experienced; 
corrective actions 
were implemented 
where necessary. 
Logistics Planning 
Team and Heads of 
Supply Managers 
meetings held 
throughout the 
financial year. 
Source: Department of Energy Annual Report (2013/14: 82) 
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While this sub-programme achieved much, some targets were deferred because there was no 
budget allocated. Furthermore, in the adjudication of licences to wholesalers, manufacturers and 
retailers, there is no data to track performance since the indicator was new (2010/11 financial 
year). However, in the 2011/12 and 2012/13 financial year, 100 % of arbitration notices were 
issued for arbitration requests (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 51). The researcher 
holds the view that while there was no baseline information on the envisaged target, it appears 
that the absence of this may have prompted an idea that 100% of arbitration notices is 
achievable, hence it is a target for 2013/14 financial year as well. 2000 new petroleum retail site 
inspections per year were earmarked for 2013/14 financial year (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 
2014/15: 51).  
 
It is paramount to note the regulation amendments with regards to petroleum product site and 
licences since 2006. For example, the Petroleum Product Act, of 1977 (as amended) prescribes 
that any person involved in manufacture, wholesale and or retail must purchase prescribed 
petroleum products and must be licensed by the Controller of Petroleum Products. According to 
the Department of Energy (2013), in considering licence, the Controller of Petroleum Products, 
guided by the Act, must give effect to the objectives of the Act and transformation of the South 
African petroleum and liquid fuels industry, respectively. For example, the Controller of 
Petroleum Products provides a business plan guideline, in which the business plan should show 
‘how many HDSA individuals does the company applying for a licence employ or intend to 
employ; how many HDSA individuals are involved in ownership and management; what skills 
development plan does the company intend to have and how long will implementation take’ 
(Department of Energy Presentation, 2013: 3). With regard to petroleum licensing, as at 2013, 
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Table 6.1 depicts output on number of issued licences. The reader should note that a major 
component of the Liquid Fuels Charter is procurement, which is set to render opportunities to 
many HDSAs companies (Department of Energy Presentation, 2013: 3). Accessing these 
opportunities requires licensing from the Department of Energy via the Controller of Petroleum 
Products. 
 
However, progress on the transformation of the petroleum industry and compliance to the LFEC 
is viewed to be less than satisfactory, as echoed by the (Report of the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament May 2009 – March 2014). Also 
adding on this point is the Department of Energy Presentation (2013: 16) which argues that the 
impact of policy instruments that seek socio-economic transformation is currently at a minimum. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates this point, mainly in the downstream petroleum pipeline. 
 
Figure 6.2: Dealer ownership in the petroleum industry of South Africa by race 
 
Source: Department of Energy Presentation (2013) 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
What Figure 6.2 describes is that, in terms of dealer ownership in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa, white people lead by 78%, Indians follow by 22%, while other groups have no 
dealer ownership at all. In the researcher’s view, huge disparity in terms of ownership shows that 
transformation is less achieved as massive ownership is still in the hands of the privileged even 
after two decades, post 1994 elections. The Department of Energy Presentation (2013: 16) 
blames this impediment on the fact that limited site availability, among other things, inhibits the 
equitable site allocation to HDSAs.  
 
Similarly, Figure 6.3 displays company ownership in the petroleum industry of South Africa as 
at 93% of ownership is in the hands of whites, while blacks follow by 6% and 1% is owned by 
Indians. Coloured and other race groups however own nothing at all in the petroleum industry 
space, where downstream petroleum is concerned.  
 
Figure 6.3:  Company ownership in the petroleum industry of South Africa by race 
 
Source: Department of Energy Presentation (2013) 
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However, the researcher went on to assess progress made in issuing of the following licences: 
Manufacturing, Wholesale, Site and Retail by South African Provinces. The rationale for this is 
to assess emerging data trends over the years as far as transformation is concerned in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa. Also, the researcher sought to unearth evenness of licence 
distribution in South Africa, because the belief is that the better the distribution of licenses in a 
province the better it is transformed. Table 6.2 shows that there has been an overwhelming 
increase in issuing licences in the petroleum industry of South Africa since 2006 after the LFPC 
enactment until 2013. The formula to calculate growth is as follows: (PV = Present Value –Past 
Value/ Past Value * 100). 
 
Table 6.2: License issuing per South African Provinces from 2006-2013 and gap analysis 
Name of Province Manufacturin
g licence 
Wholesale 
licences 
Site licences Retail 
licences 
Year of 
licence issued 
Eastern Cape 
Total 
Percentage growth 
1 
3 
2% 
15 
25 
66.6% 
267 
374 
40% 
291 
451 
54.9% 
2006  
2013 
Mpumalanga 
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
3 
3% 
19 
40 
110% 
183 
329 
79.7% 
237 
402 
69.6% 
2006 
2013 
 
Limpopo 
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
0 
0% 
15 
18 
20% 
207 
307 
48.3% 
239 
348 
45.6% 
2006 
2013 
Gauteng  
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
0 
0% 
83 
210 
15% 
837 
1117 
33.4% 
1114 
1612 
44.7% 
2006 
2013 
 
North West 0 10 186 226 2006 
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Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
0% 
19 
90% 
234 
25.8% 
298 
16% 
2013 
KZN 
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
1 
1% 
17 
29 
70.5% 
367 
472 
28.6% 
453 
673 
48.5% 
2006 
2013 
Northern Cape 
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
0 
0% 
6 
9 
50% 
75 
148 
97% 
68 
147 
116% 
2006 
2013 
Western Cape  
Total  
Percentage growth 
0 
0 
0% 
12 
22 
83% 
419 
549 
31% 
486 
774 
20.5% 
2006 
2013 
Free State  
Total  
Percentage growth 
1 
0 
1% 
12 
18 
50% 
236 
343 
45% 
258 
391 
51.5% 
2006  
2013 
Source: Author’s configuration, raw data sourced from www.energy.gov.za 
 
Figure 6.4 demonstrates the trends and gaps in terms of licence issuing per South African 
Provinces. 
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Figure 6.4: Licence issued since 2006 to 2013 per South African Provinces 
 
 
Figure 6.4 suggests that retail and site licence issuing leads in the South African petroleum 
industry. Gauteng province has the highest number of site and wholesale licences as compared to 
the rest of the provinces, even though there are no manufacturing licences issued. With regard to 
the above figure generally in terms of retail licence issuing the Gauteng Province leads from 
1114 in 2006 to 1612 in 2013. This means that from 2006 to 2013 retail licence issuing grew by 
498 and when this is translated into percentages growth is at 44. 7%. This skewed growth in 
terms of licensing may be caused by the fact that National Government, where licences are 
issued, is situated in Pretoria, which means that transportation could be a challenge for other 
aspiring entrepreneurs who may be in remote areas. Thus, the services are there but not all South 
Africans are able to reach them. This means that transformation is progressing well in the 
Gauteng province if all licence holders utilise them. Furthermore, the number of site licences that 
were issued increased between 2006 until 2013 throughout the country. The province with the 
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lowest number of site licence is the Northern Cape even though licence issuing grew from 75 in 
2006 to 148 in 2013. In percentage terms, the growth received by Northern Cape is at 97.3%. 
However, the onus is on whether upon licences being issued there is sustainable ownership by 
HDSA.  
 
The number of manufacturing licence is the least in comparison to retail and site licences 
throughout the country. It is the view of the researcher that slow pace of issuing licences, 
especially for manufacturing licence impact negatively on the transformation objective due to the 
amount of ownership can be obtained. As argued earlier, the Liquid Fuel Empowerment Charter 
was designed to drive transformation agenda, targeting 25% ownership by HDSA, at least within 
the ten year of Charter enactment. However, the Department of Energy Presentation (2013: 17) 
argues that access to large infrastructure for the movement and storage of crude oil and 
petroleum products, such as Single Buoy Mooring, pipelines and depots and storage tanks, oil 
refiners and synthetic fuel manufacturers’ plants is acknowledged as a major challenge in the 
supply chain of emerging companies owned by HDSA. Basically, the owners of such facilities 
provide third parties with non-discriminatory access but with no commitment to capacity. The 
Department of Energy (2013) holds a view that HDSA companies should be given fair 
opportunity to acquire ownership in such facilities as well. 
 
As was said in the study, transformation in the petroleum industry carries seven pillars; it is 
paramount to showcase progress made through other forms of transformation the petroleum 
industry undertook. Table 6.3 demonstrates a summary.   
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Table 6.3: Transformation Journey in the Petroleum Industry of South Africa 
2005  Successful completion of SAPIA’s scarce and critical skills research.  
 Launch of the association’s first human resource development journal, dubbed ‘The Petroleum 
Professional’. 
 SAPIA and Women in Oil and Energy signed an MOU. Cooperated to facilitate the sustainable 
empowerment of women in the oil, gas and other energy sectors.  
2006  Leadership in Oil and Energy programme was launched.  
 Joint initiative of SAPIA, the Chemical Industries Education and Training Authority, and the University 
of the Witwatersrand. Run from 2006-2011, with 348 industry employees graduating, in which 93% pass 
rate. 
 2008  The launch of the South Africa Supplier Development Agency (mandated to accelerate empowerment 
through increased access to the industry procurement opportunities). 
 Implemented a five-year Human Resource Development Strategy for the industry.   
 2009  SAPIA works with Department of Education to direct curriculum content for technical students to qualify 
as process plant operators at National Vocational Certificate Levels 2, 3 and 4.  
 2010  Developed partnership with the National Petroleum Employees Association on skills development and 
representation in CHIETA. 
 Participate in the Liquid Fuels Charter and energy industry transformation public hearings in Parliament. 
 Participate in development of the National Skills Development Strategy.  
 Participate in development of the CHIETA Sector Skills Plan. 
 2012  Women in Leadership Programme launched in August. 
 The SAPIA constitution was amended to make provisions for admission of members that are licensed 
wholesalers or manufacturers.  
Source: South African Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) Presentation (2014: 6-8) 
 
Furthermore, in terms of ensuring that petroleum services reach all in South Africa to address 
past marginalisation, a number of IeCs were initiated by government. The IeCs form part of the 
IDPs of District Municipalities, and were developed in 2002, but intended to lapse by 2015.  
“The main purpose of IeC programme is to have 30 filling station type centres in operation and 
an information type centre in each of approximately 287 municipalities spread across Nodal 
areas” (www.energy.gov.za). The IeCs sell products such as paraffin, candles, diesel, petrol, gas 
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and gas burner stoves in the community. The IeCs are owned by a registered community 
cooperative. The IeCs also have a village vendor network of people, mainly women and 
youngsters, who serve as delivery points within the communities (www.energy.gov.za). People 
then purchase energy products from these vendors in order to reduce travelling costs. The 
vendors are trained on how to use the energy sources safely and they, in turn, are expected to 
train other local people (www.energy.gov.za). These IeCs not only provide energy services 
closer to the people, but also they indirectly create jobs and skills, reducing thereby the incidence 
of poverty. In terms of jobs creation, each IeC provides 50 short-term during the construction 
phase and 10 permanent jobs after construction. Progress made so far is shown in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Progress made with regards to IeC initiative since 2003-2014 
Area in which IeC is located Name of municipality Population benefiting Year of construction 
earmarked 
Kgalagadi (now called John 
Taolo Gaetsewe) in Northern 
Cape 
Kgalagadi District Municipality 224,799 2003 
Caba Mdeni in Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo Municipality 801, 344 2005 
Mutale in Limpopo Vembe District Municipality 
ISRDP 
1, 294, 722 2007 
Ratlou in North West Ngaka Modiri Molema District 
Municipality 
842, 699 2008 
Morrisberg Central Karoo ISRDP 71, 011 2010 
Qunu in Eastern Cape OR Tambo District Municipality  1, 364, 943 2010 
Bizana in Eastern Cape Mbizana Local Municipality 7, 974 2010 
Ulundi in KZN Zululand District Municipality 803, 575 2010 
Qamata in Eastern Cape Chris Hani District Municipality 795, 461 2010 
Caba-Mdeni in Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo District Municipality  801, 344 2010 
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QwaQwa in Free State Free State ISRDP 54, 661 2010 
Mpumalanga  Bohlabela District Municipality 390, 610 2010 
Source: Author’s configuration, information sourced from www.energy.gov.za and from 
Wikipedia where population is concerned. 
 
However, even though this initiative is crucial in terms of addressing transformation, lack of 
funding, poor cooperation by bigger oil companies, who must contribute in implementing the 
IeCs, and poor governance of the existing IeCs, hampers government’s efforts. Also, the 
population of these district municipalities is way too much for one IeC to supply its energy 
needs. Furthermore, the target of 30 IeCs by 2015 is unlikely to be reached, considering that not 
all these IeCs are completed. Next, to be discussed and analysed is the second sub-programme, 
which is ‘petroleum compliance’.  
 
6.2.2 Petroleum Compliance  
Compliance monitoring and enforcement is important to conduct for the purposes of ensuring the 
policy objective of HDSA inclusion into mainstream economic activities. This activity aims to 
ensure development and transformation of the liquid fuels industry and security of supply of 
petroleum products in the South African economy through monitoring and enforcing technical 
and economic compliance to legislation, specifications, standards and licence conditions in each 
year of the medium term (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 50). However, the researcher 
focuses only on transformation. The main activity is to ensure that a number of new petroleum 
retail site inspections are conducted in each year in order to ensure targets are met. 
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To conduct compliance monitoring, the Department of Energy Annual Performance Plan 
(2013/14: 85) shows that in the 2009/10 financial year 1 200 compliance inspections were 
conducted. In the 2010/11 financial year, 3 360 retail site compliance inspections were 
conducted (Department of Energy Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 50). This means that a 
baseline target of 1 500 inspections was exceeded. In 2011/12 financial year, 1 500 retail site 
compliance inspections were conducted. In the year 2012/13, 1 500 retail site compliance 
inspections were conducted, and by year 2013/14, 1 500 retail site compliance inspections are 
envisaged to be conducted (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 50). In so doing the DoE 
employs an external company to conduct random inspections. Judging from the statistics 
gathered earlier, 5 096 retail licences were issued throughout the nine provinces. This means that 
the number of inspections earmarked for the year is way below the number of issued licences in 
the petroleum industry of South Africa, considering that these are only retail licences. Gauteng 
Province alone has a huge number of retail licences. This begs a further question: to what extent 
are licence holders eventually becoming entrepreneurs? 
 
Enforcement of conduct has been a challenge, since, the indicator being new, there has been no 
past data to track performance. The projection therefore is for 2013/14 financial year in which 
enforcement notices would be issued in 80 percent of cases where non-compliance is identified 
during routine compliance inspections (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 51). It is 
important to note that enforcing compliance could be a challenge. Since this is a new activity, the 
Department of Energy needs to have a basic plan and a strategy in place that will see this goal 
achieved. In terms of testing a fuel sample, a percentage of cases where enforcement notices are 
issued in cases where non-compliance is identified during fuel sample testing. Fuel sample 
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testing faces similar challenges, as in the years from 2010 to 2013 there is no past data as the 
indicator was new. Estimates of the performance indicator starts to focus on the 2013/14 
financial year in which 95% enforcement notices would be issued where non-compliance is 
identified during routine fuel sample testing (DoE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 51). 
Compliance monitoring and enforcement is also viewed in terms of the requirements of the 
Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter. The logframe, Table 6.5, indicates a summary of the 
achievements made.  
 
Table 6.5: Log-frame exhibiting performance for Petroleum Compliance sub-programme 
Strategic 
objectives 
Performance 
indicator 
Actual 
achievements 
in 2011/12 
Planned targets 
for 2012/13 
Revised targets 
for 2012/13 
Actual achievements for 
2012/13 
Petroleum 
Inspection 
-Process all 
applications 
within 90 days. 
-95,5% 
applications 
were processed 
within 90 days. 
-Process all 
applications within 
90 days. 
-100% 
compliance rate 
by the 
Controller on 
finalising all 
applications 
within 90 days 
excluding Site 
and retail (NTI) 
applications. 
-Partially Achieved: 
67,8% compliance rate on 
finalising all applications 
within 90 days (excluding 
site and NTI applications).  
1050 licence applications 
were received (excluding 
site and retail NTI) of 
which 712 
applications were finalised 
within 
90 days.  
576 licence applications 
from the previous years 
were also finalised. 
Petroleum 
Arbitration 
-Finalise 
arbitration 
requests within 
-All arbitration 
requests are not 
being finalised 
-Finalise 
arbitration 
requests within 14 
-100%  of 
arbitration 
notices issued 
-Partially Achieved: 66% 
of Arbitration notices 
issued within the 14 
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14 working days. within 14 
working days 
due to capacity 
constraints. 
working days. within the 14 
day turnaround 
time for 
processing. 
working days turnaround 
time.  
3 arbitration requests were 
received and only 2 
finalised within 14 
working days. 
 -Finalise public 
complaints 
within 14 
working days. 
-No targets set. -Finalise public 
complaints within 
14 working days. 
-Finalise public 
complaints 
within 14 
working days. 
-Partially Achieved: 22 
out of 24 received 
finalised within 14 days. 
Petroleum 
Enforcement 
-A system of 
corrective action 
for 
noncompliance 
with the Liquid 
Fuels Charter 
(LFC) and 
technical, legal 
and commercial 
licensing 
conditions 
developed, 
maintained and 
implemented. 
-No targets set. -A system of 
corrective action 
for non-
compliance with 
the LFC and 
technical, legal 
and commercial 
licensing 
conditions 
developed, 
maintained and 
implemented. 
-A system of 
corrective action 
for non-
compliance with 
the LFC and 
technical, legal 
and commercial 
licensing 
conditions 
developed, 
maintained and 
implemented. 
-Partially Achieved:  The 
Minster of Energy met 
with all oil company Chief 
Executive Officers 
individually to discuss the 
LFC Audit findings and to 
map the way forward. 
Source: Department of Energy Annual Report (2013/14: 83) 
 
Performance of this sub-programme appears to be a challenge for the Department of Energy, 
since its aims have only partially been achieved. When it comes to this activity also, the LFPC of 
2000 Audit Report findings of 2011 suggests transformational gaps, owing to poor compliance 
by the industry to the provisions of the Charter. This means that even though the DoE issues 
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licences in accordance with the policy, this does not translate into transformation impact. In 
addition, the DoE Annual Performance Plan (2014/15: 53) points out that on an annual basis, the 
sub-programme aims to conduct 1 500 retail site inspections for petroleum manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers to ensure compliance with the LFC and technical, legal and commercial 
licensing conditions. The Annual Performance Plan (2014/15) reveals that in 2012/13, 1 717 site 
inspections were carried out, meaning that a target therefore was reached and exceeded. 
However, by the end of September 2013 (half-way into the new financial year), 845 inspections 
had been conducted, but already twenty non-compliance issues had been noted. Six were 
resolved immediately, and fourteen enforcement notices were issued. Issues of capacity should 
be noted as well as this sub-programme carried a complement staff of fourteen in 2013/14 (DoE 
Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15: 53). This means that there is a gap between the policy 
objective, input resources made available, and the sub-programme. This is where ex post 
mechanisms are wielded by the principal to ensure policy goals are achieved. It is the failure to 
successfully implement enforcing measures that proves that rule-bound institutions do not 
always achieve effective implementation of policy. The next sub-programme to be discussed is 
‘petroleum pricing’. 
 
6.2.3 Petroleum Pricing 
This sub-programme seeks to strengthen the regulatory framework in the liquid fuels petroleum 
industry by implementing the Regulatory Account System (RAS). This is intended to achieve a 
transparent fuel pricing mechanism that will reward investors in the liquid fuels sector 
throughout the value chain, by 2013/14 (DOE Annual Performance Plan, 2012/13). It is 
important to explain what the RAS is and the rationale behind the creation. RAS replaces the 
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previous Market of Petroleum Activities Return Mechanism and Retail Margin determination 
(MPAR) model, which is observed by (Sibiya, 213: 20) to protect the new entrants in the retail 
sector less. The MPAR is the model that was used by the oil companies to make investment into 
retail sites (SAPRA, 2008). However, while this model ensured investment returns, on the other 
hand it caused institutions to over invest into retail sites (Figure 6.4 demonstrate this claim). As 
SAPRA (2008) explains, the consequence of this is that the average national throughput of 
service stations was declining, putting pressure on effective retail operations. Furthermore, 
investment returns were not realised at retail outlets.  
 
The DOE Performance Plan (2012/13) states that RAS calculate the margins of retailers and how 
they meet their licensing conditions. RAS compensates for all assets and operating expenses in a 
transparent manner (Sibiya, 2013: 21). Sibiya (2013) further explains that employing RAS means 
that whoever owns the asset would get full compensation for it and whoever operates the asset is 
envisaged to get the return for operating the asset. This means that if the site is owned and 
operated by the retailer, she or he would get both CAPEX and OPEX margin, with the exception 
for the pumps and tanks which are normally owned by the oil company (www.energy.gov.za). 
According to Sibiya (2013: 20), new licensing had to be introduced to save potential service 
stations owners from having to purchase unviable service stations through the inclusion of the 
net present value (NPV) calculation in the licensing system. RAS thereby is seen to protect the 
vulnerable retail sector by separating wholesale assets from retail (service stations) assets 
(Sibiya, 2013: 20). According to Sibiya (2013), the protection of the entrepreneurial margin in 
RAS margins is crucial for HDSA empowerment. Furthermore, Sibiya (2013) views such 
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protection to render confidence to financial lenders and SMME development, highly required in 
the petroleum industry to enable operations. 
 
According to the DOE Annual Performance Plan (2014/15), in 2012/13, the stakeholder 
consultation process on the fixed retail margin for illuminating paraffin was finalised, and a 
discussion document on the maximum refinery gate price was published. By the end of 
September 2013, the global energy information provider, Platts, was consulted regarding 
elements to ensure internationally competitive pricing in the administration of petroleum product 
pricing (DOE Annual Performance Plan, 2014/15). The DOE also participated in the South 
African Petroleum Industry Association-Kellogg Brown Rood study on the review of the basic 
fuel price, and two reports on the implementation of the regulatory accounting system applicable 
to the adjustment of fuel margins and petrol attendants’ wages were compiled and approved in 
2013/14. All these efforts saw the RAS being implemented as from December 2013, as 
envisaged by the Department of Energy. Output is demonstrated in the logframe, Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6: Log-frame for Petroleum Pricing sub-programme 
Strategic 
objectives 
Performance 
indicator 
Actual 
achievements 
in 2011/12 
Planned 
targets for 
2012/13 
Revised targets 
for 2012/13 
Actual achievements for 
2012/13 
Fuel Levies and 
margins 
-Revision and 
implementation 
of the Basic Fuel 
Price (BFP) and 
Magisterial 
District Zones 
(MDZ) System. 
-Terms of 
Reference for 
the review of the 
BFP and MDZ 
have been 
finalised. 
-Promulgation 
of BFP and 
Zone 
Differential 
Rules. 
-Conduct a 
desktop study on 
BFP. 
-Achieved: The DOE had 
meetings with Platts and 
Argus to discuss the 
international pricing 
elements. A DOE official 
participated in the 
SAPIAKBC study on the 
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review of the BFP. The 
report would be used as 
input document to the DOE 
processes. 
 -Implementation 
of RAS. 
-The Rapid RAS 
margins 
were 
implemented in 
fuel prices 
structure in 
December 2011. 
-
Implementatio
n and 
Monitoring of 
RAS. Two 
Reports per 
annum on the 
calculated 
price margins 
for the 
respective 
segments of the 
value chain. 
-Two reports 
produced on the 
implementation 
of RAS. 
-Achieved: Two reports on 
the implementation of the 
RAS as it applies to the 
adjustment of fuel margins 
and petrol attendants’ 
wages were approved. 
 -Promulgate and 
implement the 
fixed retail price 
of illuminating 
paraffin. 
-The Fixed 
Margin for 
Illuminating 
Paraffin (IP) 
Study is 
completed and 
approved by the 
Minister. 
-Monitor the 
fixed retail 
margin of IP. 
Promulgation of a 
fixed retail 
margin for IP. 
-Partially Achieved: The 
stakeholder consultation 
process on the fixed retail 
margin for IP was finalised 
on 26 March 2013. The 
comments were 
consolidated into a report 
and will be incorporated 
into the regulations. A 
discussion 
document on the Maximum 
Refinery 
Gate Price (MRGP) was 
published for public 
comment. 
Source: Department of Energy Annual Report (2013/14: 84)  
 
It should be noted that since RAS was approved in 2013, the Basic Fuel Price for liquid fuels, 
Single Maximum National Retail Price for Paraffin and Maximum Retail Price for LPGas was 
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developed and implemented as well, as depicted in the logframe. As said before, the rationale for 
the development of RAS was to address the pricing system by separating wholesale assets from 
retail asserts. Prior to the creation of this structure, wholesale assets and retail asserts were 
vertically integrated, meaning that wholesalers, both emerging and established, were swallowing 
profits from the retail sector (Sibiya, 2013). This means that the retail sector, which is dominated 
by SMMEs and by those who are HDSA will only develop at slow pace. This necessitate 
correction in order to comply with Section 2A (5) (a) Petroleum Product Act of 1997 (as 
amended), which encourages appropriate investment and returns to every activity in the 
petroleum industry, respectively. According to Sibiya (2013: 20), the main challenges that were 
facing the liquid fuels sector are a direct product of this vertically integrated wholesale and 
retailing in terms of ownership, among other things. The researcher agrees, because Table 6.2 
shows a number of licences i.e manufacturing, wholesale, site and retail licences, meaning that if 
these are integrated to bigger groups, they will swallow all the investment returns made by 
smaller groups. This undermines the government policy objectives of ensuring HDSA 
transformation. 
 
Sibiya (2013: 20) argues that when RAS was introduced the positive motivation was to take 
away a return for retail assets from the wholesale margin, back into the retail activity via the 
retail margin. In addition, RAS sought to eliminate the double dipping effect in that it splits the 
retail margin into two major portions, thus Apex and Investor Return (Sibiya, 2013: 21). Even 
so, while this activity is fairly new, there are already challenges in terms of addressing what it 
was intended for. Sibiya (2013) expresses the view that expected changes to pricing system have 
rather not yet fully flowed through to the intended beneficiaries, as bigger oil companies still 
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swallow returns made by the retail sector. The retail sector basically is not yet fully liberalised to 
divert investment returns to benefit SMMEs and transform the downstream petroleum industry of 
South Africa. Furthermore, there are still challenges in monitoring the implementation of the 
maximum retail price where the middle-man is involved in the industry under review, since this 
space is not yet regulated. The middle-man basically buys at wholesales and re-sells way above 
the maximum retail price of liquid fuels. The most impacted group are the destitute and 
especially in rural areas where there may be one supplier of paraffin or Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
that the community purchases from. Poor people continue to use traditional methods of cooking 
due to unaffordability of petroleum products. For example, the use of firewood for cooking in 
South Africa increased from 65% in 2011 to 74% in 2012 (A Survey of Energy Related 
Behaviour and Perceptions in South Africa, 2013: 26). The researcher furthermore went on to 
investigate whether the Department of Energy conducts awareness workshops. A discussion of 
this is next. 
 
Stakeholder awareness workshops  
The DoE renders stakeholder engagements and advisory services on the petroleum licensing 
process to facilitate the development of small businesses, for example, the development of 
business plans, licence application and tracking process. Furthermore the DoE conducts 
stakeholder awareness workshops, which seek to inform policy implementers about compliance 
on policies and regulations. Other workshops are prompted by input on policies, among other 
things.  The workshops shown below in Table 6.7 pertain to the programme and sub-programmes 
selected in this study. However, where stakeholder awareness workshops are concerned there is 
no evidence of workshops conducted prior to 2012. The Table 6.7 shows that a total number of 
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five workshops were conducted in 2012. In 2013, twenty two workshops were conducted and in 
2014 twelve workshops were conducted thus far.  
 
Table 6.7: Workshops Conducted by Department of Energy since 2010-2014 
2012  2013  2014 
Two workshops were on draft 
regulation on mandatory blending of 
Biofuels with Petrol and diesel.  
 
One workshop was on Illuminating 
Paraffin pricing structure and awareness 
on the sale of petroleum product.  
 
Twelve workshops were conducted on 
nine South African provinces, for 
awareness on the 12L Tax Allowance of 
the Income Act Tax and allowance of 
energy saving were conducted. 
One workshop was on the Bio-fuels 
Break-even price and the Bio-ethanol 
Blending value. 
Twelve workshops were on awareness 
on price of Illuminating paraffin to all 
nine South African Provinces.  
 
One workshop was on Petrol Products 
Act as amended and all its amendments. 
 
Nine workshops: On the draft 
Integrated Energy Plan on September 
2013, the first consultation workshop 
was held in Johannesburg, with other 
provincial consultation workshops taking 
place in October and November 2013.  
 
One workshop on the price of 
Illuminating Paraffin. IP retail sector. 
  
Total 5  Total 22  Total of 12 
Source: Compiled by the Author, information sourced www.energy.gov.za 
 
It does appear that the DoE gradually brings awareness to stakeholders about enforcing 
compliance to government policy. For example, awareness workshops were initially at a snail 
pace, but progressively increased over the years, mainly in the downstream petroleum channel. 
While this is the case, there is no evidence of workshops conducted on the LFEC compliance, 
which was developed in 2000. The researcher holds the opinion that, in ensuring compliance and 
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commitment to the implementation of policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation, the 
LFEC requires extensive training. The purpose of training will ensure that there is traceable 
knowledge of it.  
 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that shows yearly programme and or schedule for earmarked 
targeted areas where workshops must be conducted, for what and for which province and local 
municipalities. This could be developed and documented so that learning progress is traced. It is 
the view of the researcher that institutions are likely to fail to comply if they are unclear about 
guidelines. Workshops for compliance awareness should be conducted in order to increase not 
only compliance, but also the national government mandate, which is to ensure socio-economic 
transformation in the petroleum industry of South Africa and full economic participation. Next, 
the study mirrors the described and analysed sub-programmes against the DAC/ OECD 
evaluation criteria.  
 
Table 6.8: DAG OECD Logical framework  
Sub-programmes  Component/ project description Indicators  Means of 
verification 
Assumptions 
Goal Transformation by HDSA: 25% Black Ownership within 10 years of Liquid Fuel Empowerment 
Charter Enactment  
Petroleum 
licensing 
 
To process manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail licence applications. 
100% compliance 
rate by the Controller 
on finalising all 
applications within 
90 days excluding 
Site and retail NTI 
applications. 
Department of 
Energy data base. 
Applicants to 
submit all 
required 
information 
during licence 
application time. 
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 Finalise all NTI applications within 
60 days.  
90% compliance rate 
by the Controller on 
finalising site and 
retail NTI 
applications within 
60 days.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
Applicants to 
submit all 
required 
information 
during licence 
application time. 
Number of sites inspection.  1500 Compliance 
inspections 
conducted sites.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Outsourced 
company to 
conduct this to 
be hired on time 
and be well 
resourced. 
Number of fuel samples tested for 
compliance to fuel specifications and 
standards. 
No targets set. DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Clear targets be 
in place in order 
to be able to 
trace 
noncompliance.  
Fuel stock levels monitored and 
corrective actions to avoid 
distribution shortages coordinated.  
Fuels stock levels 
monitored and 
corrective actions to 
avoid distribution 
shortages 
coordinated.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
Monitoring and 
Corrective 
mechanisms to 
be readily made 
to circumvent 
fuel shortages. 
Petroleum 
compliance 
 
To inspect petroleum manufactures, 
wholesalers and retailers for 
compliance with LFC and technical, 
legal and commercial licensing 
conditions. 
100% compliance 
rate by the Controller 
on finalising all 
applications within 
90 days excluding 
NTI applications. 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Outsourced 
company to 
assess 
compliance to be 
hired on time 
and be well 
resourced.  
To develop, maintain and implement 
a system of corrective action for 
noncompliance with the LFC and 
technical, legal and commercial 
licensing conditions. 
A system of 
corrective action for 
noncompliance with 
the LFC and 
technical, legal and 
commercial licensing 
conditions 
developed, 
maintained and 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Corrective 
system to be 
developed, 
implemented and 
be made 
available for the 
public once 
finalised. 
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implemented.  
To manage arbitration requests and 
public complaints in the petroleum 
industry. 
Arbitration requests 
and public 
complaints to be 
finalised within 14 
working days. 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
A log-call 
system for all 
complaints to be 
developed and 
managed.  
Petroleum pricing Promulgation of Basic Fuel Price and 
Zone Differential rules. 
Conduct a desktop 
study on Basic Fuel 
Price. 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Final study 
report on BFP to 
be made 
available and be 
able to provide 
the needed 
pricing 
guidelines.   
Implementation and monitoring of 
RAS. Two reports per annum on the 
calculated price margins for the 
respective segments of the value 
chain. 
Two reports to be 
produced on the 
implementation of 
RAS.  
 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Evidence of 
RAS report to be 
made available 
to the public. 
Petroleum Products Act with annexed 
LFC, LPG retail price regulations in 
place, BFP for diesel, illumination 
paraffin, and petrol based on Import 
Parity Pricing methodology. 
Draft report on fixed 
retail margin for 
illuminating paraffin 
Fuel Price Working 
Rules. 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
Evidence of the 
report to be 
made available 
to the public.  
Output  Output  indicators   
Petroleum 
licensing 
conducted  
To process manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail licence application. 
67,8%: All 
applications were 
finalised within 90 
days.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
To monitor compliance on LFC, 
technical, legal and commercial 
licensing. 
86,7%: Compliance 
rate on finalising site 
and retail NTI 
application within 60 
days.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
To inspect petroleum manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers for 
1717: Compliance 
inspections 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
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compliance with LFC and technical, 
legal and commercial licensing 
conditions. 
conducted. 
Petroleum 
compliance 
enforcements 
conducted 
To inspect petroleum manufactures, 
wholesalers and retailers for 
compliance with LFC and technical, 
legal and commercial licensing 
conditions. 
67,8%: Achieved 
compliance rate on 
finalising within 90 
days excluding NTI 
applications.  
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
To develop, maintain and implement 
a system of corrective action for 
noncompliance with the LFC and 
technical, legal and commercial 
licensing conditions. 
A system of 
corrective action for 
compliance to LFC is 
not completed. 
DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
 
 To manage arbitration requests and 
public complaints in the petroleum 
industry. 
66%: Arbitration 
notices issued within 
14 working days. 3 
arbitration requests 
were received and 
only 2 were finalised 
within 14 working 
days.   
22 out of 24 public 
complaints finalised 
within 14 working 
days.  
 DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
  
Petroleum pricing 
implemented 
Promulgation of Basic Fuel Price and 
Zone Differential rules. 
DoE met with Platts 
and Urgus to discuss 
international pricing 
elements.  
 DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
  
Implementation and monitoring of 
RAS. Two reports per annum on the 
calculated price margins for the 
respective segments of the value 
chain. 
 Two reports on the 
implementation of 
RAS as it applies to 
the adjustments of 
fuel margins and 
petrol attendant’s 
wages were 
approved. 
 DoE Annual Report 
(2013/14). 
  
Petroleum Products Act with annexed Illuminating Paraffin DoE Annual Report  
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LFC, LPG retail price regulations in 
place, BFP for diesel, illumination 
paraffin, and petrol based on Import 
Parity Pricing methodology. 
retail price partially 
achieved.  
(2013/14). 
  Activities Inputs    
Petroleum 
licensing 
  
  
  
1. License analysis -Implementing staff 
at Head Office 
(Controller of 
Petroleum Products)  
-DoE Annual Report 
2013/14 
 -Data is 
captured 
accurately.  
-Licence 
application 
processed in-line 
with Petroleum 
Product Act 
requirements. 
2. Charter and permit compliance -Regional workshops 
conducted  
 -DoE Annual 
Report 2013/14 
 -Workshops 
conducted as 
planned. 
3. Petroleum supply  -Implementing staff 
at Head Office 
 -DoE Annual 
Report 2013/14 
-To continuously 
confirm fuel 
supply is 
enough. 
4 Petroleum enforcement  -Implementing staff 
at the head office 
 -DoE Annual 
Report 2013/14 
-To continuously 
enforce 
petroleum 
compliance. 
Petroleum 
compliance 
 5. Petrol inspection. 
   
 -Company 
outsourced to 
conduct random 
inspection nation-
wide. 
 
 
 -DoE Annual 
Report 2013/14 
 
 
 
-Non-
compliance may 
undermine 
government’s 
efforts of 
ensuring that 
international best 
practise are 
followed. 
6. Petrol arbitration. 
 
-DoE continue to 
negotiate with 
wholesalers and 
-DoE Annual Report 
2013/14 
-14 arbitration 
were issued. 
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 retailers.    
7. Petrol enforcement. -Implementing staff 
at the head office. 
-DoE Annual Report 
2013/14 
-Enforcement 
notices issued 
where there is 
non-compliance 
Petroleum pricing 8. Fuels levis and margins 
 
-Implementing staff 
at the head office 
-DoE Annual Report 
2013/14 
Two RAS 
reports 
developed. 
9. Fuel price and administration -Implementing staff 
at the head office 
 -DoE Annual 
Report 2013/14 
  
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
6.3 DAC OECD evaluation criteria of policy implementation effectiveness in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa 
According to Meyer (2002: 22), evaluation is primarily used to ensure that the direction chosen 
is correct, and that the right mix of strategies and resources were used to get there. Evaluation is 
typically observed to focus on outcomes and their relationship with outputs (Meyer, 2002: 22). 
As Meyer (2002: 22) contends, there are numerous types of evaluation, in which some are 
formative in terms of helping to develop learning and understanding within stakeholders, while 
others are summative, indicating the degree of achievement, among others. This study however 
puts focus on the evaluation of the policy implementation process. According to Ile et al. (2012: 
133-4) implementation-process evaluation puts focus on the extent to which the plans are created 
for implementation and the way the project/programme activities are actually being executed. 
What is important also about this kind of evaluation is its capacity to investigate the extent into 
which intended outputs were made and also determine unintended consequences that might arise 
from implementing project/programmes (Ile et al., 2012: 133-4). Evaluating outcomes therefore 
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will assist this study to assess the intended policy objective achievements, considering that 
implementation of policies in the petroleum industry have already travelled two decades since 
the inception of democracy in South Africa. This would in turn provide opportunities for 
revisiting the projects/ programmes that are underway, in order to effect amendments and 
improvements (Meyer, 2002: 22), if need be. Evaluation is used in this context on ex post 
perspective since it rigorously assesses completed or ongoing activities to determine the extent to 
which stated policy objectives are achieved, while also contributing to improved decision-
making. It is important for this study to unpack DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria so that policy 
implementation effectiveness can be determined.  
 
The DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria is employed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
implementation of policy in relation to transformation targeted at Historical Disadvantaged 
South Africans in the petroleum industry of South Africa. As said earlier in the study the DAC/ 
OECD evaluation criteria embody relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. 
To assess policy effectiveness in the petroleum industry of South Africa the discussed three sub-
programmes will be assessed using the five DAC/ OECD evaluation yardsticks.   
 
Table 6.9: DAC OECD evaluation criteria of sub-programme for transformation targeted 
at HDSA in the petroleum industry of South Africa 
Sub-programme Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency  Impact  Sustainability  Percentages 
of B-BBEE 
Owned 
1. Petroleum licensing 
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Licence Analysis. -Highly relevant 
to the specific 
situation of 
petroleum 
industry. 
 
-Output 
partially 
achieved.  
 
-67,8% 
achieved 
against the 
target of 
100% for 
licence 
application 
excl. NTI 
applicants. 
Partially felt 
 
-Lack of 
funding for 
HDSAs 
threatens 
transformation 
agenda. 
 
-Information 
not 
available. 
 
 -Highly relevant 
to the specific 
situation of 
petroleum 
industry. 
 
-Output 
partially 
achieved.  
 
-Partially 
achieved: -
NTI 
applicants 
86,7%.  
-Partially 
achieved.  
 
-Non 
availability of 
full 
information 
during licence 
application 
delays this 
target and 
thereby a threat 
to speedily 
transformation. 
-Information 
not 
available. 
 
Charter and permit 
compliance. 
-Highly relevant 
in the sense that 
it addresses 
transformation 
as national 
government 
agenda. 
-Effective as 
the target was 
exceeded and 
produced at 
allocated 
time-frame. 
-1717 
achieved 
against the 
target of 
1500. 
-Impact 
achieved. 
-Sustainability 
is high 
-Information 
not 
available. 
Petrol supply. -Not relevant 
especially for 
the study as it 
sought to assess 
policy 
implementation 
effectiveness in 
aspect of HDSA 
transformation  
-Output 
achieved as 
there are no 
fuel 
shortages. 
-Efficiency 
achieved as 
output 
achieved 
within 
available 
resources. 
-Impact 
achieved.  
-Sustainability 
is high 
-Information 
not 
available. 
2.  Petroleum compliance 
Petroleum inspection. -Highly relevant 
due to the fact 
-Output 
partially 
-67,8% 
achieved 
-Partially 
felt. 
-Sustainable 
only if 
-Information 
not 
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that if 
inspections are 
not done there is 
a high risk of 
non-compliance 
at retail outlets. 
achieved. 
 
against the 
target of 
100%. 
 
 resources are 
available to do 
so. 
 
available. 
Petroleum enforcement. 
 
-Highly relevant 
because is the 
only reasonable 
way to enforce 
compliance to 
policy 
implementation. 
-Output 
partially 
achieved. 
 
-66% 
achieved 
against 
100% target. 
 
-Partially 
felt. 
 
-Sustainable 
only if 
resources are 
available to do 
so. 
 
-Information 
not 
available. 
 
Petroleum standards 
and guidelines. 
-Highly relevant 
because SA 
must be at par 
with 
international 
best practices. 
Output 
partially 
achieved. 
 
-66% 
achieved 
against 
100% target. 
 
-Partially 
felt. A 
system of 
corrective 
action for 
non-
compliance 
with the 
LFC and 
technical is 
not yet 
finilised. 
-Threatens 
compliance to 
transformation. 
-Information 
not 
available. 
3. Petroleum pricing 
Fuel levies and margins. -Needs-driven 
as it sought to 
ensure 
investments 
returns benefits 
wholesalers, 
manufactures 
and retailers 
through 
development of 
RAS.   
Completed 
-Output 
achieved: The 
overall; aim 
of developing 
all the 
regulatory 
elements of 
institutional 
petroleum 
management 
capacity has 
been 
-Highly 
effective: 
The 
objective 
was 
achieved 
earlier than 
the targeted 
time-frame 
and within 
the available 
funds. 
-Impact 
achieved: 
Meetings 
were held 
between 
DoE, Platts 
and Argus to 
discuss 
international 
pricing 
elements. 
-Sustainable 
for 
transformation. 
 
-B-BBEE 
companies 
not yet 
benefiting.  
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institutional set 
up for proper 
petroleum 
management. 
achieved.  
Fuel price 
administration. 
-Illuminating 
paraffin fixed 
margins also is 
highly relevant 
in the sense that 
it sought to 
impose 
regulations to 
ensure 
transformation.  
-Output 
partially 
achieved. 
-Less 
effective as 
illuminating 
paraffin 
fixed margin 
is not 
finalised 
within the 
stated time-
frame.  
-Less 
impact: 
Fixed 
margin for 
illuminating 
paraffin is 
partially 
achieved. 
-Not 
sustainable for 
transformation 
if this is not 
achieved. The 
middle-man 
still exploits 
this area since 
there are no 
regulations yet. 
-Information 
not available 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
6.3.1 Relevance 
Relevance checks the extent to which the objectives of the sub-programmes are still valid. It also 
assesses the degree to which the activities and outputs of the programme are consistent with the 
overall goal and the attainment of its objectives (Chianca, 2008: 41-51). Relevance also reviews 
whether the activities and outputs of the programme are consistent with the intended impacts. 
Starting with sub-programme one, which is ‘Petroleum licensing’, it appears to be relevant to the 
specific area of the petroleum industry. The licence analysis activity is in-line with this sub-
programme, because it accurately identifies the conditions to qualify for licensing new entrants 
in the petroleum industry. It indicates clearly that applicants must demonstrate the inclusion of 
HDSA for one to qualify for the licence to operate. Even though output is partially achieved, the 
67, 8% obtained with regards to licence applications (excluding the New To Industry applicants) 
is a clear indication of the relevance of the sub-programme to the policy objective of ensuring 
HDSA transformation. 86.7% achieved regarding processing licences for new to industry 
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applicants, further reinforces this claim. What the researcher observes to be an issue is the 
unintended consequences in which applicants delay bringing required information on time.  
 
Furthermore, this sub-programme speaks to the Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter and permit 
compliance, and this clearly promotes the policy objective which the study evaluates. To show 
relevance of this sub-programme, a staggering 1717 is achieved against the target of 1500. 
However, the researcher does not find ‘Petroleum supply’ activity embodied within the discussed 
sub-programme to be linked with the HDSA transformation target. Despite the study seeking to 
assess the level of transformation achieved, information regarding the percentage of Black 
Ownership is not available in the DoE Annual Performance Plans. It means, therefore, that there 
is no ability to track the extent of transformation made per annum and by each sub-programme. 
Issuing licences or conducting these activities does not necessarily imply that transformation is 
achieved.   
 
The second sub-programme ‘Petroleum compliance’ also shows signs of relevance to the policy 
objective. This sub-programme is run through petroleum inspections activities to assess the 
inclusion of HDSA in mainstream economic activities. Here, output is partially achieved at 67, 
8% against the target of 100%. This is a clear sign that shows relevance of the sub-programme to 
policy objective. In conducting ‘petroleum enforcement’ 66% is achieved against the target of 
100%. In terms of ‘petroleum standards and guidelines’ 66% is also achieved against the target 
of 100%. The output obtained clearly proves that activities are linked to the sub-programme as it 
empowers HDSA. The third sub-programme is also highly relevant to policy objectives. The 
sub-programme ‘Petroleum pricing’ running through fuel levies and margins, was achieved way 
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before the target time-frame, and this is an indication that the sub-programme is relevant. In 
general, sub-programmes are in-line with policy objectives, even though few lessons can be 
learned. Next, the analyses of effectiveness of these sub-programmes, is discussed.   
 
6.3.2 Effectiveness 
Effectiveness basically assesses the extent to which the objectives are achieved and likely to be 
achieved. When evaluating effectiveness it is also paramount to interrogate major factors 
influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives (Chianca, 2008: 41-51). From 
a general perspective, the sub-programmes analysed in this study have a balanced outcome in the 
sense that some output is achieved and even exceeded, while others are only partially achieved. 
In order to validate the effectiveness of the sub-programme, a comparison of expected vs. 
achieved results is used based upon the logical framework displayed below. Taking into 
consideration the fact that not all indicators have baseline information, these are not taken into 
consideration in the logframe in Table 6.10.  
 
Table 6.10: Effectiveness of policy implementation  
Sub-programme Committed outputs by the 
Department of Energy 
Output yielded  % of BBBEE 
Ownership 
Petroleum licensing 
 Licence Analysis 
 
 Charter and permit 
compliance 
 
 100%  
 100% 
 500 
 
 
 67,8% (excl. NTI) 
 86,7%  (NTI) 
 1717 
 
Information not 
available 
Petroleum compliance 
 Petroleum inspection 
 
 100% 
 
 67,8% 
 
Information not 
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 Petroleum enforcement 
 Petroleum standards and 
guidelines 
 100% 
 100%  
 
 67,8% 
 66% 
available 
Petroleum pricing 
 Fuel levies and margins 
 
 To develop RAS and 
implement by 2013. 
 
 RAS developed and 
implemented by 
2013. 
 
Information not 
available 
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
So, while there are outputs achieved, judging from the above logframe it cannot be claimed that 
policy implementation is effective in the petroleum industry of South Africa, because not all sub-
programmes reached the committed 100% target. It is paramount to unpack why other outputs 
were achieved and why others were not achieved. Overwhelming, achievements were made 
when it comes to enforcing Charter and permit compliance, as more sites were visited within the 
targeted time-frame. To make this achievement the Department of Energy employed on time an 
external company to conduct random nation-wide testing for compliance, with no resource 
constraints. However it becomes apparent that for some activities, performance indicators did not 
meet the Specific, Measurable, Assignable, Realistic, Time-related (SMART) principles, nor did 
they ensure that the annual and quarterly targets were aligned with indicators, hence the 
conclusion that they did not meet the targets.    
 
The researcher brings a view of what policy implementation encounters in general in the 
petroleum industry. It should be noted that anywhere in the world many regulations have 
improved, but also accompanied by areas of non-compliance. There are indeed a plethora of 
cross-cutting issues that lead to non-compliance with the rules stipulated in the (OECD, 2000: 
 
 
 
 
204 
 
14-20) that may affect the petroleum industry. The OECD (2000: 14) stipulates that non-
compliance to regulations occurs when requirements are too complex to know and understand. In 
this instance, people are said to fail to comply with regulations because they do not understand 
the requirements and therefore fail to implement the policy. The OECD (2000: 14) point fingers 
at policy initiators, mainly in the design of regulations. For example, policy makers often feel 
pressure to issue new rules or expand existing ones to cover unforeseen circumstances, to close 
loopholes, and to address new problems (OECD, 2000). Preliminary impact assessment of new 
changes to be implemented does not take effect at this stage. To remind the reader, as was 
observed by historical institutionalists, designing an idea is a challenge, hence norm 
entrepreneurs or policy makers opt to adjust the existing one with path dependence. In this 
regard, the researcher is of the view that the reason why it is a challenge to craft an ideal rule 
from its inception, is because norm entrepreneurs may have no idea themselves, and hence they 
fail to educate the targeted population on adherence. As OECD (2000) contends, reacting to 
pressure could lead to the loss of simplicity in transferring the details of compliance with the 
regulatory structure involved. The researcher observes that upon policy non-adherence, enforcing 
institutions are not doing follow-ups to understand whether this is not the prime reason for non-
compliance. They instead assume that coercive means will lead to compliance. In such a 
situation the principals distance themselves from implementation of a norm completely, 
supporting an argument made by various policy implementation protagonists. Policy 
implementation has been attempted by trial and error from its inception because it is seen as an 
activity that must be done by a certain body in exclusion of all other policy processes. 
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The researcher links the said challenge to poor stakeholder consultation. OECD (2000) echoes 
this claim by arguing that failure to consult with target populations cause regulatory failures 
because lack of adequate consultation may fail to secure target group support for the proposed 
regulation. It was observed in the study that stakeholder workshops on LFEC that are done by 
the DOE are minimal and they do not target the HDSAs that are still in peripheral areas where 
real transformation lacks. The OECD (2000: 16) infers that failure to monitor the regulations is 
unlikely to induce compliance. The OECD (2000: 18) further states that compliance to 
regulations is unlikely to be adhered to if it bares too much cost. Factors that are seen to 
contribute to this are that, “substantive standards may be too high, the transition time for coming 
into conformity may be too short, or the regulation could be inflexible” (OECD, 2000: 16). For 
example, the Mining Charter and the Liquid Fuels Charter specify procedures and rules for 
granting production and exploration right, royalties, and taxes. In South Africa, for instance, 
there is contention with the proposed provisions made in the Mineral and Petroleum Resource 
Amendment Bill (MPRDA) (2013), whereby the government proposes to take a 20 percent ‘free 
carry’ in all new oil and gas projects, and reserve the right to buy another 30 percent at market-
related rates, which would allow it to take its interest in projects to an effective 50 percent. The 
industry players view this to be difficult to translate and vague. Due to this, government is still at 
loggerheads with investors as they threaten to pull out of South African exploration should the 
Bill make its way into law. OECD (2000) is of the view that if a rule seems unreasonable, instead 
of complying, businesses may dedicate more time and money in lobbying regulators to change it 
or ask for special immunities. And this is currently what happens in SA with regards to the 
proposed MPRDA Bill. Next, efficiency of sub-programmes is discussed and analysed.  
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6.3.3 Efficiency 
Efficiency is said to measure the outputs (qualitative and quantitative) in relation to the inputs 
(Chianca, 2008: 41-51). The OECD (2010) defines efficiency as “a measure of how 
economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results”. Efficiency 
in the context of this study is analysed according to the relationship between resources and 
results; thus the input-output ratio for evaluating by sector. It is evident so far that there are 
partial successes in terms of implementing policy that seeks to ensure HDSA transformation. It is 
paramount to first highlight that for it to be successful, each policy input must be strong. Input to 
support the petroleum industry in achieving policy goals are finances, skilled personnel, and 
infrastructure, among many others. These inputs are analysed in order to assess their relevance to 
policy objectives and whether they are strong enough to enable policy implementation in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa. Firstly, the study analyses the financial status and 
infrastructure and its linkage to policy objectives that the industry must achieve.  
 
From financial resource perspective, the current funding structure in the petroleum industry is 
among the challenges that raise concerns in terms of enabling attainment of policy goals. 
Programmes and projects that are heavily driven by the petroleum industry do not fall under 
government funding structures as they require huge financial injection. Institutions are required 
to source their own private funding. Even so, the researcher believes that government has a role 
to play in this space, which is to assist these institutions with financial guarantees that require 
intensive negotiation with the National Treasury. The impediment is that, in the petroleum 
industry there is low gross profit margin due to high costs of loans, especially to black retailers 
(Department of Energy Presentation, 2013: 17) who may lack capital and ability to demonstrate 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
critical skills highly required in the industry. In most instances private lenders withhold hundred 
percent loans until guarantees show that risks are minimal. In addition to this, it appears that 
rules to on-sell are less relaxed and thereby restrict the blacks and Coloured retailers from selling 
in the event of financial difficulties, and in obtaining lucrative opportunities like high volume 
sites (Department of Energy Presentation, 2013: 17). It should be noted that this financial hurdle 
impacts heavily on those who intend to venture into downstream petroleum business (as 
wholesale, dealer and owners) and the most highly impacted group is the very same HDSA. 
Project Mthombo, for example, a project intended to import crude oil in barrels, run by PetroSA 
has been postponed several times, due to finances being prohibitive. This project for instance 
was announced in 2007 as a response to the Energy Master Plan: Liquid Fuels, but was 
postponed a number of times. Sibiya (2013: 1) posits that ‘funding is the most critical part of the 
transformation agenda and funders need assurance of sustainability’.   
 
Furthermore, the Department of Energy’s funding to deliver on all the areas that need attention 
for energy resource development in South Africa is seen to be minimal, as explained in the  
Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 
Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014). It should be noted that, while finances constrained 
infrastructure development for a while, the Department of Energy Budget Vote Speech (2014) 
suggests an increased budget for the 2014/15 financial year to meet some of its infrastructure 
challenges. In the 2012/13 financial year for example, the budget of R6.7 billion was 
appropriated to the DoE, in which 98.9% of it was spent. In 2013/14 financial year, the DoE was 
allocated a budget of R6.5 billion, showing a 2% decline over the previous year’s allocation. The 
allocation for the year 2014/15 is R7.4 billion, with 93% of this amount being earmarked for 
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transfer to Municipalities and state-owned Entities, meaning 7% is directed at department’s 
operations. The 2014/15 appropriation is 14% higher than the 2013/14’s final appropriation. The 
evolution of the DoE budget is shown in Table 6.11.  
 
Table 6.11: Evolution of Department of Energy Budget 
Year Amount 
2012/13 R6.7 billion 
2013/14 R6.5 billion 
2014/15 R7.4 billion 
Source: Author’s configuration, information collected from www.energy.gov.za  
 
However, it is clear that by observing the presented budget it is no way near in solving petroleum 
industry infrastructure challenges. These require huge capital, far more than the increase in the 
budget. Infrastructure investment remains a core objective for many governments as a means of 
stimulating economic growth and ensuring sustainability. The framework to ensure development 
of infrastructure to support the petroleum industry is well considered in South Africa. An 
important initiative is the NDP 2012-2030 that was developed by the Presidency’s Office in 
2011. The NDP 2012-2030 is explained in detail in Chapter Four of this current study. Another 
giant step that has seen the petroleum industry feature in national development programmes has 
been the establishment of the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission, which 
stream-lines spheres of government together in a joint forum to promote infrastructure 
coordination and decision-making. Furthermore, in 2012 the President launched the National 
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Infrastructure Plan, which is aimed at delivering on an integrated and sequenced programme 
across sectors, in line with the NDP. The plan clusters, sequences and prioritises future projects 
and infrastructure initiatives into 18 Strategic Integrated Projects in which the sector under 
review appears prominently. According to Twenty Year Review South Africa (1994-2014), this 
will be a continuous process, creating a pipeline of projects that would give substance to the 
infrastructure initiatives outlined in the NDP, while also giving effect to infrastructure as one of 
the key drivers of the New Growth Path.  
 
In the researcher’s view the dream to ensure infrastructure to enable implementation of policy 
objectives in South Africa will take very long to materialise. The rationale for stating this 
argument is that the Strategic Integrated Projects alluded to here appears only on paper. 
Currently, the government funding structure does not have enough budgets to develop and or 
upgrade existing refineries. Thus, implementing institutions are required to finance infrastructure 
projects from themselves, or source private landing from other institutions. The NDP (2012-
2030), furthermore, makes clear that, even though systems, policies and procedures are available, 
government does not have sufficient institutional or financial capacity to finance and implement 
the infrastructure investment plans on the scale required to support further economic growth. It is 
paramount to note that the Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities 
undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014) confirms the urgency and the 
need to upgrade aging energy infrastructure, so that full economic growth is realised. In the DoE 
Budget Vote Speech (21 July 2014: 6), the Minister of Energy confirms the existing 
infrastructure constraints, some of which are as a result of inadequate infrastructure development 
planning, resulting from challenges in delivering on the government goals and objectives. This 
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compels the researcher to argue that the government policy objective is not linked with available 
infrastructure and funding. So, government may continue to issue licences, but if there are no 
funding and infrastructure resources to support the new to industry applicants, the licences 
obtained cannot be put to use, and transformation is unlikely to be achieved.   
 
There may be underlying reasons why a sector that in 2012 contributed 6.48 % to the national 
GDP (DoE Presentation, 2013: 17) is financially overlooked. In the process of understanding 
why funding is an issue in the petroleum industry the researcher discovers various reasons, in 
which some respondents blame government while others blame the system and so forth. The 
researcher interviewed a total number of 66 respondents. Figure 6.5 shows that 24% of 
respondents argue that funding challenges are as a result of too many mandates that need 
funding, which are beyond government’s capacity. These mandates are accompanied by a 
number of projects that need extensive capital. At the same time, it appears that these projects are 
allowed to compete financially and it is at this point that government’s indecisiveness and lack of 
political will is observed. This group of interviewees sees funding as an important role that 
government must play if policy goals are to be realised. Furthermore, a total of 59% of 
respondents confirm that lack of funding is due to minimal investor confidence. They go on to 
argue that investor confidence stems from the fact that government itself lacks confidence in the 
leadership of some of the companies, as it does not commit to securing government guarantees 
on their behalf. 16% of the respondents put to it that there may be too many companies that seek 
funding and government does not want to be seen to be favouring some above others. As a result 
of this lack of support, output so far has not been linked to the policy objective, which sought to 
achieve 25% of HDSA transformation within 10 years of enacting the LFEC. 
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Figure 6.5: Funding challenges in the petroleum industry of SA 
 
 
The skills gap, as a subject of this study, is analysed on the angle of what government seeks to 
achieve, thus, HDSA transformation, subject to conformance with rules and regulations. The 
researcher holds the view that the Department of Energy and its agencies have embarked on an 
extensive venture in ensuring skills gaps is bridged. Skills transfer and development are well 
documented in the LFEC which echo the intentions cited in the Skills Development Act, 
Affirmative Action and BEE codes of practice, among others. It does appear from the discussion 
in this study that workshops, which are a pinnacle in educating and transferring skills, have been 
conducted. It is clear that effort have been made to empower citizens about policies and 
regulations. Nevertheless, skills gaps that still persist in the petroleum industry appear to be of 
concern in impinging on government’s intended goals. For example, the DoE Presentation (2013: 
17) infers that at the downstream petroleum sector entrepreneurship and business skills are not 
provided in the initial training, particularly for those who are awarded retail licenses. In essence, 
if this initial training is missing, those people who seek to venture into the petroleum business 
are set up for failure, because policies carry technical lingo and the industry is highly regulated. 
The implication is that, in such a situation, the chances of non-compliance with policy provisions 
24% 
16% 59% 
Too many mandates and lack of
prioritisation from government
side
Too many companies seek
funding
No investor confidence in
companies seeking funding
Funding challenges in the petroleum industry of SA 
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are probable. However, as SAPIA appears to have an upper hand in driving the transformation 
agenda in the petroleum industry through workshops and various programmes; it could be argued 
that the impact of this is minimally felt, for black entrepreneurs in the petroleum industry are still 
limited even after two decades post-apartheid. In addition to this, workshops must go beyond just 
facilitation of skills, but rather to penetrate the actual use of licences obtained in downstream 
acquisition across the value-chain.  
 
The researcher furthermore holds the view that skills gaps in the petroleum industry should be 
bridged through workshops targeted strongly in the rural areas where HDSAs are still trapped in 
poverty. These skills should penetrate in rural areas where transformation impact has not been 
yet fully felt. Another issue is that liquid fuel price changes all the time, thus sometimes the price 
per litre of liquid fuel increases and sometimes it decreases. Where the middle-man operates, 
prices are ever increasing whenever there is an increase in international markets, and never 
decrease when the prices are reduced. The further assertion is that, if communities are 
empowered with information about awareness on the actual prices for liquid fuels, there could be 
monitoring agents between the Departments concerned and the communities. It is important to 
note that currently, skills available in the country do not match the requirements for 
transformation as put out in policy objectives. Subsequent to this discussion is impact analysis.  
 
6.3.4 Impact 
According to OECD/ DAC evaluation impact assesses the positive and negative changes 
produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended (Chianca, 
2008: 41-51). So, judging from information collected in the study so far, the South African 
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petroleum industry has achieved a lot when it comes to HDSA transformation. However, the 
policy objective states that petroleum industry much achieve 25% of transformation within 10 
years of enacting the Liquid Fuels Charter. The conclusion made by the researcher is that 
achievement of this policy goal is partial and, therefore, the impact is minimally felt. An issue 
here, according to the researcher, is that the sub-programmes do not show a logical link with the 
policy objective. Thus it is clear that conducting licence analysis, petroleum inspection, and fuel 
levies and margins does not translate and bridge the transformation gap that still exists towards 
HDSAs, even though they are deemed relevant. It is shown in the study that there is so much 
progress when it comes to awarding of licences. According to the researcher this is an 
untendered negative result, because the impact of these licences should be translated to visible 
HDSA transformation. The skewedness of these licences is worrisome also because there is an 
over concentration on the Gauteng Province. Issues such as site non-availability should be noted 
as well because this is also another unintended consequence that slows down the pace of 
transformation. However, of note is that there may be several positive unintended results and 
impacts, but these are not documented in any detail by the sub-programmes. For this reason, the 
researcher can only provide a general indication of the unintended impacts the sub-programmes 
have achieved. In the researcher’s view, monitoring systems should include data collection on 
unintended impacts if and when these become apparent.  
 
Besides this gathered general view, the researcher made interviews to understand other issues 
impinging on successful policy implementation. The researcher embarked on understanding how 
stakeholders view government policies, programmes and project impact in the petroleum 
industry. The researcher interviewed 66 respondents from institutions in the petroleum industry 
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who brought various opinions. The researcher carefully selected these stakeholders because they 
are at the heart of programme/projects implementation, with the intention of meeting the 
government mandate of ensuring HDSA transformation. A total percentage of 53% of 
respondents view government policy as not successful in achieving the desired impact. These 
respondents blame government capacity in fully understanding the policies that impact the 
petroleum industry. They go on to infer that, while internally the Department of Energy appears 
to have a number of employees, they actually lack policy practitioners who are specialists in the 
area of petroleum industry. It is also stated in the presentation that was done by the Department 
of Energy (2013: 17) that the structure of royalties, which is within the policy, complicates the 
process to negotiate and manage contracts, which in turn, impacts on effective policy 
implementation. The researcher is of the opinion that, if policy requirements are not relaxed, 
policy implementation is unlikely to be effective.  
 
From Figure 6.6, 25% of respondents state that policy in the petroleum sector has been partially 
successful ever since the demise of apartheid. These respondents suggest that policy 
implementation has managed to make some benefits on its provisions, even though not fully 
employed in the rural areas where poverty and economic opportunities are minimal. 21% 
however argue that policy to address HDSA transformation has been so far successful. However, 
it cannot be disputed that during policy implementation efforts there will always be winners and 
losers. But it raises concerns if there is a high number of people frustrated during the process of 
implementation, and if these are caused by policy requirements and input. However, hard earned 
achievements since the demise of apartheid cannot be watered-down, even though there is still 
much to be done. Next, sustainability is discussed.  
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Figure: 6.6 Policy Impact in the Petroleum Industry 
 
 
6.3.5 Sustainability   
Sustainability according to Chianca (2008: 41-51) is concerned with measuring whether the 
benefits of an activity are likely to continue without appropriate support. The researcher believes 
that the impact of sub-programmes is considered sustainable, and this is based on solid 
transformation considerations. Furthermore, it is evident that today is better than yesterday when 
it comes to the progress made thus far in the industry under evaluation. This warrants 
recognition, because industry players progressively include HDSA even though this is not yet to 
full potential. However, it should be noted that the goal to ensure transformation targeted at 
HDSA remains at threat as a result of funding being prohibitive, infrastructure not being up to 
scratch and critical skills being still in short supply. This means that inputs are not linked to 
policy objectives, and hence output is not satisfactory. Following this discussion and analysis, 
the study provides best practice and a well-considered conceptual framework. 
Summary of issues raised are as follows: 
 Inputs are not linked to policy objectives, thus targets are not met;  
 Indecisiveness and lack of political will in terms of leading financial institutions to 
support HDSA companies; 
21% 
25% 53% 
Successful
Partially successful
Not Successful
Public policy impact in the Petroleum Industry 
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 Delays in transformation and ownership by HDSA; 
 Weak monitoring and enforcement measures; and 
 Unstructured workshops and lack of proper documentation thereof; 
 Policy implementation in the petroleum industry is deemed not effective. 
 
6.4 Best practice and conceptual framework of well-considered institutional architecture 
construct: Policy Implementation effectiveness 
Based on the findings so far in terms of evaluating policy implementation effectiveness in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa, the researcher proposes best practice and a considered 
conceptual framework, with the hope to improve future policy implementation effectiveness. It is 
clear from the findings that transformation targeted at HDSA is taking a very slow pace and this 
suggests policy implementation is ineffective. There are a number of reasons unveiled in this 
study that hamper speedy progress in terms of achieving the goals set by government. To remind 
the reader, the hypothesis adopted by the researcher is that an approach to tackle transformation 
in the petroleum industry of South Africa is purely based on historical institutional architecture 
theorists’ point of view in which ‘history is used as the foundation to address the challenge of 
today’ without linking input to it. It is paramount that the reader observes the Figure 6.7. 
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Figure: 6.7 Policy position to address transformation by HDSA 
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
  
With regards to this, the researcher puts forward the following points: 
 The inference here is that institutional formation is based on the idea that ‘transformation 
by 25% targeted at HDSA need to be achieved within 10 years of Liquid Fuels Charter 
enactment’.  
 Institutional design in the petroleum industry is based on what historical institutional 
theorists presented, thus history matters because it provides facts about the past and this 
provides an easy way to address it.  
 Individuals and institutions respond differently to this; hence transformation takes a very 
slow pace. Meaning that the norm is not fully institutionalised (interactively socialized). 
 Adapting to change comes with unintended negative impact. These unintended 
consequences are instigated because there is a huge disjuncture between input and policy 
objective and this put the industry in an unsustainable future. Transformation furthermore 
does not take full effect because it is dictated from top-down for mainly, historical 
reasons. 
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Considered Best practice  
However, while history can never be forgotten, institutional architecture of the petroleum 
industry of South Africa needs to rise above this and bring a solution to the societal challenges. 
The challenge with history is that one could hoard it: thus not move beyond this. The researcher 
therefore brings forth (4C0s) thus; Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and 
Cooperation, as this seem to be among other things lacking in the petroleum industry. These can 
be employed through what the researcher dubs ‘Community Driven Development’, which is best 
in ensuring speedily transformation impact targeted at HDSA. The formula therefore adopted by 
the researcher, is: (C04 + (C01 + D2) - HI = PIE). The translation of this formula goes as follows:  
“Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation, (C04); Community (C01) 
Driven Development (D2) minus Historical Institutionalisation (HI) is equal to Policy 
Implementation Effectiveness (PIE)”. 
 
To unpack what C04 means for the petroleum industry and how this could improve policy 
implementation effectiveness warrants exploration. The researcher proposes that even with good 
policies, when there is poor communication from the outset, thus coordination and collaboration 
is most likely to fail, and as such, no one would feel the responsibility to cooperate. The 
researcher bases this on the fact that the Department of Energy issues retail licences in high 
volumes, as observed in the study, but training is not forthcoming to new industry licence 
holders. This training, according to the researcher, provides a basis for sustainability only if it is 
infiltrated through Community Driven Development where transformation is needed the most. 
The formula proposed also says C04 is a two-way thing, thus; applicants should also be blamed 
for not bringing all required information on time. It is understandable that Community Driven 
Development is not a one-size-fits-all model as it also warrants a fitting context. The advantage 
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of this approach is that shared principles are applied in working directly with communities, with 
line ministries, with local elected government, and the private sector, especially the banks.   
 
What gives the researcher the guarantee that this formula will achieve sustainable transformation 
is that Community Driven Development is grounded on the  philosophy of local empowerment 
and that three other anchors thus; ‘participatory decision-making’, ‘participatory monitoring’ and 
‘participatory evaluation’, are crucial into bringing community views into decision-making in the 
petroleum industry. Some scholars argue that when development interventions align to the 
priorities of a community, the sense of ownership is induced, and that communities will work to 
maintain the results, thereby increasing the chance of sustainability.  
 
In the researcher’s view it is paramount to empower the poor to take the lead in transforming 
their lives applying the ‘self-dependency/ reliant approach’ in the South African petroleum 
downstream channel. The researcher defines this approach as mainly based on liberalising the 
petroleum value chain in all forms. It means decentralising the sector to the extent that the 
central government should play a minimal direct autonomous role in transforming the industry. 
President Thabo Mbeki introduced a term called ‘Vuka Uzenzele’ targeting mainly the ground 
roots communities who were waiting for government, or any messiah to give hand-outs. The 
term basically means ‘wake up and do it yourself’. However this does not mean one must reject 
external help, but that transformation should be driven by internal self-motivation. This is why 
economists take a more robust view of self-help as ‘helping poor and disadvantaged people to 
help themselves’ (Charles and Lotsmart, 2003: 196). The Urhoboland in Nigeria was highly 
neglected by the federal government in terms of resources. Likewise Afghanistan was among the 
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first countries that took the notion of ‘self-reliance’ into action (Ojameruaye, 2004: 1). Literature 
also reveals that many countries and groups have adopted the principles of self-reliance in 
promoting rapid development and this could be used in the South African petroleum sector. The 
principles of self-reliance are propagated by (Ojameruaye, 2004: 1) and they are as follows: 
 The outsider must make a positive difference in the living conditions of the doer (the 
helped), thus, the impact of the helper must be seen as felt. 
 The doer (the helped) must own and implement the program or plan of assistance. 
 The outsider must see the world through the eyes of the doer and respect the autonomy of 
the doer. 
 The help or support must not undercut the autonomy of the doer as too much help can 
make the helped lazy. 
 The help must be for a limited period of time, because long-term charity corrupts self-
help and undercuts the capacity for development. 
 The doer should be able to sustain or continue with the development process if and when 
the help stops or even terminated abruptly (Ojameruaye, 2004: 2-3). 
 
The challenge currently in the petroleum industry of South Africa is that central government has 
too much autonomy over policy, regulation and price mechanisms and therefore is deemed by 
the researcher as too centric. The mere fact that the Controller of Petroleum Products who issues 
licences is at the central government and done by the Minister stands a huge chance of being 
politicised. Basically there is no independence and bias is highly probable, in which the 
politically connected in the petroleum sector would benefit more from transformation. Also the 
price system mechanism is controlled by central government, in which liquid fuels prices could 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
fail to accommodate the poor who are still striving to be better off. The benefits of liberalising 
the petroleum industry can be drawn from the China case prior to government again taking a 
central leading role. Institutional transformation in China, mainly in the petroleum industry, took 
hold gradually, eventually indicating the end of Ministries and government’s direct control of the 
oil sector (Francisco, 2013: 9). Furthermore, transformation of the petroleum industry paved a 
way for the decentralisation of other functions that used to be under the State Council (Francisco, 
2013: 9). Operational autonomy given to the National Oil Companies (NOC) included changes in 
price control mechanisms implemented by government. By slowly integrating domestic and 
international prices of the petroleum products, the State not only gave decision-making authority 
over the petroleum industry to NOC, but it propelled them to embrace domestic and global 
competition (Francisco, 2013:10). So in order for the ‘self-dependency/ reliant approach’ to 
promote HDSA transformation, the petroleum industry needs to be decentralised and liberalised, 
because this was never tried in the South African context of ensuring socio-economic 
opportunities at grass roots. An applicant has to go to Pretoria to apply for a licence to operate; 
regionally there should be empowered personnel by the Petroleum Product Act to ensure that 
licences are issued evenly throughout South Africa. The Department of Energy can then monitor 
the extent in which transformation occurs annually.  
   
6.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This Chapter presented findings and analysis of selected issues pertaining to the effectiveness of 
policy implementation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. Findings in this chapter were 
contextualised according to policy implementation as one of the three components of the study. 
Here the researcher primarily outlined and analysed the current status of policy implementation, 
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in relation mainly to HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry. The DoE implements this 
policy objective through sub-programmes that facilitate licensing and enforce compliance. 
Findings in this regard are that:  
 Input is not sufficiently linked to policy objectives, leading to missed targets;  
 There is indecisiveness and lack of political will to negotiate with financial institutions to 
support HDSA Companies;  
 There are also delays in transformation and ownership by HDSA in general, as the 25% 
target has not been reach within the enactment of the Charter period;  
 There are weak monitoring and enforcement measures in the petroleum industry; and  
 Unstructured workshops and lack of proper documentation result in poor learning 
outcomes; 
 Overall, policy implementation in the petroleum industry is deemed not effective.  
 
These findings were authenticated through the use of DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria, which 
embody relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. For example, with 
regards to relevance the researcher noted that the sub-programmes are aligned with this specific 
sector and for the purposes that the policy seeks to address. When it comes to effectiveness, the 
DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria noted that policy implementation is not effective because so 
many activities did not achieve the set target of 100% within the specified time-frame. On the 
efficiency aspect, the relationship between resources and results was assessed. In this regard it 
appeared that the lack of critical resources such as funding, infrastructure and critical skills were 
the main causes of the petroleum industry lacking in efficiency. Where impact is concerned, the 
researcher concluded that at this stage it is minimal. The researcher argued that the sub-
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programmes could only be sustainable if input challenges are addressed. The researcher 
examined potential benchmarks for this study, in particular international best practice and well-
considered institutional architecture aimed at the implementation of policy objectives. In the next 
chapter, the study provides findings in the evaluation of legislative oversight and accountability 
effectiveness in the petroleum industry of South Africa.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ISSUES ON 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY EFFECTIVENESS IN THE PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry 
of South Africa. Evaluation of oversight effectiveness in this current chapter is with regards to 
the policy objective, which is to ensure transformation targeted mainly at HDSA. In this regard, 
the function to be assessed monitors the achievement of selected goals set by legislation, 
including the government’s programmes. In this part, it is not the government departments that 
are evaluated, but rather the role played by PPCE as responsible for rendering oversight and 
accountability in entrenching a culture of high performance, so that policy objectives make 
envisaged impact. By overseeing the actions of government, Parliament is able to ensure that 
service delivery takes place as visualised. Firstly, the current status of oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa is discussed. Secondly, data trends in 
relation to the outcome of activities related to oversight and accountability are unveiled. Thirdly, 
the study employs the DAC/OECD evaluation criteria to gauge the effectiveness of oversight and 
accountability over the petroleum industry. Lastly, the paper provides a summary and 
conclusion.  
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7.2 Oversight and accountability status quo in the petroleum industry of South Africa and 
analysis of emerging data trends 
Among the philosophies behind oversight functions is to ensure that policies enacted and 
authorised by Parliament are delivered timeously as envisaged. As was explained in Chapter 
Two of this study, South Africa adopted an Oversight and Accountability model, which guides 
Parliamentarians to conduct oversight. In the South African context, oversight is a 
constitutionally mandated function of Legislative organs of state to scrutinise and oversee 
Executive action and any organ of state (Oversight and Accountability Model, 2013). In this 
regard, the Portfolio Committees wields oversight and holds the Executive branch accountable 
for performance. As constitutionally expected, the Portfolio Committees also wields oversight 
and accountability over the State organs regulated under the Public Finance Management Act No 
(1) of 1999.  
 
The reader should note that in Chapter Two of this current study, accountability and oversight 
were discussed separately so that a theoretical or conceptual framework underpinning these 
variables is understood better. As the study put these variables into context, the researcher 
marries them. The rationale for combining findings on oversight and accountability is that these 
are blood sisters one cannot separate. The researcher adopts an approach where institutions of 
accountability and oversight are viewed in collaboration to defuse the notion that certain 
institutions play a particular role. While there are institutions that play a particular role, they are 
also not immune to accountability and oversight. The argument that the researcher brings forth is 
that these two variables coexist because it is a relationship between the principal and the agent in 
any societal setting. There is therefore a very thin-line between the two concepts. Furthermore, 
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this relationship happens horizontally, vertically and diagonally along the petroleum value-chain 
as divergent dichotomies of accountability suggested in Chapter two of this current study. 
Proponents such as (Stapenhurst, O’Brien and Weber: 2008: 4) puts this in the current 
environment in which the study is set. Figure 7.1 exhibits this claim.  
 
Figure 7.1: The Oversight and Accountability Tools and Cycle through the lenses of 
petroleum industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original author is Mathews (2006) and further developed by Stapenhurst et al. (2008: 4) 
edited by the researcher 
 
Ministerial Accountability/ Question period 
Executive  Civil service/ Public 
sector 
Legislature  
Oversight Institutions 
Citizens  
Recall electoral 
Commissions 
Question period/ Budget 
oversight 
Public Hearings 
 
Public petitions 
Site visits 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
At the apex, oversight and accountability is conducted by Parliamentarians over the Executive 
body in order to hold the government answerable for how taxpayers’ money is spent. Oversight 
and accountability also entails that Parliamentarians hold the petroleum industry to account for 
performance. It is important to mention three core main functions of Parliament conducting 
oversight and accountability, namely that they represent constituent interests, legislation, and 
overseeing the Executive branch and state-owned Companies for performance (World Resources 
Institute, 2009: 8). However, the focus of the researcher is on the latter, mainly performance 
related to HDSA transformation. However, Parliamentary Portfolio Committees are confined to 
particular activities in conducting oversight to monitor and hold the petroleum industry to 
account for performance. These mechanisms are not different from the Westminster style of 
governance, and in South Africa, the Accountability and Oversight Model propagated by South 
African Parliament is a point of reference. Some of the most common oversight activities used in 
South Africa, not only to oversee the petroleum industry, but the entire parliament process, are 
here examined. Thus, Parliamentarians question the Executive branch whenever there is a need 
to, they conduct hearings through plenary sessions, they process policies and laws, and they 
conduct site visits to areas where programme/project implementation takes place, among other 
things. While providing an analysis of these activities, emerging data trends is unveiled that 
assists the researcher to understand the extent of oversight on the policy objective of ensuring 
HDSA transformation. Question period is therefore explained and analysed first. 
 
The procedure of putting questions to the Executive in South Africa is one of the ways in which 
Parliament holds the Executive to account. Parliament holds the Executive to account by 
questioning and challenging the Executive’s policies and actions, and requiring Ministers and 
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senior government officials, company Chief Executive Officers overseeing state-owned 
Companies in the petroleum industry, in person, to account publicly for their decisions. The 
petroleum industry has various policy implementing areas. When they suspect lack of 
compliance, Parliamentarians would summon companies to account for their actions. The 
Accountability and Oversight Model (2013), explains that questions can either be put for oral or 
written reply to the President, the Deputy President and the Cabinet Ministers on matters for 
which they are responsible for as well. Also during this time the legislature would set aside time 
for Parliamentarians to question Ministers on issues of clarity, government projects in their 
constituencies, the performance of Ministries and policy implementation progress. Question time 
could lead to debates on certain burning issues that need expeditious and collective attention 
(World Resources Institute, 2009: 8). According to World Resources Institute (2009: 8) on 
Parliamentary debates, certain mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability are used. 
These include the consideration of Committee reports, showcasing, scrutinising and debating the 
implementation of policy and budget votes, members’ statements and questions by members of 
Parliament, which draws the attention of the Executive to the concerns of members’ constituents 
(Oversight and Accountability Model, 2013).  
 
The researcher holds the view that this process provides maximum opportunity for learning and 
sharing, which in turn could hone Parliamentarian’s oversight and accountability activities. 
Parliamentarians furthermore scrutinise the budget against activities planned annually, in order to 
ensure that there is value for money. During the question time, suspicious maladministration 
issues are scrutinised, and if found to be true, recommendations to reprimand offenders are 
given. This goes through the process of hearings explored also in this current study. In mature 
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democratic countries such as America and Britain, recommendations made in this platform are 
strictly followed in order to maintain public confidence. In South Africa this is still poor due to 
the insufficient reprimanding of offenders. Poor performing Ministers do not account for their 
actions, but rather are shifted around to other higher portfolios instead of being fired completely. 
According to the researcher, it appears as if poor performance is promoted. What can be 
encouraged however, is that, regardless of weak oversight and accountability, media is normally 
called in as an independent observer. Thus Parliament’s oversight and accountability function is 
reinforced by publicising what takes place during the question period. In this manner, it appears 
that indirectly, a culture of transparency is realised, which is highly recommended for the 
petroleum industry. Of note, question time in this study is analysed based on the policy objective 
that the petroleum industry sought to achieve thus, transformation geared towards HDSA.  
 
It is paramount to understand the type of questions put by Parliamentarians (MPs) and whether 
they assist in monitoring the Executive and whether the industry is committed to achieving the 
selected policy objective. In this instance the researcher compiled all questions enquired by 
PPCE to be answered by the Executive, as part of conducting oversight and accountability 
activities. The period assessed is from 2010 to 2014 before the elections. The rationale for 
selecting this time period is that it marks two decades since the birth of democracy in South 
Africa and MPs are expected to have learnt more about oversight and accountability at this stage, 
especially for the industry under scrutiny. It is only reasonable to examine oversight activities for 
the past five years, in order to contain the study. 
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7.2.1 Question period  
The number of questions enquired by National Assembly to the Minister of Energy and the 
Department are shown in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Total number of questions relating to petroleum sector in the period from 2010-
2014 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
40  79 98 47 41 
Source: www.energy.gov.za 
 
Table 7.1 demonstrates that forty questions were put by the Parliamentarians in 2010. The 
questions were related to progress made on policy implementation and transformation targeted at 
HDSA. During this period, thirty-eight questions were enquired by the opposition parties, in 
which two were with regards to progress made regarding HDSA transformation. In this period, 
two questions were from the ruling party, which forms majority in Parliament. Of these two 
questions, one is related to progress made regarding policy implementation and one is with 
regards to electricity, in which the latter is not relevant to this current study. The researcher’s 
observation is that Parliamentarians during this period placed more focus on overseeing 
electricity sector. However, there were few enquiries related to policy implementation and socio-
economic transformation. There were no questions enquired also on progress made in awarding 
licences to prospective or aspiring business people, as one of the DoE’s sub-programmes that 
embarks on. The researcher believes that focus should have been placed in tracking progress 
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relating to this component as well. The implication is that, failure to observe implementation of 
policy objectives suggests that no one will account for poor performance, nor be awarded for 
good performance. The 7.2 Figure illustrates this point, portraying that 92% of questions asked 
in 2010 focused more in electricity, an area that the Department of Energy shares with the 
Department of Public Enterprise where Eskom reports. The reader should recall that the country 
was suffering electricity shortages during this time. As Figure 7.2 displays, there were at least 
5% of questions related to socio-economic transformation. There was however 2% of questions 
related to progress made on policy implementation in relation to what the Department of Energy 
is tasked to do.  
 
Figure 7.2: Questions asked by MPs in 2010 
 
 
In 2011 the number of questions increased significantly to seventy-nine, in which seventy-seven 
were not related to transformation targeted at HDSA, but rather on electricity. However, two 
questions that were asked by opposition parties were related to progress made on Project 
Mthombo and the reasons for not delivering. Another enquiry was related to the amount of fuel 
imported from 2010 to 2011, and whether there is compliance around fuel specification. It is 
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paramount to note that this question is in-line with the activities that the Executive conducts. The 
percentages depicted in Figure 7.3 suggests that non-related questions to the study increased by 
5% from the previous year, at 97%. Progress on policy implementation suggests that enquiries 
remained few at 2%, similarly to the previous year. However, there were no questions on socio-
economic transformation during this year.   
 
Figure 7.3: Questions asked by MPs in 2011 
 
 
2012 saw a decrease in the number of unrelated questions put to the Minister of Energy and the 
Department. Ninety-eight questions in total were asked by the Parliamentarians. From these, 
seventy-one questions were not related to this current study as they focused on electricity.  
Seventeen questions were with regards to security of liquid fuel supply, and enquiries increased 
significantly more than the previous years. The increase in focus on liquid fuel supply was 
instigated by a number of international and local factors, which among others include sanctions 
imposed by the European Union on Iran, a major source of oil imports for South Africa and also 
as a result of the scheduled shutdown of local oil refineries. This oversight could be argued to be 
reactive as it is prompted by exogenous and endogenous shocks. Therefore should there be no 
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such shocks at all, Parliamentarians would have kept mum on monitoring the policy objective 
that government must achieve with regards to the industry being examined. Furthermore, Figure 
7.4 exhibits Parliamentarians also focusing on compliance enforcement at 3%. This is a giant 
step that observes oversight gradually growing to maturity in terms of ensuring obedience to 
policy specifications by implementers. Of note, 1% of questions put related to progress on policy 
formulation. It is paramount to note that these two variables did not appear in the years analysed 
already. It appears that as Parliamentarians assess compliance enforcement; they are also 
aligning themselves to one of the activities placed in the hands of the Executive (DOE) towards 
ensuring HDSA inclusion by license holders. However, the Figure 7.4 suggests a 2% decline in 
the focus on oversight of socio-economic transformation, as compared to 2010. Probe on 
progress made on policy implementation remains at 2%, respectively.   
 
Figure 7.4: Questions asked by MPs in 2012 
 
 
In 2013 however, there is a significant decline in the number of questions enquired by 
Parliamentarians to the Minister of Energy. This is the time when the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy had full capacity: report writers, the researcher and content adviser. Forty-seven 
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questions were put in total during this year. However there was still an increase in the number of 
questions unrelated to the current study wherein, eighteen questions were put. These questions 
focused mainly on electricity. Fourteen questions sought to harness transparency which did not 
appear in all the years previously discussed. It is paramount to note that a focus on transparency 
was prompted by a number of poor corporate governance issues related to tender irregularities in 
the petroleum industry around this time. This also shows the reactive nature of oversight and 
accountability which seeks to clean/ manage the house after the effect. Of importance, 
transparency is one principal component that heightens confidence and ensures that service 
delivery is done evenly. This exercise should have been done from the outset. As the reader may 
observe, there is also increasing progress in monitoring policy implementation. Policy 
implementation monitoring scored a significant seven questions from Parliamentarians in 2013, 
while enquiries on security of liquid fuels supply declined. One may wonder why monitoring 
policy implementation progress became a ‘star’ during this year. The researcher obtains a view 
here, that increasing pressure in following up on policy implementation progress may have been 
the result of oncoming elections, in which Parliamentarian must demonstrate progress made on 
service delivery to South African voters. This pressure is important because it means that 
Parliamentarians are obliged to answer to South African citizens who placed them in positions of 
power, and that they are aware they could be removed easily by way of voting. Service delivery 
on policy objectives (political ideas) is what prompted votes in the first place, and therefore 
obtaining more votes is contingent on delivering the promises. Enquiries on socio-economic 
transformation and policy formulation also grew by 1%, as compared to the previous year. On 
this front, in 2013 socio-economic transformation enquiries was at 4%, while policy formulation 
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was at 2%. The latter owes to stagnant policy formulation progress by the Executive (DoE) as 
there were no policies forth coming to the National Assembly during this time. 
 
Figure 7.5: Questions Asked by MPs in 2013 
 
 
The declining number of questions raised by MPs to the Minister of Energy continues to persist 
in the year 2014 as well. Forty-one questions were raised, in which twenty-two were unrelated to 
the current study as they focused on electricity. Three were enquiries on policy implementation 
progress, while one question was with regards to beefing-up human capital. The reader must bear 
in mind that human capacity is one crucial input that assists in achieving policy target. Human 
capacity also entails bridging the gender imbalance wherein race and disadvantaged people as 
stipulated in the Affirmative Action Act and in the BEE Code of Good Practice, must benefit in 
the industry. Seemingly, it was emerging that the DoE was experiencing human capital 
shortages; hence some of the targets were not fulfilled during this year. In the 2014 period only 
one question thus far is raised on security of liquid fuel supply, dropping significantly from the 
previous year. Enquiries related to transparency increased by 4% as compared to the previous 
year. Of importance to note is that, following up on policy implementation progress has been 
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seldom at 2% throughout the entire five-year period. What this means is that in the entire five-
year period, oversight and accountability on selected policy objective of ensuring HDSA 
transformation has been very minimal.   
 
Figure 7.6: Questions asked by MPs in 2014 
 
 
When it comes to question period, the PPCE placed more focus on electricity, and less on 
oversight over the petroleum industry. Figure 7.1 confirms this claim as 92% of questions placed 
more focus on electricity. As such, most of the questions related to electricity that were directed 
to the Minister of Energy were referred back to the Ministry of Public Enterprise for answering. 
In this regard, the PPCE lacked a clear framework to give effect to policy objectives and its 
implementation regarding HDSA transformation. There was little emphasis on questions related 
to this. This means that there is a huge disjuncture between the activities that the Executive 
branch conducts when it comes to HDSA transformation and the questions posed by 
Parliamentarians. Furthermore, follow-up questions on licensing, as an engine to ensure 
transformation, are very seldom throughout the years. In addition, as noted in the study question 
period, which is part of oversight activity also, must aim at pressuring the Executive branch to 
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expeditiously table policies before the National Assembly. In this instance there was the 
expectation that during the five-year period the Executive branch would have tabled a number of 
policies. Instead in the five-year period, only one policy saw the light of the National Assembly, 
in order to stabilise governability of the industry. This means that the question period did not 
benefit policy approval success either. The Report of Portfolio Committee on Energy on its 
activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (2009-2014: 7) agrees as it points to low rate of 
inputs on members’ statements and motions except for the moderate number of questions to 
Ministers, which still had a low through-put on energy-specific questions.  
 
Another issue is that the Portfolio Committee on Energy lacked the ability to compare apples 
with apples in order to improve institutional performance during its question time. Thus, if there 
are agreed upon performance measures and targets between the Executive and the Parliament, 
question time should be guided by this in order to unearth relevant questions. The Report of 
Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (2009-
2014) admits that the PPCE specifically had no guidance emanating from the signed annual plans 
committed upon between the Department and its agencies in discharging oversight, and 
therefore, the ability to hold the Executive to account never materialised at all. Issues underlined 
here have made oversight and accountability, in terms of questioning, to be minimally felt, 
especially for the performance of petroleum industry in terms of ensuring HDSA transformation. 
The next element to be discussed and analysed is committee hearings. 
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7.2.2 Committee hearings  
Committee hearings are also a standard tool to wield oversight and accountability over the 
Executive branch and state-owned Companies. This entails executing inquiries into specific 
issues which may include taking submissions, hearing witnesses, going through evidence, 
discussing matters in detail and formulating conclusions and recommendations (World 
Resources Institute, 2009: 8). However, as the study unfolds it will be demonstrated that even 
though Parliamentarians give recommendations on certain issues, the Executive branch they 
monitor barely takes these into consideration. For instance some recommendations are on policy 
content itself in which Ministerial directive is required. The point of the matter here is that 
political issues should be addressed politically and by politicians. Committees are therefore seen 
to be a convenient vehicle for this activity, and according to the World Resources Institute 
(2009), by concentrating on specific subjects automatically defaults to benefits on specialisation.  
 
The PPCE ran a number of public hearings on topical issues arising in Parliament prior to 2014 
elections. In order to ensure that the PPCE had a clear picture in its guidance to the Department 
of Energy, the Committee facilitated numerous public hearings and stakeholder meetings on 
selected issues related to upstream and downstream petroleum in the five-year period. The 
researcher is concerned with the latter stream. In 2010, the PPCE for example held public 
hearings on the revised Liquid Fuels Charter in order to get input from affected stakeholders. In 
2011, however, there were no public hearings conducted by the PPCE. In 2012 three public 
hearings were held on the electricity distribution industry (not related to the study). In the same 
year, two public hearings were made on energy efficiency (not related to the study). The PPCE 
furthermore, in 2012 held energy stakeholder meetings on transformation in the petroleum 
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Industry. In 2013, one public hearing was held on energy efficiency. In 2014 one public hearing 
was made on possible transformation of the oil and gas industry. The PPCE held hearings on the 
upstream oil and gas industry early in 2014 where industry players were given the opportunity to 
air their views on matters related to transformation (Report of the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament, 2009-2014: 38). In the researcher’s 
view, Committee hearings conducted by PPCE initially were not aligned with policy objectives 
that the petroleum industry sought to address. However, hearings related to policy objectives 
such as ensuring HDSA transformation intensified only at the beginning of 2014 when elections 
were imminent.  
 
While this is not wrong, the researcher thinks that if Parliamentarians are serious about 
transformation, following up on this policy objective should have been intensified from the 
beginning of the five-year period, not towards the end. The researcher also recognises the extent 
to which these committee hearings contributed to the facilitation of policy input from the public 
and in allowing Parliamentarians to understand policy implementation challenges much better. 
The Committee hearings are viewed by the researcher as an umbilical cord between the 
Executive, the Parliamentarians and civil society. However, some challenges faced by 
Parliamentarians in conducting Committee hearings should also be squarely examined. The main 
obstacle confronting this crucial role is chronic absenteeism of Committee members, due to 
multiple memberships of other Committees. The Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy 
on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (May 2009 – March 2014), voices this 
frustration, thus “multiple memberships of MP’s to various Parliamentary Committees has 
deprived the Portfolio Committee on Energy of opportunities to maximise its performance”. This 
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means that in many instances members are double or triple booked to other Committees where 
they hold memberships, and wherein they must also wield oversight and accountability. The 
issue is that even though there are such multiple bookings, it is unrealistic to attend all at once. 
For example, the researcher observed over the years, a constant attender will be the Chairperson 
of the Committee and one or two other Parliamentarians to create a forum for discussion. At 
times there will not be a single member from the opposition parties to harness constructive 
discussion. The researcher sees this as lack of support from team members because the 
Chairperson alone does not form a Portfolio Committee, especially in a democratic country like 
South Africa. Considering the technical nature of the petroleum industry, lack of this crucial 
support should be seen as harming the very same institutional architecture of oversight and 
accountability. Not only this, but also human morale is destroyed, because how does one or two 
Members of Parliament hold this huge industry to account for actions taken?  
 
The implication of this is that since Parliamentarians also have their own schedule of 
performance which is strictly five years, they may be pressurised at times to vote on crucial 
issues they have no deep intimacy with. Then the researcher observes an emerging trend thus; 
…‘Going with the flow syndrome’ as it appears that present members are seen to represent the 
views of those that are absent. These emerging behavious suggests what institutional theorists 
termed punctuated equilibria discussed extensively in Chapter two. The institutional theorists’ 
view obtains that formal and informal rules could surface within institution because human 
beings are generally social constructs. As claimed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147) 
institutions can be found everywhere, from handshakes to marriages to strategic-planning 
departments, among other things. The study refers to the concept of ‘uBuntu’ or ‘oneness’, which 
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appears to play a big role inside the Parliament. North (1990: 20) admits that formal rules are an 
important part of the institutional framework, but only a ‘part’. To work effectively they must be 
complemented by informal constraints such as conventions and norms of behaviour. New norms 
of behaviour are bound to frequently develop because institutions are in a constant equilibrium. 
However, in harmonising institutional architecture uBuntu could be embraced but, politicians 
may at times fail to draw the line due to the history of the country that it embodies, which 
instinctively drives them to support each other against the opposition. This is the case in 
Zimbabwe as the first democratic President is still the President of the country from 1980 until 
to-date. Opposition parties in Zimbabwe are at times detained, jailed or ousted out of Parliament. 
In order to achieve this, history is brought to the fore and this cripples every construct of 
oversight and accountability. The inference is that, conducting robust oversight and 
accountability could be a frightening activity in such an environment. This suggests that while 
such rules of action may have connotations of morality, they do not by definition suggest what 
March and Olsen (2009: 10) term ‘moral heroism’ because, “rules of appropriateness can also 
underlie atrocities of action” (North, 1990: 20). The reader should remember the argument made 
by historical institutional theorists in Chapter Two, that critical junctures or significant change is 
hard to alter because of resistance that it may experience. It is a challenge in South Africa to 
employ oversight robustly because psychologically the enemy (which is the opposition) is seen 
to want to return to the past. Therefore, uBuntu is shown towards fellow ‘comrades,’ while this 
indirectly weakens oversight and accountability. A challenge in balancing formal and informal 
institutions is furthermore observed as it appears that informal rules take precedence. As 
Parliamentarians also process legislation in conducting activities in the petroleum industry, the 
next discussion unpacks this component. 
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7.2.3 Processing legislation 
Policies and legislation are compiled by government officials at the Executive branch even 
though they are initially political ideas. Upon given a go ahead by the Executive branch, the 
legislation will be tabled before the PPCE for consideration. In so doing, the PPC initially 
coordinates public hearings for policy input or proposed Bills and Charters. In order to ensure 
that policy input receives attention to the intended groups, the PPCE would place advertisements 
in national newspapers and regional newspapers, calling for written submissions. The 
Committee, furthermore, paves a way for different stakeholders to make oral presentations on 
their written submissions. However, in certain circumstances the Portfolio Committees would 
facilitate workshops on the legislation in order to enhance its understanding of the policy 
content, and in the petroleum industry this is important due to the technical and complex nature 
of the sector. Once all processes are finalised and parties agree to policy content (sometimes not 
all agree), the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee would table the policy before the National 
Assembly for further debate and consideration. Subsequent to this, the relevant Minister will 
seek approval through voting in the National Assembly, before the policy goes to the President 
for signing it into law. The challenge is that on numerous occasions, even with little debate on 
the proposed legislation, the National Assembly would allow policy to go through voting. And 
because the ruling party holds a strong two-third majority, this means that policies do not get 
stuck at this stage. The researcher views this on its own as oppressing constructive debate, as this 
would benefit policy more. Bryan and Hoffman (2007: 34) agree, arguing that the ruling party 
domination within Parliament prevents further development of a culture of critical oversight and 
accountability. It is paramount to know how the PPCE has performed in terms of processing 
legislation that impact on the petroleum industry of South Africa in the past five years.  
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The PPCE over the 2010-2014 period conducted extensive work in processing policies, 
regulations and strategies that impact the petroleum industry of South Africa in order to ensure 
that they are aligned with national development imperatives, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals, Government Outcomes and the Strategic Outcomes-Orientated Goals and 
the Strategic Integrated Projects, including directives from State of the Nation Address, mainly 
on energy related issues (Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities 
undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament, 2009-2014: 30). The PPCE furthermore focused on the 
Independent System and Market Operator Bill, outstanding legislation and policy documentation 
with regard to energy planning, electricity and hydrocarbon policies. According to the Report of 
the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (2009-
2014: 30) the Committee processed the Petroleum Regulation and assessed petroleum licensing, 
pricing and compliance. The PPCE also assessed related policy instruments such as the Liquid 
Fuels Infrastructure Roadmap, the Basic Fuel Price, the Biofuels Strategy and the Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas Regulation  (Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities 
undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament, 2009-2014: 38). It is important to note that, as these policy 
instruments are compiled by the Executive branch, processing them is done in conjunction with 
affected stakeholders. 
 
Overall, the majority of the engagements of the PPCE stems from the Energy Act of 2008, as it 
encompasses the objectives of the State to ensure energy security and diversity for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation (Portfolio Committee on Energy Legacy Report: 41) through 
transformation. The PPCE claims that it assessed the programmes and alignment of the 
programmes to the Energy Act. Throughout the five-year period, the PPCE was also regularly 
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briefed on the formulation and review of the Energy policies by the DoE during regular quarterly 
report updates and annually during the presentations of their annual reports and five-year 
strategic plans (Portfolio Committee on Energy Legacy Report, 2009-2014: 42). Output achieved 
with regard to legislation processing is discussed next.  
 
The output of the legislation process conducted by the Portfolio Committee on Energy is 
portrayed in Table 7.2. In 2010 and 2011 there were no policies introduced to MPs by the 
Executive branch. In 2012, one policy document (ISMO Bill) dragged up to 2014 in which it was 
finally recommended to the National Assembly 
.  
Table 7.2: Legislation processing in relation to transformation 
Year  Name of 
legislation  
Tagging  Objectives Completed/ not completed  Targeted on 
transformatio
n 
2009/10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2010/11 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2011/12 1 S75 To provide for the 
establishment of an 
Independent System 
and Market Operator 
as a state-owned entity 
which will provide an 
independent system 
operation to ensure 
safe, secure and 
efficient operation of 
the integrated power 
system, trading of 
Completed (reported on the Bill to 
the House) 
N/A 
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electricity at wholesale 
level 
2012/13 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2013/14 1 (recommitted) S76 (Same as above) 
(ISMO)  
Completed (reported on the Bill to 
the House) 
N/A 
Source: Portfolio Committee on Energy Legacy Report (May 2009 – March, 2014: 54) 
 
The Legacy report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy (2009-2014) contends that the DoE, on 
a number of occasions, delayed the processing of Bills, which resulted in many Bills remaining 
unprocessed. This means that amendments to the PLFC were not completed either, thus holding 
implementing institutions back where HDSA transformation is concerned. Of note, processing 
policies by Parliamentarians involves the past two activities already discussed as well. This 
means that no matter how hard Committee hearings and questioning were conducted; they did 
not deter poor performance by the Executive branch. It is here that the Executive must account 
for poor performance, but the Parliamentary Committee appears to be lacking teeth in enforcing 
this. Accountability should be the pillar of legitimate and effective public administration and 
good governance (Blind, 2014: 84). This means that where accountability is weak, poor 
performance and governance is highly likely to persist. 
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There are other challenges that the PPCE faced during the five-year period in processing 
legislation. Among these is the disjointment of policies tabled by the Executive branch with the 
expectation of the ruling party policies and strategies (Report of the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament, 2009-2014: 8). To remind the 
reader, Parliamentarians represent interests of their constituencies, hence it is important that 
party wishes are translated into policies. It becomes apparent that delays in processing Bills are 
caused by prolonged debates and disagreements in finding a common ground between the 
Executive and Legislative branch, or between the policy formulator and the implementer. The 
PPCE had the biggest challenge therefore in making meaningful and envisaged output, where 
legislation processing is concerned. Next, oversight visits as one of another way of wielding 
oversight and accountability is assessed. 
 
7.2.4 Oversight visits  
Oversight visits in the petroleum industry are one way of monitoring compliance to policies as 
outlined in the National Energy Act and Liquid Fuels Empowerment Charter, among other 
statute. As noted earlier in the study, the Charter outlines how transformation targeted at HDSA 
must benefit South Africans evenly. Oversight visits entails that Portfolio Committees would 
visit areas where implementation takes place so that they have a practical view of progress made 
with regards to policy objectives. Oversight visits also suggests that Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committees are able to communicate with affected communities to gauge whether promises 
made by licence holders are adhered to as per the LFEC, among other things. Upon finding non-
compliance Committees recommend redress and have powers to summon offenders to 
Parliament for questioning. In cases where non-compliance persists in terms of policies 
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pertaining to the petroleum industry, the Committees have powers to apply for the withdrawal of 
licence. The criteria for oversight visits in South Africa are three-pronged: visit the targeted 
project, meet the service providers, and meet the local community (www.pmg.org.za). The latter 
is very important in the sense that communication barriers are surmounted between government 
and its citizens. Also it allows the legislative branch to assess the impact of programme/project 
implementation to the intended groups. As Committees conduct sites visits they also assess value 
for money in order to determine not just whether funds were spent appropriately, but whether 
government programmes/projects obtained their anticipated results within the available funds. 
 
It is paramount to specifically unpack areas visited for oversight as this will provide an 
opportunity to assess whether the conducted visits were in-line with the policy objectives such as 
ensuring HDSA transformation. Evidence shows that indeed the PPCE conducted oversight visits 
in various areas all over South Africa in the fourth sitting of Parliament. Among the areas visited 
include the British Petroleum (BP) and Easigas, as part of research for the Gas Amendment Bill 
(Oversight Forum: Committee News From the People’s Parliament, Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, 2013: 18). The Committee visited state-owned and funded enterprises such as 
the Medupi power station, the Gautrain, the Bus Rapid Transit System, Nissan SA in Gauteng, 
and the Small Enterprise Finance Agency to monitor their impact on local economic 
development (Oversight Forum: Committee News From the People’s Parliament, Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa, 2013: 20). Some visits conducted sought to assess availability and 
distribution of Liquefied Petroleum Gas, particularly for the indigent communities. Furthermore, 
visits were made to assess the distribution of infrastructure in the entire Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
value-chain, mainly in informal settlements. The PPCE assessed implementation of the Liquefied 
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Petroleum Gas Regulations and conducted oversight visits on two pilot projects implemented in 
Atteridgeville and Tweefontein (Oversight Forum: Committee News From the People’s 
Parliament, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2013: 36). The Portfolio Committee on 
Energy furthermore conducted oversight visits on indigent households using Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas for cooking purposes and further visited gas distribution companies to gain some 
insights into the issues related to gas distribution in South Africa. More oversight visits were 
conducted to relevant institutions of learning that have installed technology for educational 
purposes in order to attract learners to study petroleum industry specifics.  
 
In order to bring closure to audit findings and implementation of recommendations made on 
Liquid Fuels Charter Audit Report of 2011, the PPCE continuously visited various site areas to 
assess whether transformation was made, particularly in relation to skills, technology transfer 
and B-BBEE procurement (Oversight Forum: Committee News From the People’s Parliament, 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2013: 34). With regard to this, the Committee 
engaged the industry players and experts regularly, with the aim of understanding 
implementation hurdles from a stakeholder point of view. Oversight was also conducted on the 
downstream liquid fuels sector with input by wholesalers, storage sub-sectors and retailers 
(Oversight Forum: Committee News From the People’s Parliament, Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa, 2013: 34). Indeed, the Committee managed to visit areas that were specifically 
relevant with regards to policy objectives of ensuring HDSA transformation. However, the 
problem is that the Committee took a random approach in conducting site visits with no specific 
template to guide it, so that it can notice change. The challenge with this is that historical 
development impact is untraceable. The researcher’s view is that activities conducted by the 
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Executive branch should provide the PPCE a starting point in order to track whether licences 
issued are put to use. In this manner there is an ability to track sub-programme linkages to 
output. Table 7.3 captures the output of what the PPCE achieved in the past five years in relation 
to HDSA transformation, mainly for the petroleum industry of South Africa. Following this the 
study reflects oversight and accountability on the DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria. It is 
paramount to note the below suggested logframe.  
 
Table 7.3: Suggested logframe to unpack performance by PC on Energy 
PC on 
Energy 
Strategic 
Mandate  
Component Indicators  Means of verification Assumptions 
Goal -Promote the design and 
implementation of broad 
based sector or industry 
empowerment 
programmes with clearly 
defined targets based on 
agreements between 
stakeholders enactment. 
-Ensure 25% ownership 
by HDSA. 
-Portfolio Committee on 
Energy Legacy Report, 
(2009-2014). 
-Petroleum Liquid Fuels 
Empowerment Charter. 
-Department of Energy 
website. 
-The legacy to show 
areas of improvement 
where transformation is 
effected. 
Purpose  -Transformation by HDSA 
within 10 years of Liquid 
Fuels Charter enactment 
 
-Number of beneficiary 
site areas visited from 
2009-2014. 
-Number of monitored 
areas for progress made 
on the utilization of 
Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas as well as 
transforming the sector. 
-Site visits to premises 
where transformation is 
implemented. 
-Portfolio Committee on 
Energy Legacy Report, 
(2009-2014) 
-The business or skills 
of each beneficiary will 
continue into the future. 
-Accurate recording of 
all areas visited and site 
reports are updated at 
the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group 
(PMG) website. 
Output -In relation to HDSA 
transformation in the 
liquid fuels sector, the 
-Number of actual 
visited areas where 
transformation took 
-Committee Oversight visit 
reports. 
-Accurate recording of 
all areas visited and site 
reports are updated at 
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number of site areas 
visited from 2009-2014 
are: 17 
place. the PMG website. 
Activities   
1. Question period 
Inputs  
 Credible 
information  
 
 PMG website 
 
Data of questions is 
accurately  captured   
 2. Committee 
hearings 
 Funding  
 Venue 
 Supporting 
staff 
 Industry 
experts 
 Advertisements 
of hearings are 
sent out 
nationally and 
regionally to the 
public. 
 Committee 
reports. 
 The public 
attends 
hearings  
 
 
 There is 
record of 
attendance  
 3. Processing 
legislation  
 Experts in the 
area of 
petroleum.  
 Credible 
input from 
affected 
stakeholders.  
 Table the 
Legislation 
before the 
National 
Assembly for 
noting. 
 Public 
hearings are 
held 
whenever 
there is 
legislation to 
be processed.  
 4. Oversight visits  Experts to 
explain 
operations. 
 Community 
members are 
required to 
explain if 
service 
delivery is 
indeed 
impacting on 
their lives.   
 Transport to 
communities 
 Language 
 Site visits 
Committee 
reports. 
 Availability 
of experts 
 Availability 
of community 
members (i.e 
Chiefs) 
 Accurate 
recording of 
site visits 
available at 
PMG. 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
translators 
 Funding  
 5. Recording and 
capturing of 
Portfolio 
Committee 
meetings and 
site visits 
reports.  
 Recording 
and report 
writing staff  
 Portfolio 
Committee on 
Energy Legacy 
Report (2009-
2014) 
 Report 
accurately 
captured and 
records 
available on 
PMG website 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
7.3 OECD/ DAC evaluation criteria of oversight and accountability effectiveness in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa 
The researcher here evaluates oversight and accountability effectiveness utilizing the OECD / 
DAC Evaluation criteria. All five measurement tools will be used, thus relevance, effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability. It should be noted that Parliamentary Portfolio Committees 
do not have performance contracts where for example indicators and baseline information would 
be traced in order to assess its performance. So, in terms of evaluating performance of oversight 
and accountability wielded by PPCE using the DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria, the evaluation 
will be based on the gap between output and outcome of activities conducted. The Report of the 
Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
 Parliament (2009-
2014) will assist the researcher to supplement required information in this regard. In future the 
OECD / DAC evaluation criteria would enable Parliamentarians to track where they can make 
improvements in terms of wielding oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of 
South Africa.  
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Table: 7.4 DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria of oversight and accountability effectiveness in 
the petroleum industry of South Africa  
Strategic Mandate of PC on 
Energy 
Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency  Impact  Sustainability  
Promote the design and 
implementation of broad based 
sector or industry 
empowerment programmes 
with clearly defined targets 
based on agreements between 
stakeholders enactment. 
-Highly relevant.  -Partially 
achieved. 
-Partially 
achieved. 
-Partially 
felt. 
-Promoting 
empowerment 
programmes 
should entail 
addressing 
challenges on 
time for future 
sustainability. 
Question period  -Partially relevant 
to the petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned. 
-Output 
partially 
achieved.  
 
 
 
 
 
-Partially 
focused on 
petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned: 
2010: 5% 
2011: 0% 
2012: 3% 
2013: 4% 
2014: 0% 
-Minimally 
felt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-When there is 
lack skilled 
supporting staff 
such as Content 
Advisers and 
experts, PPCE 
may not get 
accurate advice 
on the questions 
to ask. This in 
turn provides 
minimum 
oversight on 
HDSA 
transformation, 
threatening it 
sustainability.  
 
Committee hearings -Partially relevant 
to the petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned. 
-Output 
partially 
achieved.  
 
-Partially 
focused on 
petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned: 
-Minimally 
focused to 
the petroleum 
industry 
-Sustainability 
will be realised 
only if more 
focus is placed 
on HDSA 
transformation.  
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2010: 1 
2011: 0 on 
HDSA 
transformation  
2012: 6 but 1 on 
HDSA 
transformation  
2013: 0 on 
HDSA 
transformation  
2014: 1 
Processing legislation -Partially relevant 
to the petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned. 
-Output 
partially 
achieved.  
 
-Partially 
processed all 
Bills through to 
the National 
Assembly (NA): 
From 2010 - 
2014 only one 
Bill 
recommended to 
NA out of five. 
Amendments to 
the PLFC are not 
effected. 
-Partially 
felt. 
 
-Governability 
of the petroleum 
industry is based 
on Laws and if 
these are missing 
sustainability is 
threatened. 
Oversight visits -Highly relevant 
to the petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned. 
-Objectives met 
(Portfolio 
Committee on 
Energy Legacy 
Report 2009-
2014: 46). 
 
-Achieved: 
Objective to 
focus on 
petroleum 
industry where 
HDSA 
transformation is 
concerned, is 
met: 
2010: 2 
2011: 6 
2012: 2 
-High 
impact. 
-Availability of 
funds to conduct 
oversight 
effectively.  
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2013: 6 
2014: 1 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
7.3.1 Relevance 
According to the researcher the specific strategic mandate placed upon the Portfolio Committee 
on Energy to monitor the petroleum industry is highly relevant in the sense that it is in line with 
the policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. However the activities on their own lack 
focus on these policy objectives due to output received. When analysing relevance it is crucial to 
unpack why certain issues lack the necessary relevance. When it comes to question period it 
becomes clear that the focus is heavily embedded on electricity. The mere fact that question time 
on HDSA transformation received a total of 12% of attention throughout the five year period, 
against the rest given to electricity for the same period, demonstrates partial relevance to this 
crucial policy objective. Furthermore, the DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria demonstrated above 
claims minimal relevance of Committee hearings when it comes to the petroleum industry, 
mainly on HDSA transformation. For example, throughout the five-year period, Committee 
hearings focusing on HDSA transformation were 3 out of 6. On the legislation processing front, 
relevance is judged by the ability of Committees to process successfully all policies tabled before 
it. The DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria shown above suggest a huge gap between envisaged 
output and the actual outcome. For instance, there are about are about six policy instruments 
during the five year period in which the Committee had to push for these documents to appear 
before the National Assembly. Out of these policy instruments only one, (thus, ISMO Bill) 
received recommendation to be tabled at the National Assembly during the five-year period, 
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which in itself has yet to be enacted in law. Site visits show high relevance to the policy 
objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. A total of seventeen site visits were conducted in 
the five-year period. The researcher acknowledges this success as Parliamentary rules allow only 
four site visits for the entire five-year period (www.parliament.org.za). Next, effectiveness of 
oversight and accountability is analysed.  
 
7.3.2 Effectiveness 
In terms of analysing the effectiveness of oversight and accountability it becomes apparent, from 
the DAC/ OEDC evaluation point of view, that the PPCE partially achieved output since 
oversight is placed less on the petroleum industry of South Africa relating to the three 
components of: question period, committee hearings and legislation processing. To be frank, the 
performance of the PPCE has been generally poor and is deemed ineffective. This is in relation 
to the policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. It should also be noted that the PPCE 
achieved its objective related to site visits. To make this achievement the Portfolio Committee on 
Energy was clear on what to oversee, namely, evidence that shows where implementation of 
HDSA transformation took place. Next efficiency of oversight and accountability is unpacked.   
 
7.3.3 Efficiency  
However, while oversight activity may have contributed meaningfully in acquiring first-hand 
knowledge and in fostering a culture of performance when it comes to site visits, financial 
challenges, absence of prominent community leaders to accompany the PPCE to areas where 
transformation took place and general poor cooperation by various stakeholders, hampered this 
activity (Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken during the 4
th
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Parliament, 2009-2014: 68). This lack of cooperation demonstrates that relationships between the 
PPCE and communities were not built from the outset. Other challenges that faced the 
Committee relate to both of technical and operational issues, and these prevented the Committee 
working to its full potential. Some challenges however relate to poor planning and the 
organisation of personnel to accompany the Committee to implementation sites (Portfolio 
Committee on Energy Legacy Report, 2009-2014: 68) so that they give explanation of what has 
changed since implementation commenced. In some cases the Committee experienced language 
barriers in which translators had not been arranged. There were also situations where there was 
not enough information available on the sites being visited, and this made oversight visits a 
challenging exercise (Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken 
during the 4
th
 Parliament, 2009-2014: 68). Furthermore, the researcher observes that the PPCE 
overlooked the rural areas where actual problems that involve the middle-man are rife (explained 
in the previous chapter). Politicians are supposed to conduct workshops in rural areas, to among 
other things educate the poor about their economic rights so that they can participate 
meaningfully in the petroleum industry.  
 
It is furthermore paramount to note skills shortages as another challenge faced the Committee in 
its attempt to wield efficient oversight and accountability. The composition of the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee overseeing and holding the industry to account warrants unravelling. In the 
Parliament prior to May 2014 Committee members for the PPCE were twelve, whereby the 
African National Congress (ANC), a party that holds majority seats in Parliament was led by 
seven members, while five were the members of opposition parties. Within the Portfolio 
Committee on Energy is the ANC Study Group on Energy, which studies policy related issues, 
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aimed at ensuring alignment of petroleum industry policies with the ANC policies, the Freedom 
Charter, decisions taken at Cabinet Lekgotla and various party resolutions emanating from 
decisions made in conferences. Such study groups are crucial as they monitor policy relevance in 
terms of meeting desired outcomes. It is the duty of politicians to monitor the progress of policy 
implementation so that citizen’s needs are delivered as promised. In South Africa, Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committees are an institution which is seen to be the only effective way to organise and 
coordinate their involvement in this complex industry.  
 
However, there is no prescribed formula in electing public officials such as Parliamentarians that 
conduct oversight. As such, education background is not a prerequisite for Parliamentarians in 
South Africa. However, technical knowledge of the industry is required so that oversight and 
accountability is channeled correctly. For example, under normal circumstances Parliamentarians 
will not have acquired technical knowledge such as that Geologists would have. As such, this 
knowledge would require an external expert to be part of supporting staff to the Portfolio 
Committee. Among other things, the importance of experts provides a stamp of authority since 
their views are more likely to be taken seriously by Parliamentarians. The researcher furthermore 
holds a view that, as Parliamentary Portfolio Committees also oversees government budget, 
public finance knowledge is essential so that they can interrogate the balance sheet presented to 
them by institutions they monitor. This knowledge requirement prompted other nations to have a 
Budget office in which independent advice and support to Members of Parliament is provided 
(National Audit Office, 2011:11). In South Africa the Auditor General’s annual report is subject 
to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts scrutiny and so are those of departments and 
Committees. 
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Parliamentarians must also be familiar with the policy processes of this industry, from policy 
formulation, to policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This knowledge may assist 
Parliamentarians to assess promptly, whether policy objectives speak to input and activities, and 
whether these policy objectives are yielding the intended outcome. Furthermore, Portfolio 
Committees require high-quality report writers to compile reports on activities conducted, 
conclusions and recommendations made during Committee meetings and upon conducting site 
visits where implementation takes place. Furthermore, while the PPCE later had supporting staff, 
this took too long to materialise. For example, the Committee started its office in the 2009/10 
financial year, but it had no researcher and no content advisor until later in 2012. This is one of 
the impediments that impacted negatively on the performance of the Portfolio Committee in 
conducting oversight and accountability effectively.    
 
Furthermore, Parliamentarians rely on the information they obtain from the Departments or state-
owned Companies they oversee. The independence of the Auditor General in terms of 
scrutinising the budgets for example, is noted. However, Parliamentarians may not have 
independent scrutiny of documents unrelated to finances and those that are technical. This 
argument is based on what the researcher observed, wherein, MPs lacked technical knowledge of 
the industry operations especially during the early months of taking office. For example, some 
MPs could not understand what to drill a ‘well’ entails, because ‘well’ on its own is a common 
English vocabulary used daily in forming a sentence. Therefore, to effectively conduct oversight 
in this regard, simple to understand and credible information is among other enablers. Personnel 
that must wield oversight need to be capacitated with correct technical and non-technical 
information in order to ensure that oversight and accountability is channeled to the intended 
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direction. Lahn et al. (2009: 55) concurs; in the petroleum industry, the investors/operators 
provide the information and feedback to enable appropriate regulatory standards and policies. 
There is also people/society contribution to policy-making debates, which are seen to be 
ultimately responsible for the approval of the chosen policy, assist in the monitoring and 
regulation of operations in the sector through media investigation, industry analysis and direct 
communication with the sector (Lahn et al., 2009). This does not end there; the researcher 
observes information about company performance disseminated through quarterly business 
updates and other communication channels provided by companies. This entails debates about 
how far the company is in implementing government mandates and what challenges it faces as 
implementation unfolds. In this instance, a dichotomy between institutional versus social 
accountability is observed in the sense that institutions of accountability such as Parliament 
among many others, facilitate policy dialogue with affected parties, in which the media may play 
a significant role in exacting accountability.  
 
So the input highlighted by the researcher sought to support effective oversight and 
accountability over the performance of petroleum industry of South Africa, so that policy 
objectives such as ensuring HDSA transformation is realised. With regard to input so far 
financing, skilled personnel and credible information has prevented MPs from discharging their 
role efficiently. Next, impact is discussed.   
 
7.3.4 Impact  
Furthermore, when it comes to activities such as question time, committee hearings and 
legislation processing impact has been minimally felt. The latter activity is dependent entirely on 
 
 
 
 
260 
 
the Executive branch in which it appears that no one is held to account for this poor performance. 
Site visits also could not deter non-compliance at times and has not resulted in effective 
performance in the petroleum industry of South Africa, at all. The researcher further states that 
balancing oversight and accountability may depend upon deep knowledge that Parliamentarians 
have with that particular sector, as this determines their focus. The implication of this is that 
institutions are not held to account in areas that receive poor or no oversight.  
 
Furthermore, Parliamentary Portfolio Committees summon offenders to Parliament for 
answering whenever there is a need. However, observations noted by the researcher in oversight 
activity placed on Parliamentarians is indecisiveness or weakened authoritative power to assist 
institutions when experiencing challenges during policy implementation phase and neither are 
punitive measures employed where there is poor performance, especially with regard to HDSA 
transformation. The Report of the Portfolio Committee on Energy on its activities undertaken 
during the 4
th
 Parliament (2009-2014) also notes that at times it receives partial responses from 
the Department of Energy on issues recommended by the Committee through Parliament. Its 
oversight power has proven to be weak in this regard as the Executive branch does not always 
take cognisance of the recommendations given by the Portfolio Committee. The question time, 
committee hearings, legislative processing and oversight visits are also confirmed by the 
respondents to be weak in terms of unlocking policy implementation hurdles. For example, sixty-
six respondents were interviewed about the ability of these activities to assist policy 
implementation progress in the petroleum industry of South Africa. Figure 7.7 shows that 29% 
argue that there is impact made by these activities, in terms of unlocking challenges the industry 
faces, as some issues were escalated to the political level. Seventy percent of respondents argued 
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otherwise, as they stated that impact of oversight activities have not managed to unlock policy 
implementation challenges they experience. This means that there is a disjuncture between 
oversight activities and policy objectives in the sense that, employing these activities did not 
assist the industry to implement policy objectives effectively. Sustainability of oversight and 
accountability is next discussed. 
 
Figure 7.7: Ability to unlock policy implementation challenges 
 
 
7.3.5 Sustainability 
When it comes to sustainability it is clear that the role of Parliamentarians to provide oversight 
and accountability over the petroleum industry will still continue in the future. However, certain 
areas need to improve if the direction of policy implementation is to be sustainable, especially 
where HDSA transformation is concerned. In this regard, the researcher notes issues that threaten 
sustainability of the petroleum industry itself under Parliamentary monitoring in achieving 
HDSA transformation in the future. What threatens sustainability is a poor focus on this strategic 
policy imperative, as the study unveiled. One of these issues is the extent into which resources 
reach the intended beneficiaries in the process of transforming the industry. For example, some 
institutions implement this policy through what is called Corporate Social Investment (CSI). 
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Amundsen (2011: 8) posits that activities and funding schemes labelled corporate social 
responsibility have a potential to add to the corruption problems of the petroleum industry. While 
this may look like a noble idea, according to Amundsen (2011: 8), donations by multinational 
petroleum companies have a profit-maximisation motive and rationale. The argument is that, 
through branding and reputation management, involvement in social projects can improve their 
reputation and thereby make it easier to win contracts (Amundsen and Wiig, 2008: 6 cited in 
Amundsen, 2011). In other words this appears to be an institutionalised way of facilitating 
bribery, which many Parliamentarians fail to recognise. Basically, what Amundsen (2011) is 
trying to show here is that it is relatively easy to manoeuvre social projects into serving the 
political interests of the ruling party and the government, while camouflaging behind what is 
termed ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, which is highly promoted by the King III Report on 
Good Corporate Governance. The real challenge is that Parliamentarians who conduct oversight 
may not be privy to company’s information in order to detect and prevent these issues before 
they happen. This is so because information about oil companies’ social activities is quite 
opaque, and it is difficult to monitor what the oil companies are doing (Amundsen, 2011: 9).  In 
this way resources are likely to be driven towards unintended directions and thereby would not 
achieve policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. This threatens the sustainability of 
transformation.  
 
The next issue that requires attention is the business transactions under the umbrella of public-
private-partnership and the ability to discharge oversight and accountability effectively and in a 
sustainable manner. For example, this is the space where B-BBEE converges with bigger players 
and the public sector through the means of procurement. According to World Resources Institute 
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(2009: 14), opportunities for corruption in the petroleum industry are probable and they begin at 
the contracting or procurement phase where there are public-private partnerships. This is so 
because contracting and procurement in the industry is often done under a blanket of secrecy, 
with a potential to cause a triangle-conflict demonstrated in Figure 7. 8.  
 
Figure 7.8:    Triangle-conflict in petroleum industry 
  
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
What the triangle above shows is that government delegates to institutions the implementation of 
policy objectives, such as HDSA transformation. This means a contract is between the 
government and service provider, and further between the multinational oil company, joint 
venture and or local BEE or B-BBEE Company. The Corruption Perception Index (2013: 5) 
claims that oil and gas companies often hire third parties to manage their on-the ground 
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transactions. It is here that Parliamentarians are not privy to information and so, legislative 
oversight particularly is heavily prevented because; exercising control over third parties is a 
significant challenge. For example, numerous attempts made by opposition parties in the past 
five years to get transparency and access to these third party transactions failed, regardless of 
availability of Access to Information Act.   
 
Corruption Perception Index (2013: 5) shows that procurement is a key bribery and corruption 
risk area for the sector due to the high levels of expenditure involved in oil and gas projects. It is 
in this space that senior political leaders are viewed to take advantage by simply manipulating 
tenders to benefit large logistics companies for their private gain, and officials would give 
preference to companies owned by their cronies (Amundsen, 2010:14). The borderline is that 
companies require government permits and licences as a prerequisite for operations in the 
petroleum space. In so doing, companies are compelled to engage local government officials to 
secure and retain leases in order to conduct activities such as drilling, construction and the use of 
state-owned infrastructure (Corruption Perception Index, 2013: 9). Furthermore, companies in 
the petroleum industry must acquire Environmental Impact Assessments, Social Labour Plans 
and water licences in order to be allowed to operate. At most, the maximum waiting period for 
the facilitation of these licences is three months. Price Waterhouse Coopers (2013) agrees, as 
contenting that something that should take two days to go through government would take three 
months instead. The researcher’s assertion is that, while these laws are critical in conducting 
good corporate activities, there is a danger of falling into a trap as companies may be exposed to 
government officials seeking bribes in return for these licences. Furthermore, not only 
government officials may solicit bribes, influential and vocal community leaders, who may be 
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major communication points in the obtainance of these licences, may too seek bribes. Companies 
may fall into pray as they attempt to bypass customs bureaucracy inefficiencies and the related 
cost of delays to companies (Corruption Perception Index, 2013: 9). 
 
The researcher’s claim therefore is that oversight conducted by Parliamentarians may notice 
these activities less if there is a general lack of awareness about the operations of the industry 
and the Laws governing it. The researcher highlights this point because this means that those 
who have huge amount of money to solicit licences through bribery, stand a better chance of 
getting licences much quicker than those who may lack funds. In addition, weak monitoring of 
this area means that the poor remain poorer, while the rich are getting richer and this is what 
oversight and accountability should guard against. The institutional architecture should protect 
the poor by ensuring that resources are shared evenly, because this in turn bruises the policy 
objective goals of ensuring HDSA transformation. Parliamentarians need to strongly monitor 
policy implementation process. This means knowledge of the industry needs to be enhanced so 
that when Parliamentarians conduct site visits, they are aware of what to observe. In so doing, 
Parliamentarians need to know the dynamics that comes with the process of implementing 
government policy in the petroleum industry, so that oversight is wielded to counteract 
unintended negative outcomes. It should be noted that a challenge relating to corruption is that it 
induces disinvestments and may lead to job loss, thereby perpetuating the cycle of poverty.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that in South Africa the actions for Parliamentarians are regulated 
by Ethics Code of Conduct with regards to financial interests, gifts disclosures and disclosure of 
conflicts of interests among other things. Furthermore, companies that report to government are 
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required to abide by and apply similar Ethics Codes in conducting business. A point to note is 
that, regardless the existence of these rules of engagement, poor corporate governance does 
persist. For instance, PetroSA Board of Directors in 2010 fired its CEO due to tender-rigging and 
financial mismanagement. At the time the whistle-blower evidence showed links between 
politicians, businessmen and PetroSA Directors (Mail and Guardian, 26 April 2013). Similar 
incident happened in 2013 in the same company, which is dubbed by Mail and Guardian, 
‘Oilgate Two’. Hence some commentators view the oil industry as an ‘oily’ business. 
Additionally, the mere fact that a similar incident happened in the same company shows the 
extent of how weak oversight and accountability is, because these issues should have been 
detected as they were forthcoming. The issue at hand here is explained by Hughes (2012), thus;  
 
“It is thus probable that any emerging upward mobile economic class will exhibit some political 
affinity with the ruling party. The distinction in South Africa is the degree of party elite and new 
business elite alignment. Party membership, support and alignment are seen by many as an 
important element in securing financial success in both the private and public sectors. This 
phenomenon has given rise to the term ‘tenderpreneurs’, thus those who make a practice of 
winning lucrative contracts (including extractive sector) by virtue of their political connections,” 
Hughes (2012: 3). 
 
This on its own may redirect resources that were meant for the HDSA, to those who are 
politically connected. In the National Budget Vote Speech (2013), furthermore, the cumbersome 
nature of procurement services in South Africa is noted. The National Budget Vote Speech 
(2013) explains that in the present system, procurement transactions take place at too many 
localities and most contracts are short-term. Consequently, there are hundreds of thousands of 
transactions from a multitude of centres, in which there is little visibility over all these 
transactions (National Budget Vote Speech, 2013). Oversight becomes worse wherein company 
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operations are in remote areas since monitoring procurement controls are difficult. Corruption 
Perception Index (2013: 8) argues that often these sites are not connected to corporate systems 
and electronic controls and this limits management control.  
 
Lack of transparency basically is a major obstacle for effective oversight and accountability in 
the petroleum industry. It is apparent that transparency along the entire petroleum value-chain is 
essential in improving the governance and management of the industry in order to achieve policy 
objectives to the targeted groups. The researcher contends that where there is lack of 
transparency there cannot be any oversight and accountability and thereby the Parliamentarians 
role is made impossible. Transparency facilitates trust and legitimacy, which in turn opens 
various opportunities crucial in conducting business in the petroleum industry, because it induces 
investor confidence. However, some scholars argue that transparency in the petroleum industry is 
impossible due to the competitive nature of the business. Where competition is heightened, 
vested interests are likely to take centre stage and this is what the petroleum industry is fraught 
with. Vested interests rife in the industry are to be noted in the study as they disallow effective 
oversight and accountability.  
 
Furthermore, Parliamentarians themselves may not be immune to such vested interests because 
they are human beings who are social constructs, who at times may not know how to balance 
their oversight and accountability role. The researcher argues that it is highly probable that 
Parliamentarians may find themselves caught up in this web because they also form part of the 
society and they always face an uncertain future due to the fact that they are only employed for a 
period of five years contractually. The researcher puts this out as numerous Parliamentarians 
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who were overseeing the petroleum industry in the past have themselves turnout out to be 
entrepreneurs in the same space after their five year period elapsed. Some even resigned from 
their Parliamentary role for similar reasons. Scholars such as Marquard (2006) agree that the 
industry is impacted heavily by vested interests. A further example of vested interests in the 
petroleum industry could be drawn also from the Nigerian situation wherein multinational oil 
companies in 2013 were lobbying hard to have proposed fiscal terms in the Petroleum Industry 
Bill watered down, while politicians fought over how much the oil-producing community should 
directly benefit from production (Rice, 2013: 1). Similar to the Mineral Petroleum Development 
Bill of South Africa, the Petroleum Industry Bill of Nigeria has also been delayed and there is no 
certainty when it will be passed into law. This is the case because the petroleum industry is 
highly competitive and oil companies do not want to share wealth with communities where 
operations are, in order to address transformation objective. But government on the other hand 
has a role to protect communities by ensuring that policy directives address poverty in its 
different forms. While poor transparency and vested interests ravage the petroleum industry, 
coordination among institutions is paralysed.   
 
The inference is that the evolution of the industry complicates coordination, because the lines 
between private and public sector are becoming indistinct, causing oversight and accountability 
to be an extremely challenging exercise. The argument is that, while the relationship between 
private and public sector is supposed to be reciprocal, on the other hand coordination between 
institutions becomes more complex and complicated, and so, oversight and accountability is 
compromised. This is also in consideration of less attention paid by oversight on the petroleum 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
industry. Of importance to note is that this is the area paramount for driving transformation in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa and requires robust oversight and accountability.  
Summary of issues highlighted: 
 Resources to support oversight and accountability to operate in full capacity are weak and 
they are not linked to policy objectives; 
 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Energy oversight and accountability activities is 
partially linked to policy objectives such as HDSA transformation in the petroleum 
industry as more focus is placed on electricity;   
 Oversight over the petroleum industry is reactive and weak especially in monitoring 
activities in rural areas; 
 The complex nature of the industry disallows coordination among various institutions and 
this makes oversight and accountability an impossible activity to conduct; 
 Lack of transparency and vested interests disallows Parliamentary Portfolio Committees 
to employ oversight and accountability objectively and effectively; 
 Lack of knowledge about the petroleum industry deprives it effective oversight and 
accountability; 
 The Portfolio Committee on Energy lacks coercive or enforcing capacity and in turn, 
there is no answerability for poor performance by the Executive branch; 
 There is generally lack of independent oversight over the policy objective (HDSA 
transformation) because this role is given to the Minister of Energy and through her/him 
to Parliament.   
Best practice and conceptual framework of well-considered institutional architecture construct: 
Oversight and Accountability effectiveness is discussed in the next section.  
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7.4 Best Practice and conceptual framework of well-considered institutional architecture 
construct: Oversight and Accountability effectiveness 
The issue is that even though there is separation of power in South Africa it cannot be ignored 
that the Executive branch (Minister in particular) is not politically inclined with the legislative 
branch. There is basically no clear-cut independence of the two, politically, because the 
Executive branch reports to the majority party. According to the researcher this is what weakens 
oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa, among other things. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that behavious such as: secrecy and vested interests fraught in 
the petroleum industry display some form of path dependence, because they have been in 
existence since institutional formation. These behavious continue to exist in the current 
petroleum industry space and they threaten oversight and accountability sustainability. There 
appears to be a new behaviour named: uBuntu, which has been in existence in Africa for a while, 
but was hardly exercised in the petroleum industry space, mainly, inside Parliament. The new 
conduct of uBuntu converges with the old behaviours, further causing complications in managing 
institutional architecture, particularly where oversight and accountability is concerned, for 
improved policy implementation towards ensuring HDSA transformation.  
 
It should also be noted that in South Africa the constitution changed during a critical juncture 
(post-apartheid), wherein a constitutional democracy was adopted. However, it is clear from the 
findings gathered in the study that oversight and accountability wielded in the petroleum industry 
is driven more by a context of country’s political history than by designs of scripts associated 
with international best practice. This is with regards to oversight and accountability to monitor 
the Executive in implementing policy objective of ensuring HDSA transformation. This 
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oversight and accountability is wielded through the tools that are used by most Commonwealth 
countries. This on its own bears some characteristics of path dependence. However, it cannot 
entirely be ignored that some good results have been achieved as seemingly, the petroleum 
industry of today is much better than the petroleum industry prior to 1994. This is with regards to 
the extent of transformation attained so far. However, one could argue that more still needs to be 
done in terms of meeting the government’s goal of ensuring that poverty is alleviated through 
transformation, to which HDSA ownership should be observed.   
 
The researcher argues that, if oversight and accountability is to be effective at all in the 
petroleum industry of South Africa; Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and 
Cooperation, (C04); and Community (C01) Driven Oversight and Accountability (D1OA) with 
communities is crucial. This formula is unpacked;  
Effective (A + O) = C04 + C01 /D1OA 
(A + O)
e
 = C04 + C01 / D1OA 
(A + O)
e
 = C + C = C
2
 and 04 + 01 = 0
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The researcher’s assertion is that at the political level alone it is implausible to provide absolute 
effective oversight and accountability over the industry that is so complex.  Currently in South 
Africa oversight and accountability over the petroleum industry is supply-driven (top-down). In 
Chapter two of this current study, diagonal accountability was introduced as accountability 
driven by citizens among whom oversight committees are established at local or community 
level. The researcher argues that in order for oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
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industry to be effective supply-driven and demand-driven oversight and accountability should be 
acknowledged to complement each other. This claim is supported by Goetz and Gaventa (2001: 
57) as stating that “internal (government) and external (citizens/civil society) mechanisms of 
accountability can and should be mutually reinforcing”. Figure 7.1 demonstrates this claim 
deeply as it shows that accountability and oversight is a two-way response. Therefore in 
strengthening legislative oversight and accountability and links between parliamentarians, 
citizens and civil society organisations are important ways to enhance social or diagonal 
accountability. 
 
The Housing Sector of South Africa, for example, has a body dubbed ‘Abahlali Basemjondolo’ 
that provides social accountability. In this instance communities work as an umbilical-cord that 
bridge oversight and accountability between government and communities. In the petroleum 
industry of South Africa there is SAPIA which coordinates policy input directly with industry 
players and government and it plays an instrumental role in facilitating HDSA transformation. 
But this body is not an oversight and accounting body and its independence is questionable by 
some scholars. It was noted in the study that the Portfolio Committees does random oversight 
visits to communities where policy implementation takes place. But the PPCE at times does not 
know where to start, nor does it get reliable people that can accompany it to implementation 
sites. Even so, the researcher thinks that this is not enough because it is oversight and 
accountability that is done from top-down. However, some lessons could be learned from other 
countries that have put citizens at heart of transforming lives through the adoption of diagonal 
accountability in the petroleum sector. The diagonal accountability approach can also be applied 
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in the petroleum industry of South Africa as well for the purpose of ensuring HDSA 
transformation is achieved. 
 
In Ghana, for example, there is Ghana Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) which 
is a legally constituted body that brings together representatives of academia, NGOs, churches, 
traditional authorities and think-tanks to monitor and report on the oil sector (Shepherd, 2013: 
viii). The PIAC was established by the Ghanaian Petroleum Management Act to monitor 
compliance with the law, to act as a forum for public debate on oil issues and to undertake 
regular and independent assessment of management and spending of revenues. To show 
effectiveness of this body some key mile-stones warrant recognition.  In its 2012 Annual Report 
for example, the PIAC identified gaps in both surface rental payments and receipts from the 
Saltpond oil field. According to Bauer (2014: 1) citing Tayou (2012), action towards this was 
taken within two days, wherein “the Ministry of Energy issued a statement offering new 
information on royalty amounts paid in 2011 and the unpaid surface rental bill”. Furthermore, the 
2012 PIAC Annual Report raised concerns about overly optimistic petroleum revenue 
projections, which allowed for greater spending under Ghana’s fiscal rule (Bauer, 2014: 1 citing 
Tayou, 2012). Ever since this information emerged the Ministry of Finance sought to address this 
issue, in which the 2013 projections were generally considered to be more realistic (Bauer, 2014: 
1 citing Tayou, 2012). 
 
Chad also has Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Resources Pétrolières (CCSRP) which 
has a multi-stakeholder oversight committee with similar function to that of Ghana. It has a 
principal objective to ensure oil revenues are used to fight poverty (Shepherd, 2013: viii). This 
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oversight committee approves expenditures from the Chad fund and oversees the management 
and use of revenues from the Chad-Cameroon pipeline (Shepherd, 2013: viii). The CCSRP’s 
broad powers are enshrined in law as well, mainly to monitor production, budget and spending, 
among other things. Further to this, in the 2005 Annual Report of CCSRP highlighted ‘wells’ 
and schools that were paid for, but not completed and inflated costs of computers (Shepherd, 
2013: viii). This was a key factor that convinced the World Bank to suspend its programme in 
the country (Gary and Reisch, 2005 cited in Bauer, 2014: 2). This shows how strong this body is 
in ensuring answerability, which in turn will prevent future unwarranted behaviours. 
Furthermore, the Prince William Sound Citizen’s Advisory Committee in Alaska was established 
to educate the public on issues related to oil spill and on general oversight over the petroleum 
industry  (Shepherd, 2013: viii). The more frequently noted success stories that have been able to 
use the wealth that comes with natural resources to build a positive future for their populations 
with social harmony and relatively good governance include: Norway, Botswana, Chile and 
Indonesia (Shepherd, 2013: 6). Selected founding principles of some of these social oversight 
and accountability institutions are noted:  
 
 A credible and stable cadre of technocrats who hold some influence with political 
leaders was built (Shepherd, 2013:14). The rationale for the development of this body is 
that government needed to have access to informed views, either from within the 
traditional civil service, or from ad hoc advisory bodies, and to give specialists sufficient 
backing to ensure that their voice is heard (Shepherd, 2013:14). The issue was that the 
technical nature of industry would not provide transparent and clear messaging around 
this. This can be adopted in South African petroleum industry in order to ensure that 
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credible information is obtained for the purposes of HDSA transformation and also that 
technical challenges that come as a result of this complicated industry are unpacked in a 
more easy to understand language.  
 Independent oversight mechanism is encouraged. In Ghana transparency was informed 
by the establishment of an independent body to exercise oversight of the sector, along the 
lines of Ghana’s PIAC or Chad’s CCSRP (Shepherd, 2013:14). This approach would be 
useful for the South African context which has a legacy of secrecy in the petroleum 
industry. The South African legislation currently is not outspoken or considers the 
formation of an independent oversight and accountability body specifically for the 
petroleum industry. The Public Protector’s role is acknowledged, but may lack capacity 
in monitoring the petroleum industry per se, due to technical challenges or resource 
constraints. In this instance the researcher believes that Ghana offers South Africa a 
model to consider. 
 Ensuring impartial oversight and accountability. It comes as a concern to the researcher 
that the Petroleum Products Act empowers the Petroleum Controller (who is the Minister 
or anyone empowered by the Minister) to issue licences for wholesale, retail and site. In 
turn the Minister must also monitor compliance on this as well. The researcher observes 
significant ambiguities, mainly over the relationship between this body (Petroleum 
Controller) and the Minister where oversight and accountability is concerned. On the 
contrary, the Petroleum Agency of South Africa (PASA) plays a similar role in the 
upstream petroleum market and is independent of due influence by the Executive branch 
or political elite. Furthermore, Parliamentarians cannot conduct robust oversight and 
accountability on their own by only receiving information from the Executive branch 
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(mainly the Minister), especially with regard to licensing, this is with consideration of 
political ties that the two have. Lessons could be learnt in this regard in ensuring 
impartial oversight and accountability. South Africa must have empowered 
transformation agents by law in each district municipality especially where the HDSA 
communities are, to continually report to the Portfolio Committee (MPs), quarterly on 
transformation progress by petroleum industry. In turn this will break communication and 
trust barriers between communities of concern and MPs. 
 Institutional arrangements. The researcher suggests that oversight and accountability 
should be both supply-driven and demand-driven so that share-values are promoted and 
enhanced. The Portfolio Committee on Energy supply oversight and accountability, but 
this could work well if communities who demand this do the same. A notion that some 
institutions play a particular role should be diffused because everyone is accountable if 
oversight is not done promptly.   
 Importance of social capital in facilitating effective oversight and accountability. The 
researcher is of the view that the concept of oversight and accountability could be 
facilitated effectively through embracing the notion of social capital. The conviction held 
by the researcher is that social capital can foster cooperative behaviour and ease 
coordination challenges in this complex industry, especially maintenance of links with 
government’s objectives. To be frank, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 32) define social 
capital as the totality of all actual and potential resources associated with the possession 
of a lasting network of more or less institutionalised relations of knowing or respecting 
each other. In addition the researcher contends that the aim of social capital in the 
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petroleum industry of South Africa is important, since people and organisations influence 
their responses to economic opportunities as social constructs. 
 
Overall, issues that are analysed in this study are tabled to better shape future focus of oversight 
and accountability discharged by Parliamentarians over the petroleum industry of South Africa, 
so that its teeth are felt. This is with regards to HDSA transformation. In the researcher’s view, 
oversight and accountability are part of democratic growth through inclusivity in policy-making, 
implementation, monitoring and robust answerability. 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
In this current chapter, the study dealt with evaluating oversight and accountability effectiveness 
in the petroleum industry of South Africa. In so doing, the current status core of oversight and 
accountability in the petroleum industry was analysed. Data trends were developed and 
explained so that the extent to which oversight and accountability have evolved in the petroleum 
industry with regards to HDSA transformation is understood better. The DAC/ OECD evaluation 
criteria, which embody relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability was 
utilised to measure oversight and accountability effectiveness. In terms of relevance, a partial 
link between the activities performed by Parliamentarians to the petroleum industry where 
HDSA transformation is concerned was observed. This is so because focus on oversight is placed 
more on electricity. When it comes to effectiveness, the study again saw this to be done partially. 
However this changed when it comes to site visits as objectives were achieved on time. It was 
noted further that oversight and accountability could have been done efficiently if credible 
information, financial support and human capital were provided on time. This has resulted in a 
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partial impact mainly for the petroleum industry where HDSA transformation is concerned. 
When it comes to sustainability it was stated that indeed Parliamentarian activities will always be 
there in future, but minimum oversight and accountability over the petroleum industry in 
ensuring transformation may not be sustainable. To support this claim it was argued that 
oversight and accountability is basically channeled in the wrong direction in which many areas 
where HDSA transformation could be achieved received no oversight at all. For instance, the 
CSI area provides rigorous transformation that requires oversight; the public-private-partnerships 
provide ownership through procurement in which legislative oversight is hardly done at all. It 
appears from the research that Parliamentarians depend on the information that the Executive 
body or state-owned Companies give. It was discussed in the study that this information may 
lack objectivity because there is no third party who reviews it. In turn this may disallow 
constructive oversight and accountability. Lack of transparency and vested interests was 
deliberated.  Lastly, bench-making and a well-considered conceptual framework, workable for 
the petroleum industry of South Africa was discussed.  The conclusion and thoughts on further 
research is next provided.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This study critically evaluates the institutional architecture for effective policy implementation, 
oversight and accountability in the Energy Sector of South Africa, focusing on the petroleum 
industry. In so doing the researcher selected one policy objective: HDSA transformation. 
Effective policy implementation, oversight and accountability to ensure HDSA transformation 
are evaluated, utilising the DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria. The motivation for embarking on 
this study arises from the observation that, even two decades after the end of the apartheid era, 
little headway towards achieving this policy objective has been achieved in South Africa’s 
petroleum industry. A chapter-by-chapter summary of the study follows.  
 
 Chapter one: This Chapter justified the need for the overall study by exploring the 
transformation journey and revealing four challenges for investigation:  
 Unsustainable funding support;  
 Weak institutional capacity to drive the transformation agenda;  
 Poor capacity to develop and undertake programmes/projects that implement policy, 
mainly HDSA transformation;  
 Ill-focused and weak oversight and accountability over the petroleum industry.  
It was found that partial oversight and accountability has resulted, inter alia, in ineffective policy 
implementation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The study bases its argument on the 
assertion that these components should first be grounded on commitment to transparency and 
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supporting input in order to be executed effectively. Other relevant concepts were described and 
explained.  
 
Chapter Two: This Chapter explored concepts and theories that could serve to help understand 
the phenomena being explored in this study. Two theories were analysed: historical 
institutionalist and, rational choice institutionalist. The rationale for choosing these theories is 
that they have been proven to be key models for ideological debate and research in public 
administration studies. Each provides a different but complementary understanding of the nature 
of institutions. The central argument posited by historical institutionalists is that past events 
matter in designing better ideas of today. Being designed by people, these ideas, when translated 
into policy, in turn constrain people’s behaviour. The rational choice institutional theorists share 
similar sentiments, though the translation of these ideas is supported by the idea of utility 
maximisation. In this theory, institutions make rational choices based on the dynamics existing 
between principal and agent. The principal is portrayed as protagonist in idea/ policy initiation, 
giving order for the agent to implement. The agent is expected to cooperate by carrying out the 
principal’s instructions, in the process achieving the fulfilment of its own interests.  
 
The three major components of this study – policy implementation, oversight and accountability 
– were analysed within these theoretical constructs. The theoretical understanding of 
accountability suggested different things to different authors. Multiple, divergent accountability 
dichotomies, that come in horizontal, vertical and diagonal angles, were analysed, using 
examples to provide context. Central to accountability is the principal-agent interplay, wherein 
the agent must account to the principal for non-cooperative behaviour. It was argued that 
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accountability should not be seen as something that others have, i.e. in the sense of ‘power’, but 
rather should be seen as showing how players discharge their responsibilities to be accountable, 
and how this helps to improve efficiency and efficacy. Similarly, the theoretical understanding of 
oversight is centred on the principal-agent nexus, which observes the principal discharging this 
role with the aid of ex ante and ex post oversight mechanisms. It is the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms that determine whether unwarranted activities are detected and acted upon with the 
appropriate sanction.  
 
The study went on to review available literature on policy implementation and the challenges 
thereof. This review revealed two primary directions that policy implementation takes: top-
down, or bottom-up. The 4C0s (Communication, Coordination, Collaboration, and Cooperation) 
were accepted by the researcher as a foundation for this theoretical development, since they are 
critical to policy facilitation, oversight and accountability. At this point, the researcher explored 
the literature on monitoring and evaluation, in particular the difference between these two 
concepts. This resulted in the researcher focusing on the evaluation concept, being in line with 
the study. The researcher adopted the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) / Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) evaluation criteria as an analytic tool that 
fit this study. These embody relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, key 
aspects in evaluating programme/project impact.  
 
Chapter three: This Chapter explored pieces of legislation and regulations relevant to policy 
objectives, in particular with reference to HDSA in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The 
legislation and regulations explained in this chapter support the institutional theory asserting that 
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history matters in developing a better society for the present. As such, at the heart of the policies 
discussed is an attempt to redress past racial sidelining. The policy objective: HDSA 
transformation was conceived to dismantle apartheid institutionalised ideology. It was further 
noted that the petroleum industry operates within a national policy agenda, which sets out 
national goals, priorities and direction. Since the study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
institutional architecture to implement policy, and provide oversight and accountability in the 
petroleum industry, the first part of the study examined the ANC Freedom Charter whose vision 
is to ensure that all South Africans should benefit equally from the economic activities derived 
from its natural resources. The South African Constitution, as the supreme body of law, supports 
this dream and key areas relevant to this study were selectively explained. This was followed by 
a discussion of the White Paper on Energy Policy 1998, the National Energy Act of 2008, the 
Company’s Act, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act and the development of a 
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework in South Africa. It was observed that certain parts of the 
regulations are not applicable to the private sector, though this is a significant stakeholder in the 
petroleum industry. In conclusion, the potential for biased treatment and an unlevelled playing-
field is highly probable at the policy-making level.  
 
Chapter four: This Chapter discussed and analysed the current institutional architecture for 
petroleum governance. Primarily, the researcher explored those international and regional 
institutions that impact on the governance of the petroleum industry as whole. This approach was 
chosen to show that the petroleum industry of South Africa does not operate in isolation from the 
rest of the world, even though not all international guidelines are adopted in South Africa. For 
example, South Africa does not have memberships with Publish What You Pay and Extractive 
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Industries Transparency Initiative. These are both initiatives aimed at promoting transparency 
and good governance in the petroleum industry, so that natural resources can be of economic 
benefit to the poor. However, this does not mean that South Africa does not share similar 
sentiments with regards to transparency and good governance. South Africa mirrors the adoption 
of these initiatives through the King III Report on Good Corporate Governance, among others. 
Furthermore, South Africa cooperates well with regional bodies such as NEPAD and SADC, an 
indication that institutions are gaining in influence and are driving towards common ground.  
 
Institutional architecture governance in the South African front was furthermore discussed in 
relation to the three critical governance drivers that are the focus of this study: accountability, 
oversight and policy implementation, in which selected few were analysed. Where accountability 
is concerned, it became clear that both ex ante and ex post mechanisms, as carried out by the 
Auditor General and the Public Protector, are developed to ensure protection of democracy and 
enhance legitimacy. Upon investigation, it was found that these institutions encourage 
transparency through public reporting, amongst other actions. Institutions that conduct oversight, 
such as the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and the Department of Energy, were also 
investigated, and ex ante and ex post mechanisms were found to be in place. The central 
argument in this part of the study is that transparency is essential in improving governance and in 
allowing the oversight bodies to know what they are overseeing. The room for improvement 
observed is that both the accountability and oversight roles of the relevant legislative bodies are 
limited to recommendations and therefore lack teeth. Mechanisms to enforce compliance also do 
not carry weight, except through the summoning of offenders to Parliament. Policy 
implementation instruments such as the National Development Plan, and the Department of 
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Energy, among others were discussed as well. The last part analysed institutional power relations 
in the petroleum sector. Here the researcher disagrees with the theory that agents should take 
instructions from the principal and implement them. Institutional power-relations are altered 
when the principal has minimal technical know-how of the industry. In situations like this the 
industry’s agents may take the lead in policy development and direction. This in turn allows the 
agents to instruct the principals on what should be done. Given this advantage, the agent is 
positioned as an idea initiator, a point missed in the explanation given by institutional theorists. 
 
Chapter five: This Chapter described the process undertaken by the researcher in gathering 
information for this study. A qualitative research paradigm was explored as a first approach. The 
three components of this study: policy implementation, oversight and accountability, operate in a 
natural setting involving human interaction as social constructs. The researcher found that the 
aspects involving human interaction fit well into the qualitative-triangulation research paradigm 
and this was thus used in the entire research gathering process. The research suited this approach 
due to its versatility in obtaining various forms of data in order to enhance validity and 
reliability. As such, qualitative-triangulation embodying ethnographic, case study and historical 
research was used to collect information to support this study. Ethnography for example, was 
useful as it sought to understand the relationship between culture and behaviour, with culture 
referring to the beliefs, values, and attitudes of a specific group of people. Case study research 
allowed the investigation of contextual realities and the gathering information on the differences 
between what was planned and what actually occurred. Historical method was also seen to be 
useful in establishing baseline information prior to observing and interviewing participants. 
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Scheduled interviews, observation and document analysis were used as research tools. The study 
focused on the petroleum industry, rather than more broadly on the energy sector.  
 
Chapter Six: This Chapter presented findings and analysis of selected issues pertaining to the 
effectiveness of policy implementation in the petroleum industry of South Africa. Findings in 
this chapter were contextualised according to policy implementation as one of the three 
components of the study. Here the study primarily outlined and analysed the current status of 
policy implementation, in relation mainly to HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry. 
The DoE implements this policy objective through sub-programmes that facilitate licensing and 
enforce compliance. Findings in this regard are that:  
 Input is not sufficiently linked to policy objectives, leading to missed targets;  
 There is indecisiveness and lack of political will to negotiate with financial institutions to 
support HDSA Companies;  
 There are also delays in transformation and ownership by HDSA in general, as the 25% 
target has not been reach within the enactment of the Charter period;  
 Unstructured workshops and lack of proper documentation result in poor learning 
outcomes;  
 Overall, policy implementation with regard to HDSA transformation in the petroleum 
industry is deemed not effective.  
 
These findings were authenticated through the use of DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria, which 
embody relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. For example, with 
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regards to relevance the researcher noted fit of the sub-programmes for the specific sector and 
for the purposes that the policy seeks to address. When it comes to effectiveness, the DAC/ 
OECD evaluation criteria noted that policy implementation is not effective because so many 
activities did not achieve the set target of 100% within the specified time-frame. On the 
efficiency aspect, the relationship between resources and results was assessed. In this regard it 
appeared that the lack of critical resources such as funding, infrastructure and critical skills were 
the main causes of the petroleum industry lacking in efficiency. Where impact is concerned, the 
study concluded that at this stage it is minimal. It was further noted that the sub-programmes 
could only be sustainable if input challenges are addressed. Potential benchmarks for this study, 
in particular international best practice and well-considered institutional architecture aimed at the 
implementation of policy objectives were examined.  
 
Chapter seven: This Chapter dealt with evaluating oversight and accountability effectiveness in 
the petroleum industry of South Africa. An approach similar to that used in the previous chapter 
was employed in order to attain information in support of the study. The current status of 
oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry was analysed and contextualised. Data 
trends were developed in relation to oversight and accountability, in respect to ensuring HDSA 
transformation as a policy objective. The DAC/ OECD evaluation criteria, which embody 
relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability was used to validate the findings. 
Where relevance, efficiency and effectiveness are concerned, there is however a partial link 
between the activities performed by Parliamentarians and that conducted by the petroleum 
industry, particularly when it comes to HDSA transformation. This is the case because of the 
lack of oversight given to the petroleum industry over the preceding five years; thus from 2010 
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to 2014. It is only through site visits that Parliamentarians achieved the intended objectives. 
Among the obstacles, lack of credible information to assist MPs channel oversight in the right 
direction was found, financial support has been minimal, and skilled human capital took long to 
emerge. While MPs have no direct implementation role, weak oversight and accountability 
resulted in inefficiency and minimal impact on HDSA transformation. Furthermore, while the 
sustainability of the MPs’ activities is almost guaranteed, the same cannot be said about 
oversight and accountability, in particular in terms of ensuring the performance of the industry to 
transform people’s lives. This can only take place with a complete re-focus within the petroleum 
industry. The researcher also provided bench-marking and a workable conceptual framework, 
with the hope that it might be applied to improved oversight and accountability over the 
petroleum industry of South Africa.   
 
Chapter Eight: In this chapter conclusion and recommendations are drawn. This chapter also 
outlines future direction and further research recommended by the researcher. Prior to 
undertaking this journey the researcher brings forth the major intention of this study, which is ‘A 
CRITICAL EVALUATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EFFECTIVE 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ENERGY 
SECTOR OF SOUTH AFRICA: A PETROLEUM INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE’. Specific 
objectives are:  
 To develop a sound theoretical framework; 
 To discuss legislative basis for understanding institutional architecture in the petroleum 
industry; 
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 To analyse key institutional architecture, their roles and challenges in the petroleum 
industry sector, and its implication on effective policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability; 
 To examine and analyse emerging trends from data collected for improved policy 
management. In so doing, DAG/ OECD evaluation criteria to assess policy 
implementation, oversight and accountability effectiveness in relations to transformation 
targeted at HDSA is used;  
 To propose best practice and conceptual framework of well-considered institutional 
architecture construct, that will forge and strengthen strong petroleum sector vision; 
 Conclusion and recommendations. 
 
8.2 Recommendations 
The study provides some practical recommendations to improve the effectiveness of institutional 
architecture in relation to the performance of policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability, so that HDSA transformation in the petroleum industry is speedily realised and 
sustained. The first part puts forth recommendations on the improvement of policy 
implementation and the second on oversight and accountability.   
 
8.2.1 Policy implementation improvement 
a) Link policy objective to input/ enablers 
When the political landscape changed in South Africa after 1994, the petroleum industry took an 
historical institutional approach to address transformation, without adequately involving input 
and or enablers. Alignment with emerging developments and systems in order to meet the 
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desired goals is paramount if the dream to ensure HDSA transformation is to be realised. The 
delivery of services in the petroleum industry seems to be organised around sub-programmes, but 
people’s needs do not necessarily fit within the sub-programme categories. For instance, 
currently the government’s main role seems to be limited to issuing retail, wholesale and 
manufacturing licenses with no financial linkages to aspiring HDSA entrepreneurs. The 
extrapolation is that licences acquired to operate do not automatically suggest entrepreneurship 
and or transformation. One can be a licence holder but lack the means to realise this benefit. This 
means that this is rather just one small part of the bigger picture. The performance of sub-
programmes/ projects should indeed be linked to the number of licences issued within a specified 
time-frame, but the extent of transformation achieved should be included in the evaluation 
measures. In this way, the policy objective of ensuring 25% HDSA transformation within 
Charter enactment would be linked to the impact of sub-programme/projects.    
 
The process to secure funding for HDSA is currently complicated as these companies must meet 
certain requirements. In numerous situations the investor holds funds, but lacks confidence in the 
emerging HDSA companies. Furthermore, emerging entrepreneurs lack skills to demonstrate that 
they are able to sustain complex operations within the petroleum industry, and this on its own is 
an impediment that government takes little cognisance of. The inference is that the 4C0s that the 
researcher recommended in the study depends on sufficient and sustained resources such as 
human, financial and infrastructure in order to carry out the necessary work. Without proper 
resources, collaboration does not solve complex problems such as those encountered in the 
petroleum industry. It does not make sense to enforce compliance in a situation where policy 
requirements can’t be acted upon due to lack of resources. Therefore, since it is the government’s 
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mandate to ensure HDSA transformation, responsibility for the funding of HDSA companies 
should be at the apex of sub-programme/ projects. The child that government gave birth to must 
be nurtured with proper nutrition in order to achieve the envisaged results. To leave funding role 
solely to third parties does not solve financial challenges facing the emerging HDSA companies. 
However, the study recognises the argument that government cites relatedly, namely its inability 
to play a direct funding role. Another recommendation to consider is presented next. 
 
b)  Incentives for funding HDSA Companies 
The crippling factor in the petroleum industry is that funding institutions place stringent 
restrictions on specific outcomes tied to the funding, because large amounts are at stake and risk 
needs to be contained. Furthermore, investment returns are not that attractive, especially for 
emerging HDSA companies, and this reduces the chances of securing funds to sustain their 
businesses. On the other hand larger companies have an advantage that their infrastructure is 
well developed, can adjust well when the funding environment changes, and even have access to 
funding not available to emerging HDSA companies. This study holds a view that this gap 
provides more opportunities than risks.  
 
For example, bigger companies that are more powerful can go into a joint venture partnership 
with the smaller HDSA Company, with the proviso that the returns yielded as a result of this 
partnership must benefit smaller company fairly. Potential conflict can arise when the bigger 
company chooses to maximise profit as its main goal. In this regard the researcher sees a role 
that can be played by government in terms of filling a certain percentage of the profit deficit by 
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the bigger company. In this case, there is a win-win outcome if a partnership with government, 
business integration, sustainable transformation, profit maximisation and skills transferability 
can be achieved. Investing in mentoring new entrants to the industry is emphasised since it will 
greatly ensure the sustainability of transformation. In a nutshell, while the policy idea came from 
the top, its implementation process intimately involves all actors including government, 
businesses and civil society. In order to derive at this, 4C0s introduced by the researcher must be 
applied to meet the government mandate of ensuring HDSA transformation. The pictorial view 
of this argument is demonstrated in Figure 8.1.  
Figure: 8.1 Incentives for funding the HDSA Companies 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
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To note is that this partnership can be time-framed until there can be traceable development of 
the HDSA Company. Once this stage is reached the HDSA Company can be allowed to stand on 
its own feet, but in turn must continue empowering another HDSA Company. There is indeed no 
approach that does not have flaws and these must be addressed. The researcher acknowledges 
that access to funding depends on the funding agency having a sound understanding of the issue 
and why they are important. For example, if the funder is not clear about the context of work to 
be carried out, then the risk of not securing funding is high. Hence, by bringing in the approach 
recommended, the aim is to bridge this impediment by taking advantage of the well-known 
bigger company’s existing reputation. However, transparency induces confidence and this is 
discussed next.  
 
c)  Transparency and truthfulness to be improved to enhance governability 
The researcher compares transparency to a degree of truthfulness that goes beyond legislation. 
The known factor is that the petroleum industry is fraught with vested interests and this on its 
own perpetuates lack of communication and reporting. Basically, vested interests, corruption, the 
mismanagement of revenue and inability to reach common ground on policy issues are what lead 
to distrust on the part of the providers of finance, whether government or independent investors. 
These are prominent players that the petroleum industry needs dearly. Not being truthful before 
them dents any opportunity for their involvement in this business. The researcher recommends 
that for the purposes of the petroleum industry, the South African government needs to consider 
joining the likes of the EITI international initiatives demonstrated in Chapter Four of this current 
study. Joining these transparency initiatives improves legitimacy and thus the possibility of 
gaining the investor’s attention. For example Ghana joined the EITI in 2011, amending its 
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Petroleum Revenue Management Act, which allowed for the publication of records of petroleum 
receipts in the newspapers and online, among other measures. However, even though the South 
African government may have its reasons for not being part of these initiatives, it would likely 
benefit HDSA transformation, amongst other things. The important aspect of this is that where 
there is transparency there is a greater chance of wielding oversight and accountability 
effectively. Next it is shown how oversight and accountability can improve in the petroleum 
industry.  
 
8.2.2 Oversight and accountability improvement in the petroleum industry 
 
a) Give the petroleum industry undivided oversight and accountability 
Commitment to the empowerment of a broad base of previously disenfranchised South Africans 
is the responsibility of all actors in the petroleum industry, including the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committees. The research gathered through this study has found minimal oversight and 
accountability over the petroleum industry of South Africa, in particular in terms of HDSA 
transformation. Of importance to note is that this is just one part of the industry under scrutiny. 
There may be other areas that the study did not focus on, which may also be deprived of 
oversight and accountability. Certainly, legislative attention has been placed more on electricity 
generation and distribution, and this led the researcher to conclude that the petroleum industry 
did not receive adequate attention from parliament. It is understandable that the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Energy oversees a very broad sector, and hence oversight is not given 
equally to all sectors.  The researcher has a proposal in this regard.    
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Government must address legislative issues first. South Africa needs to have a ‘National 
Petroleum Act’ in order to enhance attention in this crucial industry. But what justifies this 
proposal? The National Petroleum Act should consider that the petroleum industry is upstream, 
mid-stream and downstream. The National Petroleum Act should link these three streams and 
also show explicitly how each stream must address HDSA transformation. Currently, South 
Africa demonstrates transformation of down-stream petroleum through the Liquid Fuels Charter 
and the Upstream Petroleum through the Mining Charter. All of the transformation achieved 
came through mining minerals, not mining petroleum. Consequently, the researcher was limited 
to examining transformation in the downstream petroleum industry, not the petroleum industry in 
its entirety. A similar development resulted from the Mineral Petroleum Resource Development 
Act of 2002, which seemingly governs the upstream petroleum industry, while mining is 
regulated under the Ministry of Mineral Resources. This means that both downstream and 
upstream petroleum companies are likely to receive minimal policy attention. There has been 
confusion on the part of Portfolio Committee on Energy on how to monitor this complex sector. 
The researcher therefore puts forward a workable structure that will see oversight and 
accountability over the petroleum industry improved, including policy implementation with 
regards to HDSA transformation. Effective oversight and accountability is proposed next in this 
study. 
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Figure 8.2 Proposed structure for improved oversight and accountability in the petroleum 
industry 
 
Source: Author’s configuration 
 
b) Align legislative oversight activities to the deliverables of the Executive branch 
In the researcher’s view, it appears that the PPCE, in conducting site visits, has no clear strategy 
or guidelines in terms of what it should be overseeing and holding the industry to account for. 
The PPCE took a general unfocused approach in observing whether implementing institutions 
are in-line with the PLFC. This is understandable because the National Energy Act is too broad. 
The researcher argues that visiting site areas obtains first-hand information on progress made on 
policy implementation by third parties. However, as the PPCE provides oversight and 
accountability on the Executive branch or SOEs activities, with regards to petroleum industry 
(particularly with respect to HDSA transformation) it should rather assess the following;  
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that the more these are rolled out the more transformation is achieved) 
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 Does the Executive branch conduct compliance monitoring and enforcement effectively? 
(this would fast-track compliance enforcement to standard rules) 
 Does the business and general stakeholders comply on fuel price regulation by business? 
(this will enable the Committee to learn more about the third-party service providers who 
exploit the poor in remote areas and find ways to address this) 
 Does the Executive branch conduct stakeholder awareness workshops to intended areas 
and effectively? (This would ensure general awareness is obtained by stakeholders 
regarding all of the above) 
 Track and report in the Annual Report the number of Black owners per year who venture 
in the petroleum industry. The declaration put forth is that the DOE needs to go beyond 
issuing licences since this does not necessarily translate to transformation. (This would 
assist in assessing whether the above activities are achieving the policy objective of 
ensuring HDSA transformation). The idea of tracking this within 10 years of Charter 
enactment is not ideal.  
 
By focusing on these indicators would mean that the Portfolio Committee on Energy is in-line 
with the sub-programmes that the Executive forges towards ensuring HDSA transformation. 
Furthermore, this would mean that when Parliamentarians conduct site visits are able to gather 
compliance to PLFC (HDSA transformation). The activities that the Executive conducts to 
ensure policy objectives are achieved should provide a starting point for Parliamentarians to 
conduct oversight visits and to hold the Executive to account where there is weak performance. 
However the researcher notes that, even though the PPCE has a mandate to stress focus in 
overseeing the petroleum industry with regards to policy objectives mentioned, this Committee 
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faced a huge challenge in the sense that there are many other areas that needs its attention, such 
as: electricity, nuclear, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Shale Gas, retail, wholesale and manufacturing 
sites, among many others. According to the researcher, poor concentration, coordination and 
organisation are likely to hamper this activity, because in each stream, the Committee must take 
cognisance of policy objective it seeks to fast-track before it can be established what needs 
oversight. 
 
c) More robust legislative oversight and accountability where PPPs are concerned 
As was discussed by the researcher in the previous chapter, oversight and accountability is less 
effective in a situation where there are multiple actors. Actors in the petroleum industry include 
government, private companies, state-owned Companies and general communities. The result is 
many conflicting stakeholder demands, and oversight and accountability tends to respond to 
exogenous and endogenous shocks. When oversight and accountability is induced by events 
there is less opportunity for learning in order to prevent similar occurrences. Hence, the formula: 
(A + O)
e
 = C
2
0
5
 / D1OA, adopted in this study, seeks to ensure that oversight and accountability 
is tackled from all angles so that the dream to ensure HDSA transformation is speedily more 
realised. While a published registry list is proposed by the researcher in order to expose 
offenders, also incentivizing those hard working and truthful community groups would enhance 
the level of oversight and accountability in the petroleum industry of South Africa. The 
researcher holds the view that Esprit De Corps must be induced through monetary means at the 
community level as well since this would ensure that all stakeholders work enthusiastically 
towards the common cause. In this manner oversight and answerability would have teeth both 
before and after incidents occur.  
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d) Legislative oversight and accountability must be balanced to improved Executive 
performance 
Where the ruling party holds a two-thirds majority, oversight and accountability are hardly 
effective. Many scholars have identified this issue as crippling constructive debates in 
Parliament. Most developing countries experience this challenge where there is a dominant party, 
especially where the ruling party also dominates the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. The 
concentration of the researcher is not in this political imbalance part, but the ability of the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee to oversee the petroleum industry in terms of HDSA 
transformation. Overseeing the Executive branch with regards to this does not suggests that this 
role is for the dominant party, but rather the Committee capacity in its entirety has failed. It is in 
this respect that the researcher blames lack of deep- seated knowledge of the petroleum industry, 
which deprived it effective oversight and accountability. The researcher suggests that 
Committees must be properly resourced and its research capacity must be strengthened. Its 
powers must be more than recommending and summoning offenders to Parliament, because this 
is weak oversight and accountability. It must embody punishable component especially if issues 
are understood so that the country can move forward with regards to HDSA transformation.  
Next, future research is proposed.  
 
8.3 Future Research 
The researcher has hinted in the study that there is minimal policy concentration on mid-stream 
and upstream petroleum in terms of HDSA transformation. Researchers may select one stream 
for full concentration and interrogation of the sector. With regards to the latter sector, a clue is 
the Shale-gas that has started to make some noise in the South Africa shores. For example, the 
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Shale Gas to be explored in the Karoo region is seen as next South African game-changer in 
economic terms. But the same must be uttered where HDSA transformation is concerned. Thus, 
to what extent does Shale Gas mean when it comes to HDSA transformation, what does it mean 
for the poor, is the legislation clear on this front? Future researchers may wish to ensure that 
transparency is emphasised in order to allow effective and measurable oversight and 
accountability timeously. So, legislative concentration, policy implementation, oversight and 
accountability remain relevant in this aspect as well. Concepts proposed by the researcher could 
also be integrated and developed further.  
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 APPENDIX I    
Interview Schedule 
Portfolio Committee on Energy (PPC on Energy) 
Evaluating oversight and accountability effectiveness element 
Dear respondent 
The interview questions below seek to evaluate oversight and accountability mechanisms 
effectives in relation to implementation activities and compliance of the petroleum industry on 
governance. The first part bares interview questions that focus on oversight element and the 
second part carries questions focusing on accountability. The Portfolio Committee on Energy 
(PPCE) is requested to assist in this interview so that it gives an account on its perspective as an 
oversight body in this sector. Information given on this questionnaire will assist the student in the 
completion of PhD studies in the field of Public Administration. The results given by the 
respondents will be compiled and interpreted for the same reasons. The University of the 
Western Cape School of Government has given permission to the student to conduct this 
research. There will be no need for the respondent to reveal their names. As such, participating in 
this study will not impact negatively on your job. You are kindly requested to answer all the 
questions. 
1. Element one: Evaluating Oversight effectiveness 
1.1 Identify frameworks for roles and responsibilities relating to oversight that are embedded on 
PPC on Energy, focusing mainly in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.2 Explain how these frameworks assist the PPC in effectively conduct its responsibility as 
oversight body in the petroleum industry? 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
1.3 To what extent is the PPC on Energy comply with the requirements embedded on it, 
especially in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.4 Are there any institutions that the PPC on Energy collaborate with in its oversight role in the 
petroleum industry? (i.e PetroSA has Ethics and Social Committee, DoE has Oversight on SOE’s 
unit) 
 
 
1.5 If the above answer is yes, what are the terms of reference/ systems for collaboration in 
conducting oversight in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.6 Is there any established independent oversight mechanism/ body? 
 
 
1.7 If the above answer is yes, what are shared structures, forms, norms and mandate of an 
independent oversight mechanism/ body? 
Yes No 
Yes  No 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.8 To what extent is authorities’ capacity in managing and overseeing fully, in order to analyse 
the petroleum industry that encourages good governance and transparency?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.9 There are some instances whereby policies overlap with other portfolios; in such a situation 
what the structures in place that enables PPC on Energy to remain in control of its oversight role 
over the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
1.10 Explain the main challenges related to oversight and give recommendations for your ideal 
oversight mandate that will suit the petroleum sector environment and space? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2 Element two: Evaluating effectiveness of accountability  
2.1 Identify frameworks for roles and responsibilities related to accountability that are embedded 
on PPC on Energy in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 2.2 Explain how these frameworks assist the PPC on Energy in effectively conduct its 
responsibility as an accountability body in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.3 To what extent is the PPC on Energy comply with the requirements embedded on it, 
especially in holding the petroleum industry accountable? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.4 Which other institutions that the PPC on Energy monitors and hold accountable for non-
compliance on agreed standards?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.5 Explain how the PPC on Energy treat these institutions partially in the light of vested 
interests that are rife in the petroleum industry in ensuring that all offenders are held 
accountable? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.6 What are the forums established in the sector other than PPC on Energy in which it shares 
accountability roles? 
 Yes  No 
Joint sector reviews   
Sector working committees   
 
 
 
 
 Sector ethics committees   
State other    
 
2.7 Explain the nature of collaboration between the forums and PPC on Energy, i.e monthly or 
meetings? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.8 Are there terms of reference articulating shared accountability objectives between these 
institutions? 
 
 
2.9 If the above answer is yes, please articulate. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.10 Elaborate how the petroleum industry complies with accountability objectives as expected 
by the PPC on Energy? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.11 To what extent are accountability roles embedded on PPC on Energy assists this industry in 
developing a culture of good governance and effective service delivery? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Yes  No  
 
 
 
 
 2.12 Explain the robustness of PPC on Energy’s independence and accountability systems in the 
petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.13 Are there monitoring systems that assesses the performance of PPC on Energy on its 
accountability roles? 
 
 
2.14 If the above answer is yes, explain the monitoring systems? (For example specify if there is 
a schedule for reviewing and documenting progress and specify the frequency of reviewing) 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.15 Explain the design of governance systems that guide the PPC on Energy to detect and 
prevent poor governance and ineffective service delivery in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.16 Explain the extent into which the PPC on Energy conduct domestic and external stakeholder 
workshops on accountability, in order to educate and ensure alignment? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.17 To what extent does the PPC on Energy have the capacity to manage and interpret a 
comprehensive analysis of the accountability mechanism environment? 
Yes No 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.18 To what extent is the PPC on Energy’s capacity to develop and manage accountability 
mechanisms in order to ensure formulation of clear and transparent policies and strategies? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.19 To what extent does the PPC on Energy’s capacity in developing strategies that actively 
discourage ineffective service delivery and provide channels for redress? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.20 Elaborate how the PPC on Energy ability to enforce accountability mechanisms regarding 
policy implementation effectiveness? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.21 To what extent does the PPC on Energy have capacity to create accountability mechanisms 
for monitoring and evaluation? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.22 To what extent does the PPC on Energy assesses its compliance with international 
agreements, frameworks, norms, and standards related to accountability? 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.23 Explain the challenges and opportunities in providing accountability activities for the 
petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.24 Give recommendations on the best accountability measures that you will see work in the 
petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your cooperation is highly appreciated! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX II   
Interview Schedule 
Department of Energy Oversight Unit 
Evaluating oversight and accountability effectiveness 
Dear respondent 
The questions below seeks to evaluate oversight and accountability mechanisms effectives in 
relation to implementation activities and compliance of the petroleum industry. The Department 
of Energy Oversight Unit is requested to assist in this interview so that it gives an account on its 
perspective as an oversight body in this sector. Information given on this questionnaire will assist 
the student in the completion of PhD studies in the field of Public Administration. The results 
given by the respondents will be compiled and interpreted for the same reasons. The University 
of the Western Cape School of Government has given permission to the student to conduct this 
research. There will be no need for the respondent to reveal their names. As such, participating in 
this study will not impact negatively on your job. You are kindly requested to answer all the 
questions. 
1. Element One: Evaluating effectiveness of oversight mechanisms 
1.1 Identify frameworks for roles and responsibilities relating to oversight that are embedded on 
DoE oversight unit to monitor the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.2 Explain how these frameworks assist the DoE oversight unit in effectively conduct its 
responsibility as oversight body in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 1.3 To what extent is the DoE oversight unit complies with the requirements embedded on it, 
especially in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.4 Are there any institutions that the DoE collaborate with in its oversight role in the petroleum 
industry?  
 
 
1.5 If the above answer is yes, what are the terms of reference/ systems for collaboration in 
conducting oversight in the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.6 What are the shared values, norms and standards among these institutions? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.7 What are the challenges in this collaboration/ partnership? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.8 Is there any established independent oversight mechanism/ body that oversee effectiveness of 
this collaboration? 
 
Yes No 
Yes  No 
 
 
 
 
  
1.9 If the above answer is yes, what are shared structures, forms, norms and mandate with that of 
an independent oversight mechanism/ body? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.10 To what extent do authorities’ capacity in managing and overseeing comprehensive 
situation analysis in the petroleum industry in enabling effective oversight? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.11 Explain the main challenges relating to oversight in this industry and give recommendations 
for an ideal oversight structure? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Element two: Evaluating effectiveness of accountability mechanisms 
2.1 Identify frameworks for roles and responsibilities relating to accountability that are 
embedded on DoE oversight unit in the petroleum sector? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.2 Explain how these frameworks assist the DoE in effectively conduct its responsibility as an 
oversight body in the petroleum industry? 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.3 To what extent is the DoE comply with the requirements embedded on it in terms of 
accountability, particularly the petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.4 Which other institutions that the DoE Oversight unit monitors?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.5 Explain how the DoE treat these institutions partially in the light of vested interests rife in 
this industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.6 What are the forums established in the sector other than PPC on Energy that it shares 
accountability roles with? 
 Yes  No 
Joint sector reviews   
Sector working committees   
Sector ethics committees   
State other    
 
 
 
 
 
 2.7 Explain the nature of collaboration between these forums and the DoE oversight unit in 
providing accountability roles in the petroleum industry?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.8 Are there terms of reference articulating shared accountability objectives between the 
institutions?  
 
 
2.9 If the above answer is yes, please elaborate on them? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.10 Elaborate how the petroleum industry complies with accountability objectives as expected 
by the DoE Oversight unit? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.11 To what extent are accountability roles embedded on DoE Oversight unit assists this 
industry in developing a culture of good governance and effective policy implementation? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.12 Elaborate on the monitoring systems in ensuring that the petroleum industry complies with 
good governance and policy implementation commitments? 
Yes  No  
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.13 Specify if there is a schedule for reviewing and documenting progress made in the industry 
when it comes to policy implementation and good governance. Postulate the frequency of 
reviewing? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.14 Explain the design of governance systems that guide the DoE Oversight unit to detect and 
prevent poor performance and governance? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________  
2.16 To what extent does the DoE assist institutions that are performing poor or do not comply 
with set standards? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.17 Explain the extent into which the DoE engage domestic and external stakeholders in the 
process of developing accountability mechanisms for education and alignment purposes? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.18 To what extent does the DoE oversight unit have the capacity to manage and interpret a 
comprehensive analysis of the accountability mechanism environment? 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.19 To what extent is the DoE oversight unit capacity to develop and manage accountability 
mechanisms to ensure formulation of clear and transparent policies and strategies? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.20 To what extent does the DoE oversight unit capacity in developing strategies that actively 
discourage ineffective service delivery and poor governance? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.21 To what extent does the DoE oversight unit have capacity to create accountability 
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.22 Who monitors and evaluate the implementation of accountability mechanisms? Briefly 
elaborate on the measurement criteria that are used. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.23 To what extent does the DoE assesses its compliance with international agreements, 
frameworks, norms, and standards in relation to accountability? 
 
 
 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.24 What are punishable offences in situations where there is no compliance and explain how 
this is enforced in a balanced manner, spanning the entire petroleum value-chain? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.25 Explain the challenges and opportunities in providing accountability activities to the 
petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2.26 Give recommendations on the best accountability measures that you will see work for the 
petroleum industry? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Your cooperation is highly appreciated! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX III 
Interview Schedule 
Evaluating policy implementation, oversight and accountability effectiveness  
Dear respondent 
The questions below seeks to evaluate policy implementation, oversight and accountability 
effectives in the petroleum industry in relation to Historical Disadvantaged South Africans 
(HDSA) transformation. Information given on this questionnaire will assist the student in the 
completion of PhD studies in the field of Public Administration. The results given by the 
respondents will be compiled and interpreted for the same reasons. The University of the 
Western Cape School of Government has given permission to the student to conduct this 
research. There will be no need for the respondent to reveal their names. As such, participating in 
this study will not impact negatively on your job. You are kindly requested to answer all the 
questions. 
Evaluating policy implementation effectiveness 
1. Explain the underlying reasons for lack of funding in the petroleum industry, particularly 
towards the HDSAs. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Rate the extent to which policy objective to ensure HDSA transformation in the petroleum is 
achieved.  
Rate Yes  No 
Successful   
Partially successful   
 
 
 
 
 Not successful   
 
2.1 Explain further the answer you have selected above. 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Explain the extent to which legislative oversight and accountability unlock policy 
implementation challenges in the petroleum industry of South Africa, in order to ensure HDSA 
transformation is achieved timeously.  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Your cooperation is highly appreciated! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
